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Municipal Food policy councils (FPC) are emerging across Canada. They are innovative governance 
models that fill an institutional gap by activating policy and engagement at the municipal level. 
Territorial, or city-region, food systems are the systems of innovation, which combine the goals of 
quality, health, ecology, fairness and participative democracy. Multi-level and cross-sectorial 
partnerships can help re-adjust the institutional context to enable, facilitate and champion the 
emergence of social innovations carried by civic food networks (CFNs). The process of creating an 
FPC opens a window on the food politics of a place, its actors, and history. This thesis illustrates some 
of the challenges city-regions may face by providing an in-depth case study of Montreal, Quebec. This 
thesis explores the influence of the provincial “neoliberal turn” on food planners and CFNs since 
early 2000. I highlight how neoliberalism has interacted with the institutional legacy of the "Quebec 
model". In turn, I follow the social formation of groups and coalitions that shape the regional policy 
networks from 1986 to 2016 and their interactions with public sector organizations. This work adopts a 
multi-method approach to analyze the negotiations and arrangements within the 2014-2016 Montreal 
Food Systems Action Plan. Specifically, this thesis uses an assessment tool built on the premises of 
Actor-Network Theory to evaluate whether the action plan meets the conditions for an effective 
partnership. I identify the territorial, technical and political dynamic inside and outside this hybrid 
public sector-civil society partnership to explain its eventual transition into a municipally mandated 
Food policy council.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The techno-productivist and neoliberal paradigm that has underpinned the global food regime is in 
crisis. The challenges ahead are significant: food insecurity prevails, disproportionally affecting the 
most vulnerable communities even in the world’s wealthiest countries; the planet’s natural resources 
are under mounting pressure; rural communities are being devitalized and multinational corporations 
are consolidating their hold on how people procure their food and what they eat. 
The political economy of the dominant food system, and its underlying principles, has been 
thoroughly critiqued and challenged across the world. At the end of Olivier de Schutter’s mandate1, the 
UN Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food spoke of the imperative of democratizing and 
diversifying food systems2. This leaves us with the task of identifying opportunities to shift power to 
civic food networks and re-invent the institutions of the state and the market. As policy analysts have 
shown, an institutional void persists at national levels: “whole-of-government” (MacRae, 2011), and 
“whole-of-society” (Addy et al, 2014) approaches are needed to enable the emergence of more 
sustainable, just and healthy food systems. 
Cities now host more than half of the global population but food has not traditionally been conceived 
of as an explicit part of municipal jurisdiction. They now, however, have an important responsibility to 
champion the re-localization of food systems that integrate the principles of fairness and sustainability. 
In 2015, the city of Milan launched the Urban Food Policy Pact to advocate for “an international 
protocol, engaging the largest number of world cities for the development of food systems, based on 
the principles of sustainability and social justice.”3 (MUFP, 2015). Hundreds of cities have responded 
to this call for action, including the city of Montreal, Quebec.  
City-regions are implementing strategies and instituting models of governance to improve urban food 
systems (Chapter 2). These models, referred to as local or municipal food policy councils, have been 
conceptualized as a continuum, varying in the degree of institutional commitment and the role of the 
local government (MacRae and Donahue, 2013). Food policy councils are receiving increasing 
attention as they adopt comprehensive approaches to food systems planning, open spaces for reflective 
                                                
1 United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 2008-2014 Retrieved from http://www.srfood.org/ 
2 It is worth noting that the UN Rapporteur was critical of Canada’s lack of commitment to domestic food 
2 It is worth noting that the UN Rapporteur was critical of Canada’s lack of commitment to domestic food 
security (De Schutter, 2012). 
3 An initiative of the Mayor: The road to Milan’s Food Policy <http://www.foodpolicymilano.org/en/urban-
food-policy-pact-2/>  
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policy making and integrate the experiments and concerns carried out by civic food networks (Lang, 
2005; Renting et al., 2012; Vivero Pol, 2013). As such, they are likely to have an increasing impact on 
the institutional landscape and urban food systems. New systems of governance that are participatory, 
cross-sectorial and empowered to activate municipal and regional policies represent the overarching 
condition to territorialize food systems. 
In Montreal, QC, actors in the field of food systems planning have built, for almost three decades, 
new systems of governance (Chapter 4.2). In the process, community coalitions have flourished, 
disbanded, re-organized and institutionalized to address food-related issues, such as hunger and poverty 
urban agriculture and neighbourhood markets.  The process of creating a food policy council has been 
“long and tedious”4, according to one long-time practitioner, and has faced a number of roadblocks, 
manifested through political and institutional inertia. Indeed, food systems have been 
compartmentalized in policy spaces at different levels of government. Since 2011, however, a hybrid 
public-private-collective partnership, the Plan d’action du système alimentaire équitable et durable de la 
collectivité montréalaise  (SAM)5, has been brought together to fill this institutional void and is now 
transitioning into Montreal’s upcoming, municipally mandated Food Policy Council.  
While municipalities are bound to play a greater role in food governance, they do not have 
independent jurisdiction and, in Canada, are largely dependent on provincial governments6. Canada is a 
federalized system where provincial governments have a great degree of autonomy in areas of social, 
health and agricultural spending. Among the provinces, Quebec is one of the most distinct culturally, 
linguistically and historically7 and has been sternly independent from the federal government. One of 
the purposes of this thesis is therefore to introduce English-speaking audiences to food policy and 
governance in Quebec (Chapter 4.1). Quebec has also been a front-runner in terms of food policies8, 
                                                
4 Informal interview (2015) 
5 SAM stands for Système alimentaire montréalais. In English: an action plan for a sustainable and fair food 
system of the Montreal community. 
6 Constitutionally, Canada has a relatively decentralized decision making structure. Since the end of the 
Canadian Assistance Plan (1996), provinces have even more discretionary power in terms of health, 
education and social spending. The main agricultural policy instrument, the Growing Forward program, also 
decentralizes decision making to provinces, although the federal government’s trade agenda provides an 
overarching neoliberal and productivist orientation. (De Schutteur, 2012). 
7 I do not ignore that other provinces or territories, such as Nunavut, have also a unique trajectory in terms of 
integrating a distinct cultural community into the construction of the Canadian nation-state. Observers will 
note, however, that the Indigenous lens is absent from this thesis, although Quebec has made significant 
advancements in terms of co-governance.  
8 This is particularly true in the domains of sustainable agriculture (e.g., land preservation legislation, support 
for new farmers, environmental cross-compliance mechanisms, agricultural extension services, organic 
sector programming), and local food economy (labeling schemes, land use planning, rural development), but 
is perhaps less evident in terms of nutrition policy.  
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the social and solidarity economy, and participatory governance. Yet since the early 2000s, Quebec has 
taken a decisive neoliberal turn (Lévesque, 2004; Vaillancourt, 2017), resulting in even greater 
institutional complexity. The shift towards public-private partnerships and the reform and eventual 
dissolution of regional agencies illustrate the effects provincial policy on city-region food planning 
efforts. Bouchard et al. (2005) speak of the reduction of public intervention and a greater orientation 
towards the business sector and individual citizens rather than social actors as a reflection of neo-liberal 
governance. City-region food politics represent an arena of both resistance and reproduction of these 
neo-liberal dynamics by civic food networks and planners.  
The SAM 2014-2016 action plan and the creation of the municipal-sponsored Food Policy Council in 
Montreal are central to this thesis. In order to understand how they came about, it is key, in my view, to 
analyze previous experiences that have shaped food systems planning and governance, as well as the 
evolution of the provincial context. What influence has the provincial regulatory landscape had on city-
region food governance? How have policy networks evolved over the past three decades in Montreal? 
What issues have they tried to address, and what barriers have they faced? How have these negotiations 
shaped Montreal’s current food strategy and governance? Finally, was the SAM partnership model 
successful, and if not, what were its limits?  
After introducing the reader to the Quebec context (Chapter 4.1), I provide an overview of food 
systems planning efforts and group formation over a twenty-five year period (Chapter 4.2). This serves 
to introduce the arrangements between public sector bodies and civil society actors behind the SAM at 
a time of great institutional uncertainty and provincial neoliberal reform. These multi-level dynamics 
are summarized in a timeline, available in annex 1 of this thesis (provincial, city-region, local)9. I then 
dive into the activation and implementation of the 2014-2016 SAM action plan (Chapter 5), the core 
case study behind this thesis. I combine formal and informal interviews with survey results and 
participant observation (Chapter 3) to give the reader an in-depth, descriptive analysis of the 
partnerships, policy instruments and governance infrastructure behind the action plan. Further, I look at 
the negotiation between and within public sector organizations and civil society stakeholders (Chapter 
5) to identify priority actions and project leaders. I highlight the territorial dimensions of the SAM, and 
show their effects on the city-region food system and the political landscape. The triangulation of the 
data generated across these different sources was helpful to capture different perspectives on the SAM 
partnership. These layers of analysis enable me in “narrowing down possible perspectives” (Mills, 
                                                
9 The timeline is separated into three levels, from top to bottom: provincial, city-region and civic food 
networks. The latter two are distinguished to separate the institutional and municipal bodies with 
community-based interventions and coalitions. In the narration of this thesis, I combine the two lower layers 
by focusing on their interactions and negotiations.  
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2004) on the transformations that are operating in the SAM policy network. 
The main theoretical framework that guides my methodology and analysis is Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT) (Chapter 3). I have yet to find an analysis in the English food studies literature that adopts such 
a lens to articulate city-region food governance. Instead, I build on the previous theoretical 
contributions, evaluation and field research of public health researcher Angèle Bilodeau, PhD, who 
studied stakeholder engagement and programming of the regional public health agency of Montreal in 
the field of social development and food security in 1998 and 2006. The transition of the SAM into a 
food policy council provides a suitable opportunity to assess twenty-five years of social learning, 
grassroots innovation and challenges in the policy making process. I also expand the field of food 
security to the notion of territorial, or city-region, food systems, which practitioners and organizations 
have been using more readily over the years. I have found ANT useful to engage with the messiness, 
complexity and dynamism of regional food governance, and it has also provided me with a robust 
partnership assessment tool that signals where the SAM may be facing unexpected challenges.  
This thesis, as comprehensive as I hope it to be, is one of the deliverables of my graduate research 
work. I have also completed a fifty-page evaluation report – in French – as part of my work with the 
SAM. A few introductory words on my positionality may be helpful to provide some background on 
this research.  
With a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science degree I graduated from McGill University in 2013, 
about a year after students had poured into the streets of Montreal demanding greater public investment 
in higher education and to resist so-called austerity measures. Far from being disenchanting, this wave 
of youth-led mobilization was energizing. After an internship in international development, I shifted 
my focus to local issues. I co-founded with several peers (emerging scholars, activists, volunteers, 
entrepreneurs, etc.) a food justice research-based working group, Justice alimentaire Montréal (JAM). 
Initially aimed at building a bilingual bridge between university campuses (research, curriculum, 
resources) and community groups, the JAM progressively broadened its mission as a hub for 
information sharing, building common ground and launching new initiatives with the idea “connect, 
converge, co-create”. In the span of a year, we organized a public forum (Oct. 5th, 2013 at Université 
du Québec à Montréal), a conference (Nov. 11th at Hautes Études Commerciales Montréal) and a panel 
discussion (Mar. 13th, 2014 at the Sustainable Development House, Montreal). The last event was 
explicitly exploring ways in which food was a municipal issue and asked panellists to discuss 
opportunities to get the City involved. During this time period, I was actively meeting community 
groups, including several of the coalitions and organizations that I feature in this thesis. In the hours 
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preceding my graduation ceremony from McGIll University, I was busy filming10 an interview with the 
SAM coordinator.   
We received a first round of funding from the Office of Sustainability at McGill University, for a 
part-time coordinator position, which I occupied, but were unsuccessful in receiving support from a 
para-municipal agency11. I decided instead to pursue a masters degree to continue researching food-
related issues in Montreal and build greater competency in facilitating collective action12. After 
exploring different platforms13, I inquired to the SAM coordinator whether they were willing to bring 
me in to assist in the evaluation of the action plan. The timing of my degree fitted with the SAM Action 
Plan 2014-2016 and my request was accepted. In summary, my role developed from being an activist 
and organizer to being a student and researcher, and finally to being hired as an external, part-time 
evaluator and consultant. More often than not, I have played all three roles simultaneously.  
To make my masters even thornier, I was hired during the 2015 federal elections by a national food 
sovereignty coalition, Food Secure Canada14, to make food an electoral issue in Quebec, the Maritimes 
and Canada’s North15. We believe the Eat, Think, Vote campaign was successful as the new prime 
minister listed in the open mandate letter to the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food the task of 
developing a food policy. The following year, I was tasked, as a research assistant to the Food: Locally 
Embedded, Globally Engaged (FLEdGE) research network, with conducting a federal and inter-
provincial food policy scan. As a result of this yearlong contract, I drafted several discussion papers, a 
dozen policy maps and a food and farming summary matrix16. These were finally presented in a 
workshop on the “Nitty Gritty of National Food Policy” with Rod MacRae, PhD, during Food Secure 
                                                
10 Some of the film material is available on the JAM Youtube Channel: 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCPmdm0lnCMYCBdL2sqvATpA 
11 In 2013, funding for youth-related programming was managed by the Conference of Regional Elected 
Officials (CREO), a regional agency that has since been dismantled and merged into the City of Montreal’s 
administration. The CREO was also the institutional anchor of the Feeding Montreal committee (2005-2010) 
and the SAM (2011-…), and funding the JAM may have possibly appeared redundant.  
12 I pursued an inter-departmental degree because Concordia University has a distinguished Department in 
Applied Human Sciences, which I combined with Community & Public Affairs  (Marguerite Mendell, PhD) 
and Sociology & Anthropology (Satoshi Ikeda, PhD).   
13 These included: Justice alimentaire Montréal, two food cooperatives – one rural/farming, the other 
urban/low-income consumers - and an open source tech start-up. Available on an online Prezi 
https://prezi.com/1-a1b4xb7kuw/building-the-food-commons 
14 Food Secure Canada is a civil society-based alliance of individuals and organizations aiming towards zero 
hunger, healthy and safe food, and sustainable food systems. foodsecurecanada.org  
15 Environmental justice journalist Derek Leahy was in charge of organizing in Ontario, the Prairies and British 
Columbia. 
16 The FLEdGE network is based out of Wilfrid Laurier University’s Center for Sustainable Food Systems. The 
results of the research are available on the FLEdGE website: https://fledgeresearch.ca/resources-
results/mapping-the-food-policy-landscape-in-canada/ 
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Canada’s 9th Assembly in Toronto (2016). While this research was not directly related to the evaluation 
of the SAM, it provided me with an invaluable piece of the provincial and national context that I would 
otherwise be missing, and which I have made available in this thesis.   
As these experiences suggest, my general approach to research is informed by my engagement with 
civil society. Far from being uncritical of the social institutions that shape civil society, and especially 
of the ways in which they reproduce exclusionary practices or neoliberal dogmas, I draw on them to 
generate knowledge that is relevant and useful to advance food policy. Similarly, I wish to bridge some 
of the existing gaps, most notably between my Anglophone peers and my Francophone colleagues in 
food planning in Montreal and Quebec. The concluding chapter (Chapter 6) of this thesis highlights my 
personal learning outcomes of navigating a process of institutionalization. This self-ethnographic piece 
reveals my personal construction of knowledge as an actor-network and my experience in undertaking 




















Chapter 2. Key concepts, approaches and research issues 
My thesis borrows from food studies literature in the disciplines of geography, sociology, political 
science and public policy. I introduce a number of concepts, including territorial or city-region food 
systems, urban food governance, and municipal food policy councils. Before I turn to this, I highlight 
some of the key authors that have introduced me to Quebec’s unique institutional trajectory.   
2.1. Social innovation and institutional change in Quebec 
Social innovations are defined as an “intervention initiated by social actors to respond to an aspiration, 
to satisfy a need, to bring a solution or benefit from an opportunity of action to change social 
relationships, to transform the frame of action or to propose new cultural orientations.” (Bouchard and 
Lévesque, 2012, p.133). The concept of innovation as both a process and a system was first applied to 
the spheres of science and technology, to economic development, to research and public policies (ibid, 
p. 131). Since then, the sociology of social innovation has emerged as the multi-faceted study of 
regulatory, institutional and organizational change. In the context of Quebec, the sociology of social 
innovation has rooted itself in a distinct cultural project and the renewal of the social and solidarity 
economy (Mendell and Neamtan, 2010, Bouchard and Lévesque, 2012). 
 Social innovation occurs when the macro-economic, regulatory model (state, market, civil society) 
enters a process of instability and reconfiguration. It is intimately tied to the lifecycle of the dominant 
regulatory system at play, emerging in times of crisis when social exclusion intensifies. The nebulous 
‘third sector’, or so-called civil society, functions as a fertile ground for social innovation to respond to 
needs or aspirations that are either unmet, or exacerbated, by the institutions of the state and the market. 
In Quebec, the multiple facets of social innovation have been thoroughly studied by the Research 
Center on Social Innovation (Centre de recherche sur les innovations sociales, CRISES), which acts as 
a provincial network of academics from the disciplines of public policy, social work, geography and 
sociology (Mendell and Neamtan, 2010; Lévesque, Fontan and Klein, 2014). In this thesis, I draw from 
the sociology of social innovation to explore the heterogeneity of Quebec’s institutional landscape as it 
moves from a partnership-based model in the 1980s-1990s to a neo-liberal17 model from the 2000s 
onwards (Bouchard et al., 2005; Vaillancourt 2017). Indeed, while the culture of deliberation and co-
construction between social actors (often referred to as concertation in Quebec’s community sector) 
                                                
17 “Broadly defined, neoliberalism is a global project of capital accumulation through dispossession by a 
dominant economic elite (Harvey 2005) – an economic and political ideology that eschews government 
intervention, and privileges economic rationalities, free trade, and market-based responses to environmental 
and social problems (Heynan et al .2007 ).” (Andrée, Ballamingie and Brynne Sinclair-Waters, 2014, p.1) 
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and partnership between state and civil society has somewhat persisted, they have also been re-
configured and combined by neo-liberal reform, resulting in a complex institutional landscape 
(Bouchard et al., 2005; Vaillancourt, 2017). The originality of this component of the thesis lies in 
combining Quebec’s historical regulatory configurations with food policy as a cross-sectorial domain 
of study (agriculture; nutrition; local, rural and sustainable development) (to be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3). 
 To assess a social innovation is to study its capacity to transform its institutional landscape: “In 
order to diffuse themselves in different contexts and in time, social innovations necessarily need to 
engage the institutional system in which they emerge from. The institutional environment may be more 
or less favourable or fearful to these new experimentations, especially when they question the 
outcomes and performance of different components of the institutional field.” (Bouchard and Lévesque, 
2012, p.131). There are different trajectories for social innovations: they may be interrupted or 
contained, or result in meaningful partnership that extends the reach of innovation into the fabric of 
market and the state. Social innovations operate within larger historical cycles that result, on the one 
hand, in an institutionalization of the experimentation, and on the other, in new partnerships between 
public and social actors (Lévesque et. al. 2014). We can assess the transformative reach of social 
innovations in their capacity to democratize the institutional landscape (Lévesque et. al., 2014). While 
innovations may coexist and be complementary with public programs or policies, institutions may 
remain un-thwarted in their “path dependency”, a term which refers to the inertia, status quo and 
commitment to continuity that is typical of the hierarchical aspect of government. I draw from the 
sociology of social innovation to qualify the institutionalization of new practices in the field of food 
security and how they are negotiated and contested in new models of governance, partnerships and 
inter-organizational relationships (Chapter 3).  
2.2. Territorial and city-region food systems  
A territorial food system (TFS) is comprised of a “set of agri-food supply chains that integrate 
sustainable development, that are localized on a regional geographic scope and that are coordinated by 
a territorial system of governance” (Rastoin, 2015, p. 1157). Inspired by the work of agro-economist 
Louis Malassis (1918-2007), Rastoin argues for TFS as an opportunity for rupture with the dominant 
logic of global agri-food systems. In contrast, “The actors of territorialized food systems are 
capitalized, multi-functional family-owned businesses and networked sets of small and very small agri-
food businesses” (Rastoin, 2015). A TFS, as a theoretical ‘ideal-type’, is pluri-dimensional in scope 
and is driven by values of ethics, equity, ecology, economy and participative governance. In this thesis, 
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I use the terms ‘local’ or ‘alternative’ food systems interchangeably with the notion of TFS.  
There are multiple, inter-dependent goals associated with TFS depending on the typologies used. 
For Rastoin (2015), these include: improving the nutritional and organoleptic quality of food; 
developing proximity-based supply chains; privileging family-based, very small, small and medium 
businesses; inventing new models of production that respect the health of consumers and responsibly 
manage natural resources; and finally, reducing waste across the supply chain.  
In his contributions with other authors, the benefits of TFS are structured around four types of 
positive externalities, which are social, environmental, cultural and pedagogical (Parent et al., 2016). 
Environmental externalities include sustainable farming practices and the conservation of biodiversity, 
as well as the “de-carbonization” of the supply chain. The novelty of a TFS approach is that it also 
promotes cultural diversity by maintaining traditional and region-specific agricultural and culinary 
techniques18. It highlights the importance of public education, or ‘food literacy’, especially for youth. 
The social benefits of TFS are also important. They include creating or maintaining employment, 
reinforcing social cohesion, improving health and supporting socio-professional reinsertion (Parent et 
al., 2016). In one review of the literature, social externalities are differentiated based on their outcomes 
on farmer wellbeing, local development or community wellbeing (Mundler and Laughrea, 2016, p. 34). 
In this case, farmer wellbeing includes both social and economic benefits, such as skill building, social 
recognition, women's empowerment and the revenues and added value generated by farmers’ activities. 
Community wellbeing relates to the accessibility of healthful foods and the creation of new solidarities 
between farmers and consumers.  
I address these inter-related components of TFS during my thesis. The context of the study, which 
takes place in an urban setting, brings me to emphasize the aspect of community wellbeing. 
Specifically, I borrow from the literature on community food security (CFS), a concept whose prime 
goal is “to end hunger and food insecurity” by building “communities’ capacity to meet their own food 
needs” (Winne, 2011, p.1). CFS, however, has been criticized for over-emphasizing self-help and 
community empowerment over the need for appropriate sources of income and social safety nets 
(Tarasuk, 2001; Emery et al., 2013).  
With this issue in mind, one author proposes to view food security as an operational continuum 
whereby the determinants of food security are associated with different types of interventions (Parent, 
2015, p. 34). On one end of the spectrum, we find food aid (e.g., food banks) and participatory-based 
interventions (e.g., collective kitchens, community gardens). In the middle of the continuum, the author 
                                                
18 Regional designation and labels can be legally binding to protect specificity of agri-food products and 
locality and social cohesion that produce them. 
 10 
identifies food access (e.g., combination of community services) and food provisioning practices such 
as zoning and short supply chains. Finally, macro-level determinants are linked with policy 
interventions on the dominant agri-food system and on economic and social determinants especially 
income. I address the full continuum of these interventions in Chapters 3 and 4. 
Territorial food systems are inter-disciplinary in scope. Geographers apply the notion of ‘proximity’ 
to describe TFS as encapsulating both geographic and socio-economic dimensions. Initially developed 
by Andre Torre, proximity may relate to a geographic distance between food related activities 
(production, processing, distribution) and consumption (Mundler and Rouchier, 2016, p.19). 
Depending on the authors, geographic distance may be conceived as ranging between 80 to 200 
kilometers (Boutry and Ferru, 2016, p.63). However, scholars have pointed out the limit of conceiving 
food systems in this fashion: “the most important component of the notion of distance may be in its 
symbolic and normative nature.” (Audet, et al., 2015, p.17). This is echoed in Canadian food studies 
scholar Phil Mount who looks at the values behind the ‘buy local’ movement not as one defined by 
geographic distance, but rather one that strives to reconnect producers with consumers through direct 
exchange along common goals (Mount, 2012, p. 14). 
Organized proximities, on the other hand, emphasize the coordination of a set of actors. This 
consideration may be understood as taking place vertically along the food supply chains. It is important 
to highlight that, while the ideal-type of TFS may represent an alternative scenario to global food 
systems, territorial supply chains are, in reality, hybrid, meaning that their degree of rupture with 
conventional food system varies a great deal (Margetic, 2016; Bloom and Hinrichs, 2011). For 
instance, it is not uncommon to see organically certified farmers market their products both directly to 
the consumer and via retailers (Lerman, 2012). The hybridity of the supply chains hints at the challenge 
of achieving social justice, environmental stewardship and economic viability. This tension has brought 
some to argue that the social innovative potential of neighbourhood solidarity markets in Montreal rests 
in achieving these various goals (Audet et al., 2015).  
In this thesis, I emphasize the horizontal dimension of organized proximities, whereby actors 
coordinate on the basis of their belonging to the same community and territory. The challenge for TFS 
is that they emerge in a decentralized and often fragmented way, lack recognition in traditional policy 
frameworks and therefore suffer from a coordination and institutional gap. Horizontal coordination, or 
the development of new systems of governance, stands out as a critical variable in the development of 
TFS. My work provides an overview, over a twenty to thirty year period, of how social actors and 
public sector bodies moved from working on isolated issues in the food system (food insecurity, 
agricultural land use planning, urban agriculture, neighbourhood markets) to an integrated approach 
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built around the development of TFS.  
Several international bodies have adopted the lens of TFS. TFS was underscored as a priority of the 
United Regions, an infra-state body that mirrors the United Nations with regional governments. One 
key promoter of TFS is the UNESCO Chair on World Food, which has conducted surveys of 
innovative TFS initiatives in France, the Mediterranean region, Costa Rica and Quebec (Parent et al., 
2016). The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) adapted the TFS approach by emphasizing the 
context of urbanization and the diverse demographic, geographic and economic realities of cities. This 
approach is particularly promoted in the context of the United Nations’ Urban Agenda and the Milan 
Urban Food Policy Pact 
A city-region food system (CRFS) embeds the notion of TFS within an urban setting and its peri-
urban and rural surroundings, and situates it in relation to the social functions of cities (Dubbeling et 
al., 2016). It refers not only to food systems in megacities, but also to those in small and medium-size 
towns: “City region food systems (CRFS) encompass the complex network of actors, processes and 
relations to do with food production, processing, marketing and consumption that exist in a given 
geographical region that includes a more or less concentrated urban center and its surrounding peri-
urban and rural hinterland; a regional landscape across which flows of people, goods and ecosystem 
services are managed”19. 
As in a TFS, a CRFS is a theoretical ideal-type that is sustainable and resilient, meaning that is able 
to respond and adapt to shocks. A CRFS provides a normative framework that cities should be striving 
towards. The Urban Food Policy Pact, signed by hundreds of cities across the world, is structured 
around six areas of action: an enabling environment for action (governance), sustainable diets and 
nutrition, socio-economic equity, production, supply and distribution, and waste management. As with 
TFS, governance appears as a determining factor that can both enable or restrict action in other 
domains, justifying it as my lens and analytical priority in this thesis. Before I turn to city-region food 
governance, I highlight some of the steps cities can take to address the five other policy areas.  
On the side of consumption, cities can improve diets by creating a healthier eating environment. 
Zoning by-laws can create requirements for food retailers: they can both limit the number of fast food 
outlets near schools (ASPQ, 2013), and also license permits for fresh food stands in public spaces (Mah 
et al., 2016). Several cities have piloted ‘healthy corner stores’ projects and programs to provide 
healthier food options in low-income neighbourhoods (e.g., Philadelphia20). Fiscal instruments can also 
                                                
19 http://cityregionfoodsystems.org/ 
20 Over 630 stores were participating in this program in 2012. 
http://thefoodtrust.org/uploads/media_items/healthy-corner-store-overview.original.pdf 
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be applied to tax sugar-sweetened beverages, and the revenues pooled and earmarked to subsidize 
mobile markets and fresh fruit and vegetables stands (Mah et al., 2016). In regards to socio-economic 
equity, cities can promote social solidarity and grassroots activities, participatory research, and fair 
wages (MUFP, 2015). 
On the supply side, cities can “protect and enable secure access to land” in and outside the city, 
which may require greater coherence with municipalities in its vicinity (MUFP, 2015, p. 4). Local 
governments can also implement “development impact fees” “to require landowners to pay for any 
impact their land use has on natural capital (and on other public goods and services)” (Olewiler, 2008, 
p.3). In more urbanized settings, cities can also provide long term leasing options over unoccupied 
land, reduce permitting fees, plant edible landscapes21 (trees, orchards, walls) (Harper et al., 2009, 
Cockrall-King 2016) and issue ordinances to allow sales (Mansfield and Mendez, 2013). In Boston, the 
city has made amendments to its existing regulations, specifying conditions to allow all types of 
farming, including animal husbandry (bees, hens, fish), as well as ground level and roof-level 
greenhouses (Article 89). 
In regards to food distribution, municipal agencies, schools and hospitals (the MASH sector) can 
leverage their purchasing power to prioritize foods that respond to social, environmental and health 
criteria. The MASH sector can do so by contracting accredited, small and medium size businesses with 
social missions in their requests for proposals. Toronto, for instance, has adopted a local food 
procurement policy that requires 51% of all products purchased to be to be grown in Ontario (City of 
Toronto, 2013). Cities can also invest in critical food distribution and processing infrastructure, and 
“provide policy and programme support for municipal food markets.” (MUFP, 2015, p.5). A city can 
also promote and raise awareness around food waste minimization by adopting a ‘food waste 
hierarchy’ that prioritizes human and animal consumption, before using waste as energy and compost, 
or sending it to the landfills (Prosperi et al., 2015).  
I noticed that the literature puts less emphasis on stand-alone city-region interventions than on 
fostering an enabling environment by exercising moral leadership, adopting a food systems lens in 
planning, and developing coordination mechanisms (Potchukuchi and Kaufman, 1998, Harper at al. 
2009, Freedgood and Royce, 2012, Hatfield et al. 2012, MUFP, 2015). A recurring theme is the 
capacity for previously isolated civil service functions and political leaders to coordinate with a range 
of organizations, businesses and other intermediaries to design and implement such policies. “A food 
policy council is one model that may fill the persistent institutional void in the municipal political 
                                                
21 Vancouver, off the coast of British Columbia, aims to have all of its municipal installations grow 25% of 
edible plants in their green landscaping. 
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space, given that food-related issues span public health, sustainable development, social economy, the 
food processing industry and parks and green spaces” (Audet et al., 2015, p.18). Municipalities, 
however, are embedded in larger systems of governance, ranging from county or metropolitan 
authorities, to provincial and national governments (Mansfield and Mendez, 2013). In Canada, 
municipalities remain, in large part, “instruments of the provinces, [and] do not have independent 
jurisdiction” (MacRae and Winfield, 2016, p.164), a fact which drives us to discuss Quebec’s particular 
institutional landscape in Chapter 3. 
2.3. City-region food governance  
 
One condition for the development of TFS/CRFS is the institutionalization of coordination 
mechanisms. Before I delve into what food policy councils (FPCs) look like, I apply the notion of a 
food governance triangle to identify the actors involved in city-region food governance. Initially 
applied on global, national or provincial scales, the food governance triangle model is comprised of the 
state, including local and regional governments; the market, that is all the actors within the supply 
chain; and civil society, or civic food networks (Lang, 2005; Renting et al., 2012; Vivero Pol, 2013). It 
can also include professional bodies, “who may be based within the state (environmental health 
officials) or be independent of the state (food scientists) or sit in both (nutritionists and doctors)” (Lang 
et al., 2009, p.77). This model has been used to look at “food policy as a contested space” (Seed et al., 
2012, p. 458), where structural tensions arise from the interactions between actors. Is can also be 
applied to find pathways of transition, in which case the relationships between different spheres are 
adjusted and re-oriented towards the multiple goals of TFS/CRFS (Renting et al., 2012; Vivero Pol, 
2013).  
Food governance problematizes the power asymmetries that now structure the food system, and the 
loss of people’s power over what they eat (Marsden 2000, Lang 2005). The term 'governance' 
represents a shift away from governing and top down policy implementation by the state. It is a 
problematic term, however, because it is tied to the rise of neoliberalism as a dominant political and 
economic ideology: the state is no longer the promoter of the public interest, devolving instead to 
market interests (Cobb et al., 2011, Lang et al., 2009). This is also known as the state-market duopoly 
(Bollier and Helfrich, 2012). The trend towards self-regulation, co-regulation, third party and business-
to-business certifications are representative of the failure of the prescriptive “command and control” 
and of the greater influence of dominant market players, especially in the retail sector (Havinga, 2009; 
Fuchs et al., 2009).  
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Food governance has also shifted from the national-level to the continental and global level, in 
particular since the signing of free trade agreements (Havinga, 2009). The state’s capacity to intervene 
has therefore come to increasingly rely on the market and civil society. “Governance in the food sector 
can [also] occur in the absence of direct state involvement when private and societal interests seek to 
exert forms of control within the market economy” (Lang et al., 2009, p.77). While governance implies 
the empowerment of civil society, it also insinuates a greater role for the global market and the 
disengagement of the state from its public responsibilities.  
Territorial food governance implies a shift of power from global market players and the national 
state, towards civic food networks, municipal and regional governments and a host of family owned 
and small- and medium-size businesses (producers, regional distributors, etc.) (Renting et al., 2012; 
Vivero Pol, 2013). “In a context of profound crises of market and state governance, civil society-based 
initiatives become an important source of innovation through social learning, the building of new 
capacities and by creating ‘space to manoeuvre’ for organizing food production, distribution and 
consumption differently” (Renting et al., 2012, p.298). Civic food networks may also formally or 
informally organize on a geographic or thematic basis. While geographic network are place-based (e.g., 
neighbourhood-level), thematic networks are developed on a municipal or regional basis to share 
experiences around common issues, such as student nutrition, urban agriculture and other community 
interventions models (e.g. food box programs) (MacRae and Welsh, 1998). 
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)22 and Civic Food Networks (CFNs) vary in size, mission and 
organizational structure, but are generally the ones that deal first hand with vulnerable communities 
and have, since the 1980s, been the most vocal on these issues. In a study on Canadian municipalities, 
Bissardon and Boulianne (2016) point out that individual consumer-citizens are involved only 
infrequently in food systems planning, highlighting instead the role of community intermediaries and 
coalitions in circulating these concerns. The emergence of recognizable and credible community 
spokespeople in “new political spaces for food justice” (Wekerle, 2004, p.381) might therefore appear 
as one variable in territorial food governance. The literature also provides a rich critique of alternative 
food networks and their advocates, questioning how they embody exclusionary and neoliberal practices 
(McCullagh and Santo, 2014, Caharer and Dowler, 2014, Andrée et al., 2014). 
Traditional policy frameworks generally do not recognize the activities and goals of TFS/CRFS 
(Carter-Whitney, 2008) and CFNs, suggesting a need to form new policy networks and agri-food 
governance mechanisms. This is critical for CSOs to extend their reach and build greater room for 
                                                
22 Koc et al. (2008) define the civil society organizations (CSOs) as primarily “community-based not-for-profit 
organizations working for the public interest independently of governments and the market place” (p. 125) 
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manoeuvre. As Cohen and Reynold’s study (2014) of urban agriculture in New York demonstrates, 
“new political spaces” emerge to address unresolved issues. In this context, CSOs and city planners 
may formally or informally come together to negotiate policy solutions. Mount explores the notion of 
alternative as a source of identify and democratic legitimacy that is constantly being reshaped through a 
“negotiation of accommodations” (2012, p.27). Wekerle, who has closely studied Toronto food 
politics, uses the example of the Food and Hunger Action Committee to indicate that, “A key feature of 
these initiatives is the fluid, amorphous networked characteristic of this movement that comes together 
for a particular purpose, makes recommendations, disbands, or reconfigures under another name” 
(2004, p.384). 
CFNs and CSOs may be dismissed and policy change can be contained (Lang et al., 2009). As one 
study on Montreal’s neighbourhood solidarity markets concludes, civic food innovations that attempt to 
reconcile contradictory goals (e.g. ensuring both a fair and affordable price to the farmer and the 
consumer respectively) face both financial and political “institutional lock-ins”, thereby limiting the 
full expression of these innovations (Audet et al., 2015). At the same time, city planners and policy 
makers face constraints, which can be made visible through research. In contrast with issues such as 
crime, transportation or housing, food has largely been invisible to urban planners and policy makers 
(Potchukuchi and Kaufman, 1998). After all, farming has been delimited to the countryside, and “the 
technology of transportation, refrigeration, and processing together with abundant and cheap energy 
made up for the loss of local agricultural land as cities grew” (p.216).  
Fesenfeld (2016), who has studied institutional procurement policies in Europe, suggests that high 
electoral safety is one condition for elected officials to take policy risks. Furthermore, the author 
indicates that high executive institutional capacity is also a condition to develop long-term policies. 
Institutional capacity refers here to the ability of policy makers to work with their counterparts across 
departmental siloes, to mobilize the necessary financial and human resources and to access policy 
networks that reside outside of their local government (Fesenfeld, 2016). Such undertaking may thus 
require bridging the gap between the administrative and political functions of a municipality. 
Institutional capacity is therefore understood as a set of hybrid mechanisms that reach both internally 
(cross-departmental, or political-administrative) and externally (various stakeholders). The 
development of these hybrid mechanisms is the focal point of our thesis.  
Furthermore, municipalities face fiscal pressure to address a number of issues related to poor health, 
poverty and rapid urban development. While CRFS can help planners deliver on city’s wider socio-
economic and environmental goals, food policy is fragmented among different decision-making bodies 
of local governments. Macrae and Winfield indicate to some of the jurisdictional responsibilities of 
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municipal governments as “public health, parks and recreation, planning, economic development, 
social services, (…) licensing, inspections and traditional public health nutrition” (2014, p. 33).  
The shift of power to civic food networks and local governments also entails rethinking the role of 
market actors: “For the civil society–market axis, CFNs provide examples of innovations by alternative 
systems of food provisioning, especially short food supply chains or forms of social or solidarity 
economy (…), in which material and financial exchanges in markets are increasingly subject to value-
based, ethical considerations.” (Renting et al., 2012, p.298). In Quebec, which has a strong tradition 
around the social economy, these alternative systems of food provisioning have more recently taken the 
shape of community support agriculture (the Equiterre CSA farmer’s network) and farmers’ markets.  
The role of market players is important, because TFS initiatives often face logistical issues incurred 
by their small volume and buying power (Dubbeling, 2016), which researchers have called a “socio-
technical lock-in” (Audet et al., 2015, p.9). There are many examples of social economic food ventures 
that have failed due to a lack of capacity, financial insecurity and over-reliance on government funding, 
notably in public health programming (Mah et al., 2016). Supply chain operations and provisioning 
practices require human resources with knowledge, skills and a network of relationships that the 
community sector lacks. Due to the seasonality of production in Nordic regions, providing a uniform, 
year-round supply is also a challenge (Dubbeling, 2016). These elements raise critical issues in a 
region’s ability to respond, on a long-term basis, to the demands of its market. 
The role of market-based agents is generally least understood and studied in territorial food 
governance. Actually, TFS practitioners hold negative assumptions on food distributors (Billon et al., 
2016), due to the power asymmetry of dominant retailers in the food system. In reality, food 
distributors may also include small and medium size wholesalers and suppliers specialized in the 
commercialization of regional agri-foods (Billon et al., 2016; Dubbeling, 2016). The authors point out 
that, while the daily operations and practices of food distributors are poorly known, TFS professionals 
recognize that distributors hold a position in the supply chain and an expertise that is “essential” to the 
development of TFS (Billon et al., 2016, p. 354). In North America, the term “regional food hub23” is 
used to encompass the role of the “missing middle” between producers and consumers, thereby “acting 
as an intermediary that offers to put the produce of many suppliers, growers, farmers and processors 
into the hands of retailers, food service firms, public sector buyers and procurement consortia, and/or 
direct to the final consumer.” (Morley et al., 2008, p.3).  
                                                
23 Not to be confused with the term “community food hub” which I use in this thesis to refer to a grassroots 
community organization that provides a range of complementary services, such as food skilling workshops 
(gardening, cooking, after-school program), advocacy and mobilization, markets, a food bank, etc. I do not 
use the term community food centers, which refers to an incorporated organization. See: https://cfccanada.ca/ 
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A recent study on the role of the private sector in CRFS highlights the diversity of actors engaged in 
economic and entrepreneurial activities. In the agri-food sector, businesses of different size and 
ownership models produce and provision specialized goods and services at all stages, may they be 
producers, manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, restaurants, caterers or involved in waste management. 
Interestingly, Dubbeling highlights the role of private entities in non-food-related activities: “More 
recently, players from (urban-based) non-food sectors such as water and energy companies, 
technological companies, private funds and landowners, social housing corporations and real estate are 
playing an increasingly important role.” (2016, p.8)  
2.4. Municipal food councils and plans  
 
The impetus of civic food networks to change institutions that regulate the food systems has been 
constrained by the limited responsibilities of municipal governments. The work of Kaufman and 
Potchukuchi  (1998) was a stepping-stone for the American Planning Association to develop tools and 
provide resources on how to integrate food into the cities’ policies. A team of the University of Buffalo 
researchers developed a local food policy database that illustrates the range of instruments that are 
available, including “local laws, ordinances, resolutions, motions, orders, and directives, as well as 
plans, standards, guidelines, tax exemptions and other public financing policies.”24 What does it take to 
apply the appropriate mix of policy instruments in a coherent and integrated way? As mentioned, the 
literature puts less emphasis on “stand alone” food policies than the ability to coordinate policy makers 
with policy networks, and creating an enabling environment. 
One theme that is systematically mentioned is the development of municipal food policy councils 
(FPC). In their most basic sense, food policy councils are deliberative policy spaces where stakeholders 
from different sectors come together to address issues related to the food system. “FPCs are ideal 
institutions to integrate the environmental justice and food justice movements, not only because they 
share concerns for the ecological and health consequences of the industrial food system, but also 
because they are localized forums with a great capacity for democratic participation and equitable 
social change.” (Purifoy, 2014, p.376). FPCs may conduct assessments, engage in stakeholder 
dialogue, develop joint actions and program or provide advice for policy change. Harper and colleagues 
speak of the core functions of FPCs as: “1. Serve as a forum for food systems issues, 2. Foster 
coordination between sectors, 3. Evaluate or influence policy and 4. Launch or support 
programs“ (2009, p.19).  
                                                
24 http://growingfoodconnections.org/tools-resources/policy-database/ 
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In Canada, the City of Toronto adopted the first food policy council as early as 1990. Speaking of 
the advocacy from community groups, environmentalists and public health officials, Welsh and 
MacRae (1998) review the institutionalization of the council:   
“It was decided that the TFPC should be administered as a sub-committee of the city's Board 
of Health, a standing committee of city council. This relationship provides immediate access 
to both the political machinery and preventive health care knowledge and apparatus of the 
City. The three staff persons are attached to the Department of Public Health, and their salaries 
and other TFPC expenses are paid by city council.” (p. 251). 
 
The number of food policy councils has steadily increased in the past three decades. Since the 
Toronto initiative was launched, multiple models of food policy councils have emerged. One later 
study by MacRae and Donahue (2013) surveyed 64 municipalities across Canada and assessed the 
strengths and limits of different models. They evaluate food policy councils based on the institutional 
arrangements with the municipality. They review six potential models, ranging from councils mainly 
situated in the community sector with no financial support or other ties with the municipality, to 
councils piloted from within the municipal administration. A range of hybrid models exist in between, 
depending on whether they have direct or indirect links to the city or to a secondary agency and to what 
degree the municipality assumes responsibility over their financial stability (2013). The spectrum of 
institutional arrangements is interesting because it raises the questions of how a FPC’s relationship to 
the municipal structure changes over time to build greater capacity and leverage resources. The case 
study in Chapter 5 illustrates well this dynamic because it provides an overview of the transition from a 
stakeholder-led food systems planning initiative to a municipal-sponsored food policy council.  
The authors emphasize here that skills and predictable, sustained funding are both requirements for 
FPCs: “The ideal appears to be a food policy organization whose staff and members have extensive 
knowledge of and expertise in food systems, a sophisticated approach to food system change, with 
funding that is stable and sufficient for at least a lean organizational effort.” (2013, p. 26). In another 
article, MacRae and Winfield (2016) add: “Skill levels and resources vary tremendously from one 
municipality to another. Those municipalities with the most advanced local food policy work also 
typically have sophisticated CSOs participating.” This is echoed in the work of Clayton, who has 
interviewed twelve FPCs in the United State at local, regional and state levels: “partnerships with high-
level leaders (such as policy makers and researchers) add credibility (…) increases policymaker 
awareness and FPC legitimacy – specifically with regards to engaging in food systems policy 
advocacy” (2015, p.12,). These individuals may help “tailor the efforts to the (…) local political 
context”, provide focus on priorities and goals, increase visibility and generate buy-in (2015, p.12,).  
Hatfield and colleagues, who led a research partnership with thirteen cities across the US and 
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Canada, state: “The location of a food policy program within a city’s organizational structure has a 
material impact on a program’s priorities and its effectiveness. While an increasing number of 
programs operate under the umbrella of sustainability departments, many also benefit from close ties 
with the Mayor’s Office: such ties can increase the authority behind a program and facilitate 
interactions with other city departments” (2012, p. 2). The authors mention both the administrative and 
political branch as playing a critical role in food policy councils. FPCs are subject to the shifting 
dynamics within the municipality and to electoral changes.  
Harper and colleagues admit that FPCs face a number of challenges, including receiving adequate 
funding and “working in complex political climates” (2012, p. 37). Members of FPCs can be perceived, 
for instance, as threatening the authority of elected officials or civil servants if they provide 
“unwelcome advice” (p. 38). In the context of municipal elections, an incoming local government may 
associate FPCs with the previous administration and consider it as irrelevant and ignore their proposals. 
Further, the participation of certain sectors over others can obscure important issues in the food system. 
While community food security groups are often active in the development of food strategies, food 
businesses, and distributors in particular, are absent, despite being critical intermediaries in the supply 
chain (Harper et al., 2012, Dubbeling et al., 2016). These assessments reveal several conditions for 
planning and food policy councils, such as expertise, funding, location within municipal structures and 
political support, as a backdrop from which to assess an experience of an individual municipality. 
There are other municipal models that exist outside of FPCs. Municipal food strategies are also a 
useful starting point to recognize the inter-linkages between food systems activities and the range of 
actors to engage with. Mansfield and Mendez (2013) propose the following definition:   
 “A municipal food strategy is an official plan or road map that helps city governments 
integrate a full spectrum of urban food system issues within a single policy framework that 
includes food production (typically referred to as urban agriculture (UA)), food processing, 
food distribution, food access and food waste management. A food strategy builds upon the 
work already underway to improve urban food systems, creates links between policies, 
integrates new ideas, addresses gaps, and creates a vision for the future” (p. 38) 
 
In order to analyze municipal food strategies, the authors identify structural and procedural factors. 
Structural variables (Mansfield and Mendez, 2013, p. 46) include: where the mandate to create a food 
strategy came from, who is the lead department or agency responsible for its implementation, what 
staffing support it receives, and how the food strategy is integrated into municipal policy or regulatory 
frameworks. Procedural factors include joint-actor partnerships and citizen participation mechanisms. 
In summary, they reveal who is involved, at what point in the process, and where does one’s input fit in 
(Mansfield and Mendez, 2013, p. 48). Cohen and Reynolds, whose focus is on urban agriculture in 
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New York, highlight the “significant overlap among individuals involved in both government and 
stakeholder-led policy making” (2014, p. 224). Bissardon and Boulianne explain how Canadian 
territorial governance is characterized by concertation, meaning ongoing stakeholder dialogue.  
Generally speaking, planning for a municipal food strategy entails the engagement of a range of 
stakeholders from the civil service, public health, community groups, universities and the private 
sector. Several community food assessment and regional planning tools and resources exist to guide 
such a process. Depending on the context, these planning exercises assess what is already taking place, 
both at the community and municipal level. They identify both the actors involved and the existing 
assets in the territory. These assets include existing programs and policies, as well as the social 
networks and physical infrastructure. The planning process might span several months or years and 
involve workshops, forums, panels, surveys and in-person meetings. It helps create a better 
understanding of the baseline situation, including the needs, obstacles and gaps. It may also generate a 
common vision, also known as a “food charter”, and identify short and long-term goals (Bissardon and 
Boulianne, 2016, p.335).  
 
2.5. Research problems and research questions  
This chapter introduced a number of keys concepts that guide this thesis. The focus of this research is 
how social innovations in the field of territorial/city-region food systems lead to the creation of new 
political spaces and governance mechanisms that take the shape of food policy councils or strategies. 
Specifically, I raise the question of how networks coordinate, deliberate and ultimately negotiate these 
arrangements in order to foster institutional change. In doing so, actors may combine their resources 
(expertise, financial, social capital) to drive socially innovative processes. However, these negotiations 
take place in a hybrid arena between top down policy-making and bottom up experimentation, and 
bring together actors with different institutional logics, roles and perspectives. The negotiation and 
resolution of the tensions that arise from partnership building and deliberation is an essential part of 
social innovation.  
City-regions are playing an increasing role in food governance. However, they remain, in large part, 
“instruments of the provinces, [and] do not have independent jurisdiction” (MacRae and Winfield, 
2016, p.164). Indeed, municipalities are “embedded” in larger systems of governance, ranging from 
counties or metropolis, to provinces, federal and global systems of governance (Mansfield and Mendez, 
2013). The absence of a whole-of-government approach to food at a provincial and national level (i.e., 
“joined-up” food policy) means that combine health, agriculture, rural and social policy operate in 
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siloes. This institutional void makes us appreciate once more why and how new forms of urban food 
governance are emerging. This is relevant in the context of the “Quebec Model,” particularly in the 
light of its unique historical trajectory and in the context of globalization and neo-liberalism. 
In conclusion, the following research questions capture a number of threads that I wish to investigate 
in the rest of this thesis:  
• What influence has Quebec’s provincial regulatory landscape had on city-region food 
governance?  
• How have policy networks evolved over the past three decades in Montreal? What issues have 
they tried to address, and what barriers have they faced? How have previous group formation 
and institutional arrangements shaped Montreal’s food strategy and governance?  
• How do actors negotiate their roles and relationships in the development and implementation 
of the action plan? Was the SAM partnership model successful, and if not, what were its 




Chapter 3. Methodology and data  
3.1. Introduction to Actor-Network Theory 
In order to study the development of new political spaces, the emergence of urban food governance 
mechanisms and the institutionalization of a food policy council, our research draws from the case 
study of the Montreal Food Action Plan 2014-2016, situated in the city of Montreal, Quebec. The data 
was generated from participant observations, interviews and surveys with a hybrid public-private-
collective partnership of thirty-five organizations working towards the development of sustainable, 
healthy and just food systems in the Montreal region. Specifically, I draw from my experience in 
evaluating the governance and partnership model of the 2014-2016 Montreal Food Action Plan (SAM), 
which eventually transitioned into a municipal-sponsored Food Policy Council.  
I draw from Actor Network Theory (ANT), also known as the theory of translation, to inform my 
methodology. ANT has been spearheaded by sociologists Michel Callon (1986), Bruno Latour (1987) 
and their colleagues, and was initially applied to the study of technological innovations and scientific 
research (Cressman, 2009). It has since built bridges with organizational sociology (Amblard et al., 
1996), strategic analysis (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977) and cross-sectorial partnerships (Bilodeau, 
2000). ANT has reached a large social science audience by questioning the conventions of the 
discipline: “The choice is thus clear: either we follow social theorists and begin our travel by setting up 
at the start which kind of group and level of analysis we will focus on, or we follow the actors’ own 
ways and begin our travels by the traces left behind by their activity of forming and dismantling 
groups” (Latour, 2005, p.29). 
An actor-network is heterogeneous from the outset because it refers to both human and non-human 
entities and the relationships they form: “Reducible neither to an actor alone nor to a network…An 
actor-network is simultaneously an actor whose activity is networking heterogeneous elements and a 
network that is able to redefine and transform what it is made of” (Callon, 1987, p.93, cited in 
Cressman, 2009, p.3). People, groups, and organizations all shape networks as much as textual reports 
and legislation, information and communication technologies, buildings, a bag of apples and the truck 
that transports it. The collection of these heterogeneous entities forms a sociotechnical network, or a 
dynamic system of action. As Latour (2005, p.8) suggests, “Sociologists should travel wherever new 
heterogeneous associations are made. They believed the social to be always there at their disposal, 
whereas the social is not a type of thing either visible or to be postulated. It is visible only by the traces 
it leaves (under trials) when a new associations being produced between elements which themselves are 
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in no way ‘social” (2005, p.8).  
Bilodeau and colleagues’ (2008) application of ANT to cross-sectorial public health and social 
development partnerships in Montreal, Quebec, provided a roadmap to apply ANT as both 
methodology and theory: 
“The theory of translation conceives situations as networks where actors and resources that 
participate are connected. The notion of translation refers to the continuous re-interpretation that 
actors operate in terms of their roles and the innovation they produce, starting from their 
respective interests and powers relationships, and leading to the construction of compromises. 
The theory argues that a controversy always precedes the emergence of an innovation, of a 
change, with the process of construction as the resolution of these controversies. Resolving a 
controversy is orienting actors towards a solution, a compromise that enables them to cooperate 
whilst still responding, at least partially, to their interests” (Bilodeau et al., 2002, p.6). 
 
Collective action is both a process and a result of identifying spokespeople, and of attracting new and 
existing actors, knowledge and financial resources. The mobilization of these different components 
prompts a new distribution of roles. These collective solutions are temporary compromises that respect, 
at least partially, the missions and mandates of the different actors. The combination of concurrent 
ideas and the distribution of new roles, however, raise differences and non-alignments between actors, 
encapsulated in the term “controversy”, or the confrontation of actors’ problem-frame (e.g., tensions, 
disagreements, etc.) 
The notion of translation “involves creating convergences and homologies by relating things that 
were previously different” (Callon 1981, p.211). In other words, translation refers to the process of 
building bridges, associations, equivalencies or shared understandings. “From the different languages, 
the historical genealogy of the word ‘social’ is construed first as following someone, then enrolling and 
allying, and, lastly, having something in common.” (Latour, 2005, p.6). Translation is a key step to 
resolve controversies and orient stakeholders towards collective solutions while considering their 
interests, position and power. Unlike an intermediary, which “transports meaning or force without 
transformation”, “mediators transform, translate, distort, and modify the meaning or the elements they 
are supposed to carry” (Latour, 2005, p.39). Mediators therefore can be sought after as potential 
translators and puzzle-solvers. 
Based on the previous work of Bilodeau et al. (2000, 2002, 2008), I applied a ready-to-use tool to 
assess the quality and efficacy of a given partnership between the public sector and civil society 
organizations. Indeed, as a hybrid network and coalition built around common goals, the SAM fits well 
within the framework of Actor-Network Theory. I combined the assessment tool with social network 
modelling into a survey that was communicated to the SAM partners, with a response rate of 48.5% (33 
responses). Further, I immersed myself in the SAM coalition as an evaluator and in the course of 2015-
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2016 I attended dozens of meetings, forums and activities addressing the different goals and levels of 
engagement. Finally, I conducted formal and informal interviews with the most active stakeholders, as 
well as actors involved in previous regional food planning experiences. 
3.2. Survey-based research  
3.2.1. The six conditions for effective partnership 
 
The main research tool that was used was survey-based. I applied an existing assessment tool that was 
developed by public health researchers Dr. Bilodeau and colleagues (2008, 2011) in the context of their 
study of cross-sectorial partnership in Montreal, QC. The survey aims to assess whether a given public-
civil society partnership meets six conditions for an effective partnership. An effective partnership can 
be assessed based on the dynamics of the process on the one hand (conditions 1-4), and the 
partnership’s arrangements on the other (conditions 5-6). The conditions are summarized in the table 
below.  
 
Table 1: Summary of the conditions for effective partnerships25  
 
Conditions for effective 
partnership 
Description of the condition  Number 
of items  
1. Problem-framing All the actors concerned with a common 
issue introduce their interests, perspective 
and position.  
2 
2. Interest-raising Actors are interested in strategic decisions 
early in the process, and in playing a role in 
the partnership. 
1 
3. Enrolling  Actors are brought into a position of 
negotiation and influence in the decision 
making process and accept temporary and 
negotiated roles. 
1 
4. Mobilizing Actors reach a sufficient critical mass that 
the project is credible and they are 
committed to bring in resources.  
4 
5. Levelling power 
relations 
Actors develop mechanisms and structures to 
reduce structural inequities.  
4 
6. Co-constructing Actors resolve controversies that divide them 




                                                
25 The items for each condition are available in annex 2. To see the full results of each item and conditions, see 
the appendix. 
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Each condition is divided into a number of statements. One descriptive statement is associated with 
conditions 2 and 3, two statements with condition 1, four statements with condition 4, and 5, and six 
statements for condition 6. In total, the six conditions for an effective partnership are presented into 18 
items, which are presented in annex 2 of this thesis. These items are not presented as questions, but as 
statements. For each of these statements, respondents can choose from three formulations that best 
describe their experience, each formulation corresponding to a degree of fulfillment (fully, partially or 
not at all).  
The survey was sent out in French. Once the responses were received, I compiled each of the 18 
items based on their degree of accomplishment. I then compiled the degree of accomplishment of each 
item into the six summary conditions and classified the items and conditions based on whether they 
were completely fulfilled, partially fulfilled or not at all.  
Based on previous studies, I judged that an item or condition was fulfilled if more than 70% of 
respondents identified them as such. On the other hand, we considered an item or condition was 
partially fulfilled if half of the respondents considered them so.  
I classified items that received fewer answers, indicating which items respondents were unable to 
formulate an opinion on. For the conditions that were not fully met, I conducted a sectorial breakdown 
based on whether respondents were from civil society, government agencies or others. I met with Dr. 
Bilodeau, one of the key authors behind this tool, on two occasions to discuss and analyze the results.  
3.2.2. Modeling the partnership network  
 
Actor-Network Theory echoes network analysis and visualization pertaining to the discipline of Social 
Network Analysis (SNA). “Social network analysis provides a means with which to identify and assess 
the health of strategically important networks within an organization. By making visible these 
otherwise “invisible” patterns of interaction, it becomes possible to work with important groups to 
facilitate effective collaboration.” (Cross et al., 2002, p. 41). In the context of the SAM 2014-2016 
action plan, I wished to capture the changes in the network in the SAM 2014-2016 by modelling a 
“before” and an “after” the launch of the action plan. 
The second section of the survey consisted of a grid-based response tool where respondents could 
identify whether they collaborate with others actors in the network, and if so since when. Respondents 
could choose from a series of options that were designed based on two axes, one vertical and one 
horizontal. The vertical axis indicates the name of each member of the SAM partner committee (n=36). 
The horizontal axis presents longitudinal options with the SAM action plan (2014-2016) as a reference 
point, a before (pre-2014) and after (2017-2020). For the 2014-2016, respondents could choose from 
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two options, that is, whether they started collaborating with another actor thanks to (“via”) the SAM, or 
outside of the SAM (“without”). 
In contrast with the conditions for an effective partnership, which was developed by Bilodeau and 
colleagues (2008), I designed the section of the network modelling section of the survey. I ran into a 
methodological dilemma that is worth presenting here. In its original formulation, the survey was 
designed in such a way as to capture the dynamic of the social relationships, ranging from information 
sharing to working on one or more projects together. Bilodeau and colleagues have previously used a 
typology in the shape of a continuum, ranging from information exchange and project conception, to 
planning and execution. However, being in an evaluation context with a focus on showing results, 
subsequently led me to look at whether the SAM partnership facilitated new relationships. This led me 
to privilege a four-period longitudinal analysis. 
In order to visualize the network, I first had to organize the data in such a way that the Gephi open 
source software, a social network visualization tool, could process it. The first step was to create a 
spreadsheet that would eventually identify the “nodes” in the subsequent network graphs. I assigned to 
each organization, an identification number as well as two sectorial attributes (a) social, environmental, 
economic, and (b) public network, civil society, philanthropic, public-community, private. I merged 
respondents originating from the same organization, which would eventually create a bias, as 
organizations with one or more staff involved in the SAM partnership appear more central in the 
network.  
Once I had an identification number for each organization, I developed a series of spreadsheets with 
the “edges” (or connections) based on each corresponding time period (before 2014, 2014-2016, after 
2017). All the connections identified by each respondent were then compiled and organized under two 
columns, one designated as “source” and the other as “target”, before being modeled in the software. In 
the case of the 2014-2016 database, each connection was associated with one of the two following 
attributes based on the survey answers (“via” the SAM, “without” the SAM). This characterization was 
meant to make observation whether partners recognized the Action Plan as contributing in creating new 
connections in the network. 
Once these initial steps were completed, the spreadsheets were imported into the software. In order 
to read the graphs, we formatted the layout (Force Atlas, Repulsion Strength), and ranked nodes 
according to social network metrics, such as between-ness and degree centrality26. In the end, we 
designed twelve network graphs based on time period and on sectorial attributes, available in Annexes 
                                                
26 Betweenness centrality measure the centrality of a node. Degree centrality measures the number of 
connections of a given node.  
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3 to 7. I generated other network metrics available through the software (connected components, graph 
density, average path length) (Annex 10).  
3.2.3. Sampling and responses to the survey  
 
The survey was sent to 68 of the partners on the mailing list of the SAM partners committee (Annex 9) 
in mid-March 2016. Three general reminders and individual reminders were sent. The online survey 
was left active for six weeks, until early May. The survey was self-administered and filled out online 
by participants. The survey introduction included instructions for its completion, the estimated time 
required to fill it out (20 min.) and the protocol on ethics27. 
 
The final version of the survey included 33 questions, grouped in the following sections: 
 
1. Introduction (8 questions) 
2. Graphs of the partner networks (social network analysis) and of the impact of the SAM on the 
development of the network (2 questions)  
3. Assessment of the six conditions for an effective partnership (18 questions)  
4. Open questions (5 questions) 
 
The sample was made up of the SAM coordination email list to the SAM partner committee, which is 
made up of thirty-six organizations. The selection criteria for this mailing list were therefore developed 
beforehand by the SAM, and correspond to the partner committee members, project leaders or project 
participant-experts. In order to capture the information connections and the professional aspect of the 
SAM network, I designed the survey in such a way that it was answered individually, rather than at the 
organizational level. 
  
In this sample, 33 answered for a response rate of 48.5%.  
 
Respondents’ participation levels in the SAM: 
• Coordination committee (18.7%) 
• Partner committee (59.4%) 
• Participants (25%) (i.e., respondents that are not officially members of either committee) 
  
Respondents’ activity sector  
• Public sector (40.6%) 
• Civil society authority or organization (40.6%) 
• Public-community authority; philanthropists or public-private partnerships; universities and 
research settings (6.3% each) 
 
Level of respondents’ involvement:  
                                                
27 https://goo.gl/1bqhqR 
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• Neighbourhood or borough (17.6%) 
• Municipality (23.5%) 
• Agglomeration (61.8%) 
• Metropolitan community of Montreal (11.8%) 
• Province of Quebec (26.5%) 
• Other (8.8%) 
 
The sample is considered to be sufficiently representative of the partners’ different levels, scales and 
sectors of involvement. One major cause of bias in the social network graphs was that several 
respondents belonged to the same organization. Further, because I provided the respondent with a 
limited number of actors to identify, and given the large scope of interpretation of what it means to 
“collaborate” with a partner organization, a high number of ties were recorded and the network graphs 
are extremely dense. This makes the network graphs difficult to interpret and analyze. I extracted a 
complementary graph from the evaluation report I authored: this network graph, available in Annex 11, 
was developed as part of a survey to project leaders, asking them to identify the three most involved 
partners in the actions funded in the SAM Action Plan.  
3.3. Participant observation and interviews 
The instruments in this social science toolbox – the survey –would be of limited use if I didn’t "follow 
the connections, 'follow the actors themselves'” (Latour, 2005, p. 179).  
As I show in the next chapter, the SAM is a rather complex, public-private partnership and a multi-
level initiative with different levels and degrees of stakeholder engagement. At the strategic level, the 
Regional Roundtable on Health Lifestyles (RRHL), which allocated funds from a public-private 
partnership, was comprised of a technical team (RRHL TT) and a partner committee (RRHL PC). 
Further, the SAM is comprised of both a coordination committee (SAM CC) and a partners’ committee 
(SAM PC). In the context of the 2014-2016 Action Plan, the SAM also had an operational dimension, 
structured around four objectives with their respective clusters of partners (working groups, 
committees, technical teams). 
 
1. Goal 1: Build regional capacity (coordination, mobilization, networking, representation) 
2. Goal 2: Enable physical access to healthy food – provide regional support to community food 
security initiatives 
3. Goal 3: Develop and organize supply and demand for public institutions – develop a regional 
procurement strategy for 2025 according to/based on the specific needs of public institutions. 
4. Goal 4: Support the development of urban and peri-urban agriculture – contribute to the 
respective regional action plans 
 
During the research project, I navigated within strategic and operational levels and across a number of 
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the action plan goals, each with different capacities, tasks and roles. In order to cover a large scope of 
dynamics and key actors to focus on, I participated in a number of working groups and events, and held 
both informal conversations and formal interviews with staff, project leaders and funders.  
There are three main overlapping but distinct moments in the SAM partnership: the building blocks 
of the Action Plan (Chapter 5.2.), its design and implementation (5.3), and the transition into a new 
governance structure as it received the FPC mandate from the City (5.4). In the first stage, a number of 
spaces opened up through the mobilization of SAM stakeholders. Then, a number of projects were 
funded, including pilots, events, trainings and knowledge generation (focus groups, reports, etc.). The 
third phase is more strategic, as it involves the public consultations and the transition of the SAM 
governance structure into the municipal-sponsored Food Policy Council. 
In order to analyze the data generated from the interviews, the working group meetings, the forums 
and the public consultations, I completed a matrix that outlined the interests, roles and influence of 
individual SAM stakeholders.  
3.3.1. Interviews 
Once the Ethics Review Boards validated the interview guide, I interviewed (November 2015-January 
2016) seven members of the SAM coordination committee, three of which were also sitting on the 
RRHL partner committee. These exploratory, scoping interviews were meant to (a) document the 
history of stakeholder dialogue in Montreal, (b) assess regional coordination mechanisms and (c) 
identify good practices and strategies. In retrospect, these interviews were largely introductory, 
provided background information on the SAM Action Plan and the roles and history of the main actors 
involved.  
I also held informal interviews with five other food systems practitioners. Three of these 
practitioners had been involved in institutional bodies as coordinators of previous experiments in 
regional multi-stakeholder dialogue. This includes the public health agency (1998-2003), the 
Conference of Regional Elected Officials (CREO) (2005-2010) and Québec en Forme (2008-2013). I 
conducted two other informal interviews with community leaders involved in Goals 2 (food access) and 
4 (urban agriculture), which I focus on in part 5.3.2. 
3.3.2. Public consultation and events  
During the fall of 2015, the City of Montreal launched a public consultation on the feasibility of a food 
policy council. These consultations, which took place in City Hall, were launched in September and 
took place over the span of two months. These consultations provided input in the research process as 
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memoires were drafted by over thirty organizations, which were invited to present their 
recommendations in front of the Commission on social development and diversity. I participated, in the 
context of this course, in drafting a memoire, and attended two of the four auditions held by the 
commission. All the memoires and auditions are available on the commission website, which provided 
a unique source of information.  
Observations were also generated in the context of events, forums and colloquiums. In Goal 2, for 
example, the SAM organized two forums, one in June 2015 and the other in November 2016, in the 
national library and a public health research centre respectively. These forums featured panelists, 
including community organizers, public health officials, city councillors and funders. In Goal 3, the 
conference “Changing the menu” (November 2015) brought together 400 experts from across the 
country, as well as Quebec’s Minister of Education, Higher Education and Research. I also volunteered 
at one of the four urban agriculture gatherings that took place in 2015-2016, an event that was also 
funded in the context of the SAM.  
 Finally, the SAM held four lunch-conferences on the topics of: urban agriculture, healthy corner 
stores, food waste reduction, and food systems innovations. For the first two conferences, the SAM 
invited keynote speakers from Boston and Philadelphia. I attended all of these conferences.  
 
3.3.3. Working groups on food supply and distribution  
I followed two parallel working groups that were funded through the SAM action plan to conduct 
assessments on food supply and distribution and develop strategies in the community (Goal 2: Food 
access) and the MASH28 sector (Goal 3: Institutional procurement). This provided me with the 
opportunity to develop greater proximity with project leaders and their partners. In this context, I was 
invited to contribute and participate in the discussions and in the assessment of methodologies.  
The “Report on alternative food procurement” (Goal 2), for instance, illustrates my contribution to 
the process. It mentions my role in supporting the drafting and revision of the report. I quote from the 
introductory paragraph, “Moreover, I would like to highlight the contributions of three individuals that 
contributed much throughout the process. Hugo Martorell, Emory Shaw and Caroline Marier: although 
your respective mandates obliged you to contribute one way or another, your contributions easily 
exceeded our expectations.” (RUI St Pierre, 2016, iii). On the other hand, the Report on institutional 
procurement (Goal 3) mentions my name as an observer and the coordinator of Justice alimentaire 
                                                
28 “MASH” stands for Municipal Agencies, Schools and Hospital sector. In this thesis I use the term 
institutional (or public) procurement interchangeably. 
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Montréal. In total, I participated in nine work meetings related to Goals 2 and 3. My participation in the 
urban and peri-urban agriculture streams (Goals 4-A and 4-B) during the 2014-2016 Action Plan was 
more limited (e.g. project level, events). I was, however, invited, in May 2017, to co-facilitate a 
meeting in Goal 4 to find consensus on funding arrangements for the 2017-2019 SAM action plan. 
I had initially wished to compare the two working groups on food provisioning in my thesis (Goal 2 
and 3). I eventually decided to focus on the issues where civil society was most involved and where 
consensus was perhaps more difficult to reach. In the section “Negotiating the agenda: identifying 
priority actions” (Chapter 5.3.2), I look specifically at food access (Goal 2) and urban agriculture (Goal 
4-A). The reader may weight some of the tensions inherent in collective action and innovation in the 
context of food planning in Montreal.  
3.3.4. Meetings on RRHL governance  
The provincial public-private partnership that funded the SAM 2014-2016 Action Plan planned to be 
dissolved in 2017. This provided the impetuous to launch a task force within the Regional Roundtable 
on Healthy Lifestyles (RRHL) on its future governance model, fundraising strategy and 
communications plan. In total, I participated to five working meetings on the governance within the 
RRHL. Unfortunately, each health promotion partnerships (the SAM in healthy eating and the MPA in 
physical activity) conducted their own evaluation, instead of coordinating it via the RRHL.   
 
4. Summary table of participant observation 
 
The summary table features a number of moments and spaces where I encountered different 
stakeholders in the SAM Action Plan. My participation was often dependent on an invitation and 
whether a space was opened to have a researcher-observer-participant in the room. As the table shows, 
I  was the least exposed to the spaces of SAM Coordination Committee (CC) and Goal 4 (urban and 
peri-urban agriculture). The first of these is of particular interest because it comprises the core decision-


































PC 3 5 n/a 
SAM CC 7 2 n/a 




Goal 2 1 6 meetings, 
incl. 3 focus 
groups 
2 events 
Goal 3 0 3 meetings 1 event 
Goal 4 1 1 meeting 1 event 




Total 11 interviews 23 meetings 10 events 2 consultations 
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Chapter 4. Context of emergence of territorial food governance 
in Montreal, Quebec 
 
City-region food systems (CRFS) crosscut provincial and municipal sectorial policies in the domains 
of health, education, sustainable development, regional socio-economic development, urban planning 
and agriculture and agri-food. In this chapter, I outline a multi-level analysis of food policy and 
governance in the city-region of Montreal. In order to contextualize the emergence of city-region food 
governance mechanisms, I look at the context of neoliberalism in Quebec and the changes in the 
institutional landscape. The respective legacies of Fordism (1960s-1980s), economic pluralism (1980s-
2000s) and neoliberalism (2000s-2010s) (Bouchard et al., 2005) and eventual combination result in a 
complex institutional context that regional food systems planners and civic food networks have to 
negotiate. Specifically, neoliberal-inspired public policy reform since the 2000s, and more intensely in 
2014-2015, had significant effects on food systems governance. 
After discussing macro-level policy change, I turn, in the second section, to a discussion of group 
formation (Latour, 2005) involved in the CRFS of Montreal. By group formation, I mean both “new 
political spaces” (Wekerle, 2004; Cohen and Reynolds, 2014) as well as spaces of cooperation and 
deliberation29. I conduct an overview of stakeholder deliberation in Montreal over the 1986-2012 
period to introduce the reader to the municipal food policy and governance landscape (timeline in 
annex 1). To begin, I examine how food insecurity emerged as a grassroots concern facing vulnerable 
populations following the economic downturn in the 1980s, and how the anti-hunger agenda 
progressively led to a greater involvement of the regional public health agency as an institutional 
anchor of stakeholder dialogue.  
Since the late 1990s, the integration of sustainable development has led to novel models of urban-
rural short supply chains, such as farmers markets and community supported agriculture, as well as a 
diversification of urban agricultural practices (Duchemin and Vermette, 2016). From a governance 
perspective, I document the shift of leadership over regional stakeholder dialogue from the public 
health agency to a para-municipal body, the Conference of Regional Elected Officials (CREO), which 
would eventually pilot the Montreal Food Systems Plan. Finally, in the field of agriculture, I look at the 
grassroots mobilization in the late 2000s, the launch of a public consultation in 2011 and the creation of 
a municipal urban agriculture committee (Mailhot-Leduc, 2014).   
                                                
29 In the context of the SAM, I speak of the previous experiments of regional food councils when the Regional 
public health (1998-2003) and Conference of Regional Elected Officials (2005-2010) acted as institutional 
anchors. 
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4.1. Context and history of the provincial institutional landscape  
4.1.1. The Fordist model and agricultural exceptionalism  (1960s-70s) 
 
In contrast with the rapid economic development that took place in the Western world following the 
Second World War, it was not until the 1960s that the province of Quebec overhauled and modernized 
its public institutions. The Quiet Revolution resulted in the secularization of the state, but also the 
nationalization of key segments of economic life by the francophone population (e.g. hydro-electricity). 
The Quebec variant of Fordism was built around a social contract committed to raising incomes and 
consumption, as well as a high degree of state intervention and the representation of unions (Lévesque, 
2007). Top down governance and a centralized state characterize this period. 
The modernization of the Quebec state was particularly felt in farming communities. The state 
legislated a suite of measures from the 1950s to the 1970s that coupled productivism with corporatism 
(Skogstad, 2012). A productivist policy paradigm is one that solely focuses on the economic outputs of 
agriculture and neglects rural development, community wellbeing and environmental stewardship 
(Skogstad, 2012). Legislation meant to protect farmland and farmers, for instance, were designed in 
this spirit. While farmland protection law in Quebec is one of the strongest in Canada (Connell et al., 
2016), its restrictive interpretation meant that fragmentation of land ownership was prohibited, which 
ended up accommodating large farming operations30 (CAAAQ, 2008). Corporatism on the other hand 
refers to the “organizational strength of those who produce food”, which “gave them considerable 
influence over officials in agricultural ministries” (Skogstad, 2012, p. 20). “Right to farm” legislation is 
one example, whereby producers were made legally immune from nuisance lawsuits brought by 
neighbours who were adversely affected by farming operations (noise, smell, pollution, etc.) 
(McCormally, 2007, Rajsic et al., 2012).   
The main policy pillars include the Act on the marketing of agricultural products (1956) which allows 
“producers to collectively negotiate a production and marketing contract with buyers – called a joint 
plan” (Ashraf and Konforti, 2010, p. 9). As also occurred in other provinces, four of these joint plans 
(milk, poultry, consumer eggs and hatching eggs) were organized under supply management, a system 
based on strict controls (quotas), regulated pricing and high border protection (Skogstad 2012). In 
                                                
30 For a more comprehensive critique of the Act to protect the agricultural territory (1978), I refer to Bernard 
Vachon (2011, p.27): “The Act (…) was welcomed for its fundamental merits, but quickly became the object 
of a severe and recurring critique for its permissive application in the fertile region of Montreal on the one 
hand and, on the other hand, for its insistence to protect farmland with weak agricultural potential, in areas 
that were often deserted due to agriculture and were communities suffered from under-developed.”   
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1972, the main professional body, the Union des producteurs agricoles (UPA), became the sole voice 
of farmers recognized by the government, consolidating its influence and allowing the professional 
body to collect fees from any registered farmer (Act on agricultural producers). The UPA is organized 
as a federation for each agricultural sector (e.g. dairy, poultry, etc.) and administrative region and 
remains a professional union with political clout at the provincial level. 
Agriculture was uniquely positioned during the modernization of Quebec’s institutions, which 
provided strong state support to farmers willing to mechanize and increase their production (e.g. Farm 
Income Stabilization Program31). These arrangements, however, were questioned from the 1980s 
forward, albeit by different forces. Pressures on farming organizations from globalization and trade 
liberalization increased32. This was reflected in a split between farming organizations: agricultural 
cooperatives were willing to extend their reach as a global competitor, whereas the farmers’ union 
advocated for strong border protection (Lévesque, 2014). On the other hand, proponents of multi-
functional agriculture33 made repeated calls for environmental and rural from the 1990s onwards. These 
reforms were facilitated, but also contained, by farming organizations (Montpetit and Coleman, 1999; 
Benoit, 2015). 
4.1.2. The emergence of a partner state (1980s-1990s)  
In response to the financial and economic downturn of the early 1980s, social movements (organized 
labour, citizen, women) questioned and contested the centralized, technocratic and top down provision 
of public services by the Quebec state. Popular mobilization had already gone through several waves of 
contestation successively shaped by citizen committees (1963-1969), popular groups, also known as 
autonomous service groups (1968-1973) and, from the 1980s onwards, community organizations 
(Bélanger and Lévesque, 2014). The state and community sector developed a number of arrangements 
that led to the institutionalization of health clinics, childcare services and local and regional social 
economic development intermediaries.  
                                                
31 In 2004, the FISP, with other farm insurance programs, represented 69% of direct payments to farmers, 
approximately $500 millions (CAAAQ, 2008, p.53). These programs, aimed at reducing the effects of price 
fluctuation, remain by far the main instrument in Quebec and Canadian agricultural policy (CAPI, 2011). 
32 The Agreement on Agriculture of the Uruguay Round (1983-1986) of the General Agreements on Tariffs 
and Trade, now enforced by the World Trade Organization, “limited, but did not eliminate, the ability of 
governments to intervene in agricultural markets and to treat agriculture as an exceptional sector.” (Skogstad 
2012, p.20) 
33 “Multi-functionality is an intrinsic quality of agriculture” (Mundler and Ruiz, 2015, p. 7). In other words, 
agriculture does not only produce economic outputs, but also rural, environment and social outputs. 
However, the market under-produces these other outputs, thereby justifying public intervention to reward 
farmers who do produce them, possibly beyond regulatory requirements. 
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4.1.2.1. Social and solidarity economy 
 
The economic crisis of the 1980s, in combination with other factors, resulted in the collapse of many 
cooperatives in traditional sectors, such as fisheries and food purchasing cooperatives (Lévesque, 
2014). It is in the domain of community economic development, however, that the Quebec partnership 
model is most salient (Lévesque et al., 2016). A number of community-based experiments were 
institutionalized. The successive Picotte (1992) and Chevrette (1997) reforms solicited a greater 
participation of social actors in regional development (Doucet, 2010; Lévesque, 2014). These reforms 
recognized the civil society-led Regional Development Councils (RDC) as the provincial government’s 
privileged partners in regional development.34 (Côté et al., 2005). This period features the creation of a 
number of community economic development intermediaries35.  
The field of childcare services36 is another example of an arena in which social economy and public 
intervention went hand in hand. The government launched, under the leadership of the nationalist party 
of Pauline Marois, a public payment scheme meant to increase access to not-for-profit childcare 
services to a reduced daily cost of $5 (286). This policy was the result of a decades long process of 
mobilization and experimentation (1968-78) and the incremental institutionalization of community-
based child care services (1979-95) (Lévesque, 2014).  
In the 1990s, the economic downturn contributed to the mobilization of social movements. Civil 
society organizations were convened to contribute to the Summit on the Economy and Employment 
(1995), which represented a turning point for the social and solidarity economy in Quebec. The 
community sector, labour unions and cooperatives coalesced to spearhead job creation and social 
finance in the province in a variety of sectors (i.e., social re-insertion, social housing, services to the 
elderly, etc.). “What distinguishes the social economy in Quebec, however, is its broad reach that 
extends beyond these collective enterprises to include social movements and territorial intermediaries 
                                                
34 In Montreal, the Regional Development Councils (RDC) changed into the Conference of Regional Elected 
Officials in 2004-2005 and into Concertation Montréal in 2014-15. Historically, the process of 
regionalization of Quebec policy started in 1966, when the government created both the RDC and the 
Regional Administrative Conferences (RAC). The RAC are regional administrative units situated between 
regional municipal counties and the provincial government. However, at the time, regional and rural 
development remained largely top down, centralized, and in the hands of government technocrats (Lévesque, 
2014). 
35 These include the Community development corporations (CEC), Community economic development 
corporations (CEDC) and Local development centres (LDC). These intermediaries played a critical role in 
Quebec’s system of innovation. 
36 I highlight childcare services because (1) education is a social determinant of health, and therefore of food 
security, (2) healthy promotion programs, which include nutrition education (2007-2007) target young 
children, (3) school food procurement is a variable in territorial/city-region food systems. 
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that identify themselves as part of the social economy” (Mendell and Neamtan, 2008, p.1). The social 
economy had deep roots in Quebec history, but was recognized and rejuvenated during this critical 
period of the 1980s and 1990s, a period where neo-liberalism as the predominant economic and 
political ideology that was growing globally.  
4.1.2.2. Nutrition and food security 
 
Despite the growing recognition of the social and solidarity economy and increased funding to 
community groups (Lévesque, 2014), poverty remained acute after the economic downturn of the 
1980s. “Between 1973 and 1986 (…) child poverty in Quebec increased from 16% to 30%”37. The 
urgency of this situation was voiced by anti-hunger organizations in Montreal. In response, the 
government launched the Plan Pagé (1992), which remains a targeted subsidy for school meals in low-
income neighbourhoods in urban areas. In Montreal, this subsidy represented the bulk of the school 
board’s annual food service budget (46%) (Raymont Chabot, 2006). From this moment onwards, the 
school board worked with a consortium of a dozen social economic enterprises38. Over the years, a 
relationship was negotiated between the school boards and the community sector. The latter, however, 
have more recently advocated for nutrition programs in schools that is universal in scope, meaning that 
it is in capacity to reaches all pupils.  
Anti-poverty efforts continued throughout the 1990s with the organization of historical 
demonstrations, such as Du pain et des roses in 1995 and the signing of the the Manifesto to End 
Poverty in 2000. Community groups and public health officials succeeded in convincing legislators to 
integrate food security into the Act on fighting poverty and social exclusion (2001). This resulted in the 
government funding provincial food security organizations and prioritizing food access in its public 
health plan (2003-2012) (Hamelin et al., 2002). This represented a shift away from a charity-based 
model to an autonomy-based model for food security interventions. Given its implication on food 
politics in Montreal, I dedicate some space to describing program implementation later in this chapter. 
A critical assessment of the unfolding of the provincial food security program highlights that it was 
mandated to, and contained within, public health authorities (Bilodeau, 2006). Further, macro-level 
interventions (e.g., income, allocations, tax distribution) were not sufficient to eradicate hunger. 
Finally, the change of government from a nationalist to a liberal party in 2003 changed the political 
                                                
37 Bulletin de la Table de concertation sur la faim et le développement social du Montréal Métropolitain (2009) 
À table, 10, 3. 
38 This consortium is the Collectif de la table des écoliers, which would eventually become one of the key 
partners of the Montreal Food Systems action plan 2014-2016. 
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basis for government intervention 
 
4.1.2.3. Agriculture, rural development and environmental sustainability 
 
The 1990s were also characterized by the partial accommodation of rural and environmental concerns 
into agriculture policy. A number of farming and rural organizations came together during the États 
généraux du monde rural (1991) and created a coalition to revitalize the countryside (Vachon, 2011)39. 
“Since 1997, this organization [Solidarité Rurale] is recognized as an advisory body to the government 
of Quebec with regards to rural development” (Doddrige and Senechal, 2014, p.5). Further, the 
government supported the creation of agri-food roundtables40, which “are mandated to bring together 
all actors in the food industry within a specific region” (Ashraf and Konforti 2010, p. 12). Other major 
reforms include the creation of agri-environmental research and advisory services41, in co-management 
with the UPA (Benoit, 2015). The design of agri-environmental clubs is novel and the most extensive 
in Canada: they are associated with an increase in the adoption of integrated pest management 
techniques and the development of large expanses of windbreaks to protect waterways (MacRae et al., 
2004).  
In regards to governance, researchers diverge on whether agricultural corporatism facilitated or 
inhibited the integration of environmental concerns into agriculture. When comparing Quebec’s agri-
environmental policy networks with Ontario and North Carolina, Montpetit (1999) concludes that 
Quebec has a relatively stronger environmental performance, highlighting that “far from being 
anachronistic, Quebec corporatism still enjoys a good deal of success.” Others, however, suggest that 
farming organizations have limited the adoption of significant agri-environmental reform. For instance, 
Benoit argues, “the farming profession will constitute an intermediary that filters pressures for reform 
(…) and that does not question its productivist standpoint” (2015, p. 331).  
 
 
                                                
39 Bernard Vachon’s book Le Québec rural dans tous ses états (1991) provides an overview of the economic 
and demographic de-vitalization of rural areas in Quebec.  
40 In contrast with other regions in the province, the agri-food roundtable in Montreal is dedicated to small and 
medium size businesses in the agri-food processing sector. 
41 This externalization resulted in the creation of the Réseau Agriconseils and the Institut de recherche et de 
developpement en agroenvironnement. Benoit (2015) observes that this externalization was meant to 
encourage greater financial participation from the farmers’ union.  
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4.1.3. The neoliberal turn, a rupture of the Quebec model? (2000s-2010s)  
During the 2000s and 2010s, a number of institutional arrangements that emerged from the previous 
decade were by the neoliberal logic embodied by the Quebec’s Liberal party. Social science scholars 
have even raised the question of whether the Quebec model has come to an end (Lévesque, 2004). In 
the context of Quebec, observers have noticed three types of changes: the reduction of public 
intervention, more authoritarian policies with greater influence from the business community, and the 
consultation of individual citizens instead of deliberation with larger social actors (Bouchard et al., 
2005). In this section, I focus on the pressure of fiscal reform on municipalities, cut backs and 
organizational changes in health (health care and prevention) and the stalled attempts of reforming agri-
food governance.  
4.1.3.1. Municipal and fiscal affairs 
 
The provincial government has a long history of negotiation with the City of Montreal around the 
creation of the metropolitan region (Douay, 2007). Previous efforts had been largely stalled due to 
conflicts between the central municipal administration and the suburbs over the equitable 
contribution of public services and fiscal responsibility (Douay, 2007). The provincial government’s 
fiscal pact (2000) triggered the creation of the metropolitan region (Douay, 2007). The goal was to 
gain efficiency over public services and harmonize regional policies dealing with land-use planning, 
public transportation, economic development, social housing and tax-base sharing (Wolfe, 2003). 
This resulted in a three-level governance system: “To respond to the double challenge of 
competitivity and solidarity, the government will go beyond territorial fragmentation and propose a 
new institutional landscape on three levels: the creation of a metropolitan entity, the creation of two 
large cities following municipal mergers and finally the creation of boroughs within these new 
cities.” (Douay 2007, p. 183). 
The merging of nine boroughs and seventeen suburbs into a ‘one island-one city’ (Wolfe 2003) led to 
immediate resistance to what was perceived as a loss of local government control (Tomàs and Collin, 
2005). Top down traditional metropolitan planning became secondary (Douay, 2007; Wolfe, 2003). 
When the Liberal party came into power (2003), the government adopted a referendum to reconsider 
the merger, resulting in the reconstitution of 16 municipalities on the island of Montreal in 2006, albeit 
with less power. “In Montreal, those that were former suburbs have less power than previously, but 
those that were former arrondissements are assuming responsibilities that they did not have before and 
this latter has involved an interesting decentralization of manpower from City Hall to the newly created 
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borough offices.” (Wolfe 2003, p.7). Simultaneously, the reforms recognized the power of the 
administrative city-center, with both the Urban Agglomeration of Montreal and the Metropolitan 
Community of Montreal presided over by the city-center’s Mayor.  
In 2004, the government reviewed the governance of civil society-led regional development agencies. 
Thee Regional Development Councils (CDR), which had been re-vamped from the 1997 reform were 
replaced with the Regional Conference of Elected Officials (CREO) (Act 34). This policy allocated 
more power to elected officials at the expense of civil society42 (Doucet, 2010) and cause a re-
orientation towards the business community (Lévesque, 2004). A decade later, the provincial 
government officially abolished the CREO (Act 28, 2014), halving the budget and allocating it instead 
to municipal administration (or counties, in rural areas) (Vaillancourt, 2017). This had implications on 
the legacy of the partner state: the budgetary allocation to the Local Development Centers and 
Community Economic Development Corporations were cut in half43 (Vaillancourt, 2017) 
The renegotiation of the fiscal pact between the Ministry of Territories and Municipal Affairs 
increased the overall responsibilities of municipalities, but diminished the financial resources at their 
disposal (Vaillancourt, 2017). In contrast with other regions, the CREO did not totally disappear in 
Montreal, but was integrated into the City’s administration as Concertation Montreal. These changes 
were notable given that the CREO was tasked with coordinating regional stakeholder dialogue around 
food systems planning (2005-2010) and the later visioning process for the Montreal Food Strategy 
(2011-2013).  
4.1.3.2. Health promotion and healthy eating 
 
One early indicator of the neoliberal turn in the early 2000s was in the domain of health prevention, 
which is where healthy eating interventions are situated44. “The then governing party [Parti Québecois] 
(…) loss in elections held in 2003 precipitated an audit, which indicated budget deficits, resulting in 
budget cuts to the health sector, and leaving the implementation of the public health policy 
underfunded” (Addy et. al., 2014, p.220). The budgetary constraints led to a number of public-private 
partnerships between the government and the Fondation Lucie and André Chagnon45 on the issue of 
health promotion (Québec en Forme, 2002-2017), early child development (Avenir d’enfant, 2009-
                                                
42 For Lévesque, this change also resulted in less participation from young people and women.  
43 The 18 LCD and CEDC were previously allocated a $14M budget. They were replaced by the “PME 
Montreal”, which are now fewer (6) and span larger territories. 
44 Intervention in healthy living is generally conceived as healthy eating, physical activity, and tobacco use.  
45 The FLAC was created by the founders of Vidéotron (multimedia distribution) in 1964 after the company 
was bought by Quebecor Media in 2000. 
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2019) and student achievement (Réunir Reussir, 2009-2015): “The inability of government actors to 
develop coherent public health policies that were adequately resourced and implemented led to the 
formal engagement of private sector and civil society in partnership to promote public health” (Addy et 
al 2014, p. 220).  
Changes in the health care and social services network were also noticeable. A first wave of reforms46 
in the mid-2000s abolished regional public health boards (creating instead regional public health 
agencies), merged front line services into central services and increased provincial authority and 
oversight in governing bodies (Vaillancourt, 2017). The Barette reform (Act 10) in 2014-2015 
intensified this trend with the end of regional health agencies and the fusion of public health institutions 
into larger, centralized bodies47 (Vaillancourt, 2017). The abolition of the public health agencies, which 
were responsible over matters regarding health prevention, illustrates a dual process of de-
regionalization and centralization (Vaillancourt, 2017). This is significant to Montreal; the regional 
public health authority remains one of the strongest institutional proponents of moving towards a 
municipal Food Policy Council and a driver in urban food governance through the committee on food 
security (1998-2004), Nourrir Montréal (2005-2010) and the Montreal Food Strategy (2010s). 
 
4.1.3.3. Agriculture, rural development and environmental sustainability 
 
In the agriculture and agri-food sector, the ‘neoliberal turn’ plays out in three major ways. First, 
despite the creation of new programs and novel approaches embodying the principles of territorialized 
food systems and multifunctional agriculture (Doucet, 2010; Doyon et al., 2016; Doddridge and 
Sénéchal, 2013, Benoit, 2015), only marginal funding was actually allocated to these programs (Benoit, 
2015). These programs hit a ‘financial lock-in’, notably due to the institutional commitment to existing 
farming insurance programs (MacRae, 2016). This will introduce our second point, which is the 
inability of the successive governments to reform agricultural policy instruments. Finally, the launch of 
the most recent consultation, the Food Summit illustrates a third way the neoliberal turn in Quebec 
impacts agri-food governance. 
The government launched the Commission on the future of agriculture and agri-food (2005) under the 
                                                
46 The prime minister of Quebec (2014-…), Phillipe Couillard, was the minister of health and social servies at 
the time (2003-2008) 
47 These new institutions are known as the Centres intégrés universitaires de santé et de services sociaux 
(CIUSSS) et des Centres intégrés de santé et de services sociaux (CISSS). Arguably, the centralization of 
community health services and public health authorities results in greater emphasis of curative health and a 
technocratic, top down logic at the expense of preventive health and control of health services by users and 
communities.  
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leadership of Jean Pronovost. This consultation involved wide segments of Quebec society to discuss 
agri-food policy. The final report outlines a twenty-year vision for the agriculture and agri-food sector, 
addressing the major issues of environmental stewardship, rural development and community well-
being. The Pronovost Report problematized the main governing body, the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food and Fisheries: “Participants critiqued the erosion of the leadership of the ministry of agriculture 
over the past years, its loss of expertise, its thin budgets and levers, and disproportionate attention on 
the economic aspect of its mandate” (CAAAQ, 2008, p. 30).  
For Doucet (2010), this consultation empowered the agricultural administration to diversify its 
interventions and become an active player in territorializing food systems functions and activities. The 
civil service also started playing a greater role in agri-environmental policy, by soliciting farmers to 
improve their farming practices beyond minimum regulatory requirements (Benoit, 2015). Further, the 
main governing body of agriculture launched programs in regional and provincial food labeling 
schemes48, agri-food marketing and organic sector development. In the context of the SAM Action 
Plan, two main provincial interventions are relevant: agriculture land use planning and institutional 
local food procurement49. While the instruments are novel from an inter-provincial standpoint, these 
various programs face expenditure constraints and, overall, remain quite marginal50 relative to total 
public spending in agriculture (Benoit, 2015) 
The events after the launch of the Pronovost Report continued to leave an institutional void due to a 
combination of party politics and the corporatist status quo. Once the Liberal government was re-
elected, it abandoned the nationalist party’s ‘food sovereignty’ policy51, which the Parti Québécois had 
launched during its short stay in power (2012-2014). More paradoxically, the Liberal party never 
followed through on its pre-2012 ‘vision’ for the agri-food sector, which had resulted from a round of 
discussions within the national assembly (i.e., provincial parliament). The process has been criticized 
                                                
48 Broadly speaking, there are three kinds of ‘local food’ labelling schemes in Quebec: registered designation 
of origins (product-specific and/or based on traditional knowledge or its cultural value), “Aliments du 
Quebec” (products produced or processed in the province) and regional designations (region-specific 
promotion programs implemented by the regional agri-food roundtable). 
49 The ‘strategy for positioning “Aliments du Québec” on the institutional market’ (SPAQMI) was launched in 
2013-2014. 
50 Benoit notes that the organic sector development strategy and the ‘multifunctionality program’ respectively 
represent 0,025% and 0,05% of total budgets of the ministry of agriculture.  
51 Desmarais and Wittman (2014) study the use of the term food sovereignty in Canada, a concept initially 
developed by peasant-led grassroots coalition from the Global South. In contrast, in the context of the Parti 
québécois’ agricultural policy, the term subscribes to a nationalist, sovereignist discourse and a signal of 
opposition to the federal government’s liberal trade agenda. The two antagonistic farmers unions, the Union 
des producteurs agricoles and the Union Paysanne, have also competed over the use of the term. 
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as being disjointed from the recommendations issued by the Pronovost Commission52. The Liberal 
government also abandoned the provincial rural policy and de-funded the coalition Solidarité Rurale53 
(2015) (Vaillancourt, 2017), which came to a surprise given that it “is one of the most advanced policy 
approached to promote rural development in the OECD area" (OECD, 2010, p.17)  
Furthermore, Benoit explains (2015) that the attempt to reform one of the main policy instruments, 
the farm insurance support program (FISP) under the St Pierre Commission (2011) was met with 
staunch opposition from the Union des Producteurs Agricoles54. The farmers’ union mobilized its 
political allies across the aisle to curtail policy changes and delegitimize the report. The final changes 
made to the FISP were minimal and were revoked during the Parti Québécois’s short stay in power 
(2012-2014). The professional farming body came under increasing pressure for public accountability. 
Most pressing, however, was the signing of free trade agreements (e.g. the Canada-European Union 
Trade Agreement is the most recent landmark) and the continued concentration of the market power of 
retailers. This dynamic illustrates the increasing tension between the corporatist, state assistance status 
quo and neoliberalism.  
A third episode in Quebec agri-food governance illustrates the neo-liberal turn in Quebec. In 2016, 
the Minister of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries, Pierre Paradis, launched a new round of consultation: 
the Quebec Food Summit55, which should technically result with an agri-food policy in 2018. In 
contrast with the Commission on the future of agriculture and agri-food a decade before, the Food 
Summit is segmented into three sectors: consumers, supply chain operators, and agricultural producers. 
Some critiques have questioned the legitimacy, as well as the sectorial focus of this consultation. One 
community representative is quoted in a press release, “I fear that citizens participating in good faith 
are taking part, without their knowledge, to a large marketing study whose results will be informing 
agri-food businesses operators (...)” (RCCQ, 2017). On the other hand, the main agricultural 
organization was weary of the government’s attempt to mobilize consumers as a counter balance to 
farmers’ influence. As we saw with Bouchard and colleagues, consulting with individual consumers, 
                                                
52 The Livre Vert (2011) provides an overview of the government’s vision for the sector, but was criticized by 
some social actors (e.g.,Nature Québec, Coalition SOS-Pronovost, Solidarité Rurale) for its delays, it's lack 
of orientation towards concrete action, and it's inadequate proposals for implementation.  
53 Solidarité rurale was negotiating with the Parti Québécois to renew a convention, but the agreement was not 
signed before the party lost in the elections of 2014. 
54 Dupont and Laplante (2010), two researchers from a research institute that aligns with the UPA, argued that 
the Pronovost Report embodied a “partial diagnostic, a truncated analysis” that failed to appreciate the need 
for a united farming organization in the context of market concentration in the food retail and processing 
sectors. 
55  The Quebec Food Summit webpage presents a pedagogical web interface and invites consumers to comment 
on the issues of topics of healthy eating, organic foods, certification, food waste and labeling 
https://sommetalimqc.gouv.qc.ca/ 
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instead of deliberating with social actors, is characteristic of the neo-liberal governance in Quebec. 
(Bouchard et al., 2005). 
 
4.1.4. Conclusion  
The institutional configurations of the “Quebec Model” have gone through significant changes since 
the 1960s, especially with the neoliberal turn in the 2000s forward. These dynamics directly affected 
some of the core stakeholders in the Montreal Food Systems Action Plan (2014-2016). In the health 
care sector for example, we referred to a dual process of de-regionalization of public health agencies 
and centralization of front line services (Vaillancourt, 2017). Further, the Quebec en Forme public-
private partnership (2006-2017) dictated the time horizon of the Montreal Food Systems Action Plan, 
as well as the resources available. Meanwhile, in agriculture and rural development, the call for reform 
by the Pronovost Report remained largely contained due to budgetary constraints, a corporatist status 
quo, and the individualization of consultative mechanisms in a context of globalization of food 
governance.  
In the case of municipal affairs, the negotiation of the fiscal pact was a key driver of the negotiation 
between Montreal, its suburbs and the provincial government to create the metropolitan region (Douay, 
2007). The reform embodied a traditional approach to metropolitan planning from the top and, 
following the mergers and de-fusions of boroughs and suburbs, lead to a decentralization of 
responsibilities to boroughs (Wolfe, 2003). More recently, the institutional anchor of the Montreal 
Food Systems Action Plan and other community economic development intermediaries saw budgets 
cut in half, leading again to a number of mergers.  
Actors in the field of city-region food systems planning in Montreal negotiate with the institutional 
and policy legacy of Fordism, economic pluralism and neoliberalism and the sectorial and top down 
delivery of provincial priorities. There are, however, a number of dynamics that contribute to cross-
sectorial action and territorial food systems planning. The public health agencies took the lead to 
deliver healthy food access programs with community groups, while the public private partnership 
Québec en Forme56 built momentum in promoting healthy eating. The Ministry of Agriculture, Food 
and Fisheries (MAFF) has also diversified its interventions in agriculture, and particularly in 
                                                
56 The entrepreneurial, network-oriented dimension of QEF’s work provided a more dynamic approach  the 
bureaucratic logic of government policy. Further, Addy (2014, p.225), notes: “interviews of local partnership 
groups in Quebec suggest (…) an initial ambivalence towards the Chagnon Foundation and Quebec en 
Forme, as private funding sources, has improved, given positive experiences that some communities have 
experienced through repeated interactions with these funding sources over years”.  
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agricultural land use planning (Doyon et al. 2016), which appear to embody a territorial food systems 
approach and contribute to understanding the food policy context of Montreal.  
 
4.2. The evolution of city-region food governance  
The neoliberalisation of Quebec’s regulatory model provides the backdrop from which we can 
analyze the emergence of spaces of regional cooperation in food in Montreal, QC. The negotiation 
around the creation of a food policy council is the result of thirty years of regional coordination 
between civil society organizations and civic food networks, public health authorities and various 
municipal and para-municipal agencies. These spaces, often politicized, are intimately tied to the 
culture of stakeholder deliberation (i.e., concertation), and have taken the shape of roundtables, 
committees and coalitions, which eventually played out as key intermediaries (or “spokespeople” in the 
language of Actor-Network Theory) in the Montreal Food Systems Action Plan. I highlight that, 
despite the emergence of these political and cooperation spaces, the municipality’s involvement 
remains partial and an “institutional void” has persisted over time (Audet et al., 2015, p.18).  
In the context of this thesis, I start with mobilization of civic food networks around an anti-hunger 
and anti-poverty agenda in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  The provincial anti-poverty plan (2001) led 
to a greater involvement of public health authorities, but also a delegation of municipal responsibilities 
to boroughs. In 2005, the mandate for regional coordination was transferred from the public health 
agency to the Conference of Regional Elected Officials (CREO) (Bertrand and Thérien, 2004), a hybrid 
para-municipal organization. This change of role did not result, however, in a greater involvement of 
municipal representatives. In parallel, political spaces continued to diversify to integrate concerns of 
sustainable development into urban planning and socio-economic development.  
4.2.1. From food insecurity to community empowerment    
4.2.1.1. The emergence of an anti-hunger agenda 
 
In the 1980s, community food relief services multiplied in response to the economic downturn and 
marginalization of large segment of Quebec society (e.g., manufacturing sector). Food relief had, until 
then, been limited exclusively to religious institutions. Food banks quickly organized the regional 
distribution of food donations through a network of regional hubs (the Moissons), which served more 
than 900 community groups by 1996 (Échette, 2000). Community organizers and religious groups 
planned a number of forums to share good practices that went beyond charity by empowering users as 
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political actors57. In 1991, anti-hunger and anti-poverty groups coalesced around the Taskforce on 
Hunger for Metropolitan Montreal to advocate for a greater social safety net and the adoption of food 
security policies by pubic authorities (Bilodeau, 2000; Vansintjan, 2015). This roundtable became a 
hub and promoter of community empowerment models throughout the 1990s, such as school meal 
programs, collective kitchens and consumers buyers clubs58. These initiatives generally emphasize self-
help, mutual support and food skills (e.g., professional insertion.) The Taskforce’s orientation towards 
public policy became more pronounced a decade later (e.g. Act on poverty and social inclusion in 
2001; Pronovost Commission in 2006-08, etc.) 
In 1990, the municipality of Montreal incubated the Nourrir Montréal (Feeding Montreal) committee 
as part of its ‘healthy cities’59 initiative. During the next five years, community groups continued to 
extend their advocacy in this committee. From the perspective of community organizations, the work 
was largely stalled by the public institution's reluctance to recognize the contribution and expertise 
developed through their respective community coalitions. The Taskforce on Hunger argued that it 
played a unique role in coordinating community organizations, sharing best practices, providing 
training opportunities to community workers and empowering food bank users, and advocated that 
public authorities should support it.60  
From the perspective of regional public health practitioners, poverty was so acute that the food 
emergency agenda dominated the space of stakeholder dialogue (Bertrand and Thérien, 2004). 
Organizations that provided food relief activities expected and solicited more support: human 
resources, equipment or funding; in short, anything to alleviate the growing issue of hunger (Harper et 
al., 2009). However, the members of the roundtable, which apparently included unions, the 
municipality, and food distributors, were either unable or unwilling to meet this need (Bertrand and 
Thérien, 2004). The Nourrir Montréal committee progressive dissolved, “In the absence of dedicated 
programs, organizations withdrew little by little” (Bertrand and Thérien 2004). 
In contrast with Toronto, where the municipality was involved (via the public health agency) in the 
early developments of a food policy council, the focus of the City of Montreal remained project-
                                                
57 One of the first spokesperson of the coalition was a vocal Jesuit that drew from liberation theology and Paolo 
Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970).  
58 These various interventions organized on a regional and provincial level, e.g., Collectif de la Table des 
écoliers (school meals), Regroupement des cuisines collectives du Québec (collective kitchens), and the 
Regroupement des magasins partage de l’île de Montréal (holiday-season food baskets) 
59 “Healthy cities” has been promoted as part of the Ottawa Charter on Health Promotion (1986) as a prism for 
local governments to create healthier and more active urban environments. In 1990, Montreal joined the 
Réseau québécois des ville et villages en santé (Mailhot-Leduc, 2014). 
60 http://faim-developpement.ca/organisation/historique/ Since the 1990s, the Taskforce on Hunger published 
regularly through newsletters. 
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based61. For example, the Magasins Partage62 received support from the city through funding, space 
and annual donation campaigns. “After working on school food programs, it was the Magasins 
partage. The Taskforce organized the first three campaigns; we went to get the support of the Montreal 
Mayor to do that. We went to get Mayor Doré, the Table asked him to get involved, and through the 
Mayor Doré we went to get the support of the city”63. In 1994, members of the Nourrir Montréal 
committee started reorienting their efforts towards the development of a municipal food security policy, 
but the committee was dissolved after the election of a new municipal administration. “The committee 
stopped simply because it wasn’t in the city’s priorities. It was a priority of the former administration, 
so the new one was against it. It’s as simple as that…”64. 
During this first period (1986-1995), the volunteer and community sectors raised the alarm on the 
increasing role of food relief services. Community groups coalesced in neighbourhood roundtables 
(Longtin and Rochman, 2015), as well as in regional and provincial organizations (Bilodeau, 2006). 
The Taskforce on Hunger played a critical role in bringing together civic food networks at the regional 
level and addressing the differences between food charity- and food autonomy-based initiatives. Two 
spaces persisted until 1994-95: one was solely community-driven (the Taskforce), and the other served 
as the interface with public sector bodies (Nourrir Montreal). While this pattern persisted with time, 
new mechanisms for community consultation were developed. These include various types of 
municipal consultations, as well as neighbourhood roundtables. As public health became the 
institutional anchor on food security, it created its own intermediary spaces (committees, roundtables, 
etc.) to coordinate with the education, social services and community sectors at a regional, 
agglomeration level. 
Although the City had technically initiated Nourrir Montreal committee, the latter was situated at an 
arms-length of the local government. To my knowledge, no other policies, with the exception of small 
grants and the promotion of donation-drives, were enacted as a result of its work. As one informant 
says, “Institutions didn’t have the room for manoeuvre; they don’t have political manoeuvre. There 
were civil servants that could support initiatives, but they couldn’t go much further than that. (…) 
That’s why the Taskforce was important. We supported networking, but obviously the institutions have 
funding, and we don’t, which very quickly made them key actors. That said, they also have limits. It’s 
                                                
61 In contrast with Toronto, public health in Montreal is not embedded within the municipal administration. 
62 The bulk of their activities are two donation drives; one at the beginning of the school year and another 
during the end-of-year holidays. Users pay a subsidized, symbolic cost and can ‘shop’ in ad hoc stores 
situated in community centres. 
63 Interview, coordination committee (2015). 
64 Ibid. 
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normal, we can’t expect it to be like the Taskforce with its advocacy agenda. We work under certain 
parameters”65.  
4.2.1.2. The positioning of public health authorities  
 
The dissolution of the Nourrir Montreal committee left a coordination void that the regional public 
health agency would come to fill over the following decade. In 1997, the agency received pilot funding 
from the Ministry of Health and Social Services (MHSS) to lead regional planning and convene 
community groups, researchers, school boards and the city, under the umbrella of the Committee of 
partners for the development of food security66. Bilodeau and colleagues (2002, p.13) indicate:  
“Having reached out to a large span of actors in the field around a regional [food security] 
policy that still had to be defined, the RPHA [Regional public health agency] endorsed its 
role as a mobilizer. The actors concerned by the issue were convened and the theoretical, 
ideological and political issues put on the table. The demonstration of the differences 
favoured the emergence of zones of convergence. The actors, whatever their position, 
managed to insert themselves in a continuum of local and regional action in favour of food 
security67. By convening this significant mass of actors, including some of them most 
progressive in the field, the RPHA reinforced its credibility as a mediator, despite, or 
maybe thanks to, its weak experience in the field.” 
 
The collaboration instilled in the committee provided additional credibility and influence to the RPHA, 
which joined the community coalition to promote food autonomy activities and local networks and 
raise awareness around the limits of food banks (Bilodeau, 2006). The shift of the RPHA 
“corresponded with a change from a medical approach to food focused on behavioural problems to a 
social development discourse looking at health inequities”68. The membership of the committee, 
however, remained largely circumscribed to community actors on one hand, and funders69 on the other.  
The involvement of the regional public agency in the field of food security caught the attention of 
senior officials in the MHSS, eventually leading to greater investment in projects and research. New 
knowledge was generated on the impacts, and limits of community food interventions (Rouffignat et 
al., 1996; 2001) and the scope of food insecurity in the province (ISQ, 2000)70 As the anti-poverty 
movement grew in the late 1990s, Hamelin and Bolduc (2003) used Kingdon’s theory on policy 
                                                
65 Ibid. 
66 Comité des partenaires pour le développement de la sécuité alimentaire. 
67 The development of a local-regional continuum of intervention in the field of food security echoes André-
Anne Parents’ (2015) model introduced in the conceptual chapter. This model features, in ascending order: 
food charity-based interventions; food autonomy; food access; food provisioning; the agri-food system; 
social determinants of health.  
68 Informal interview (2015) 
69 Funders include both public sector organization and private charities.  
70 Questions addressing food insecurity are included in public health surveys in 1998  
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windows71 to explain how community and public health policy entrepreneurs (people with time, 
resource and influence to change policy), advocated the integration of food security into the Act on 
poverty and social inclusion. It was finally included in the second draft of the legislative proposal 
(Hamelin and Bolduc, 2003). “I invited Wayne Robert, an influential person in the Toronto Food 
Policy Council, to interview him on CBC. Several of us undertook actions to influence the Ministry of 
Health and Social Services.”72 
After this law had passed73, a one-time envelope of $10 million was transferred to regional public 
health authorities to fund food autonomy activities (75%) and the core mission of food charity groups 
(25%) (MSSS, 2008). This consolidated the role of Montreal’s regional public healthy authority as a 
funder, producing a tension that was highlighted by one informant: “Public health became a funder at 
the beginning of the 2000s. There was resistance from the community sector, which needed funding for 
its core mission, not projects. We defined specific objectives in the health sector, and we would tell 
them [the community sector] that they could design the process. Even with that, the community sector 
saw it as top down.”74 
The evaluation of this program indicated the limited participation of community groups in provincial 
planning and the containment of food security within the public health sector75 (Bilodeau, 2006). 
Observers also noted misalignments in funding conditions: the program required projects to be 
developed by community roundtables, but funding could only be allocated to and managed by 
individual community groups registered with the Ministry Health and Social Service. This had the 
effect of giving undue influence to particular groups at the local level and therefore feeding a sense of 
competition over funding (Bilodeau, 2006). The prioritization of community planning over service 
delivery was also a source tension. The community sector argued that community organizers of health 
clinics were already tasked with the coordination of neighbourhood roundtables, proposing instead that 
additional funding should be channelled to respond to the chronic shortage of resources for activities on 
the ground (Bilodeau, 2006). Disagreements over funding in food security in Montreal have continued 
                                                
71 MacRae and Winfield (2016) also highlight this approach, which argues that policy opportunities open once 
there is an alignment between three ‘policy streams’: the problem stream, the policy/ solution stream, and the 
political stream.  
72 Informal interview (2015) 
73 The government also partnered with two provincial food security organizations with both core and project 
funding: the association of food banks and the association of collective kitchens.  
74 Ibid. 
75 In British Columbia, where the impetus for policy change was framed from a health perspective, and not an 
anti-poverty standpoint, food security programming was integrated as a core program of the Health Ministry, 
as well as in the Ministry of Agriculture (School fruit and vegetable snack program; Farmers market 
nutrition and coupon program) and the Ministry of Employment and Income Assistance (Food skills for 
families program) (Seed et al., 2012).  
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since (Audet et al., 2015), being emblematic of the community sector’s relationship to the state. 
4.1.2.3. The emergence of the neighbourhood intermediaries.  
 
In the early 2000s, the City of Montreal became a new decision maker in fighting poverty and social 
exclusion. This had the effect of progressively institutionalizing a social development76 policy agenda. 
This is the policy domain where food security will come to be situated. Once the Act on poverty and 
social inclusion (2001) was passed and the Montreal Summit of 2002 took place, the city reached an 
eight-year agreement with the province to allocate funding to boroughs to support community groups. 
The city also launched an integrated urban revitalization initiative (Revitalisation urbaine integé), 
which represents yet another attempt to build local capacity for community economic development.  
Moreover, a tri-partite funding partnership was reached between the City of Montreal, the regional 
public health agency and a community foundation (Centraide/United Way) to ensure core funding to 
neighbourhood roundtables, or Tables de quartier77. This is still regarded as one of the strongest 
institutional innovations in the domain of social development in Montreal (Longtin and Rochman, 
2015) as it has provided place-based forums in twenty-nine neighbourhoods to plan, coordinate and 
execute cross-sectorial actions. Over the years, these neighbourhood-level roundtables have built 
capacity for groups and public institutions to coordinate around different facets of food systems 
planning (greening, food security, urban planning). 
There is a degree of heterogeneity between local social development networks depending on the 
context and history of each neighbourhood, but also on funding arrangements. Some components and 
systems continue operating in siloes (Longtin and Rochman, 2015). Despite the creation of cross-
sectorial, neighbourhood roundtables, autonomous thematic and issue-specific committees also operate. 
For instance, food security committees were created to apply for public health funding and in some 
cases worked independently from the table de quartier78. A similar dynamic took place with healthy 
eating programming, where local partners’ committees were convened by Quebec en Forme in 2007 
onwards (Addy et al., 2014). With these reservations in mind, neighbourhood roundtables act as cross-
sectorial forums and represent a fertile ground to locally integrate food systems planning. 
                                                
76 The seven domains of social development are community life, education, urban planning, economic 
development, food security, transport and housing. 
77 These local roundtables converge regionally through a coalition, la Coalition des Tables de quartier, which 
would eventually sign onto the SAM 2025 vision for a sustainable and just food system.  
78 Interview, coordination committee (2015) 
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4.1.2.4. Conclusion  
 
From the late 1990s onwards, food security was partially integrated into provincial public health 
programming and in the municipal social inclusion agenda. Both programs privileged a food autonomy 
and community development approach to food security over food charity. Although more support was 
leveraged, a number of challenges emerged. For Bilodeau and colleagues (2003), two controversies 
persisted. First, food charity initiatives competed with community empowerment-based models around 
political attention and private funding. Second, community groups argued that the Taskforce on Hunger 
should be supported instead of forming a new space for stakeholder deliberation driven by the public 
health agenda (2006). The public health agency, which became the institutional anchor of a regional 
food security agenda, consolidated its role as a funder, resulting in greater institutional commitment 
over programming that to municipal or provincial policy change. In the early 2000s, municipal reforms 
resulted in a decentralization of manpower to boroughs, including in social development. 
4.2.2. Socio-economic development and short supply chains 
 
Food systems planning underwent new developments in 2005 onwards. The institutional anchor was 
transferred from the public health agency to the newly created Conference of Regional Elected Officers 
(CREO). The CREO, now responsible for regional development, invested itself in the value-added agri-
food processing sector. The re-convening of the Nourrir Montreal committee (2005-2010) and launch 
of another round of stakeholder consultations provided room for new experiments and pilots to grow, 
such as in the fields of urban agriculture and neighbourhood solidarity markets, but also revealed 
disagreements within the community sector.  
4.2.2.1. The weight of the agri-food processing sector  
 
In 2005, the CREO became a new driver in food systems planning. I mentioned in the first section of 
this chapter that the emergence of the CREO is somewhat controversial and indicative of neo-
liberalism. As its name indicates, it leaves less room for civil society than its predecessor, the Regional 
Development Council (RDC). The CREO adopted a hybrid governance structure, which increased the 
role of elected officials in regional development, while re-orienting itself towards the business 
community. The CREO acted as the ‘privileged interlocutor’ of the Ministry of Municipal Affairs, 
Regions and Land Occupancy (MARLO) in regional development. 
The CREO brokered a number of institutional partnerships, which contributed to the diversification of 
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the institutional landscape79. The most relevant arrangement, in view of the Montreal Food Systems 
planning process (2010-2017), is the creation of an agri-food processing roundtable. Indeed, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF) had started supporting regional agri-food 
roundtables in the late 1990s. In the case of Montreal, the Biofood Industry Council of the Island of 
Montreal (BICIM)80 focused on supporting small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) specializing in 
value-added, food processing activities81 (CRÉ 2014). The BICIM remained the MAFF’s privileged 
partner in terms of allocating provincial funds to support the agri-food sector, and became a noticeable 
partner in food systems planning as a project leader on institutional procurement (SAM Action Plan 
2014-2016).  
The launch of the BICIM underscores the attempts of the MAFF to harness opportunities for the agri-
food sector in the province’s largest pool of consumers. Over 2005-2013, the regional office of the 
MAFF tried to activate an “agri-food cluster” at the metropolitan level. As part of its economic 
development agenda (2005-2010 plan), the Montreal Metropolitan Community launched an office 
responsible for innovation clusters82 in order to facilitate technological transfer, job creation, skill 
development and financial investment. A research institute was tasked with conducting a metropolitan-
wide assessment to activate the agri-food cluster (CMM, 2004). 
The report provided a strategic orientation towards fostering research and development, training and 
education and strategic investments in the organic food and farming sector (CMM, 2004). Furthermore, 
the institute recommended that the metropolitan region put in place an agri-food council that would 
draw on the contribution of “champions” from both the mainstream and alternative food system. The 
agri-food cluster was, however, never activated and neglected in favour of culture and tourism, cutting-
edge technologies and competitive industrial clusters, such as aerospace. 
4.2.2.2. The shift of institutional anchor stakeholder dialogue 
 
The Conference of Regional Elected Officials83 re-instigated the Nourrir Montréal committee to 
                                                
79 For instance, the CREO brokered a partnership with the Taskforce on the social economy, creating the Social 
economy committee of the island of Montreal  
80 Conseil des industries bioalimentaire de l’île de Montréal (CIBIM) 
81 In other regions, agri-food roundtables bring together actors from across the supply chain to harness regional 
agri-food marketing opportunities (e.g., public markets, agri-tourism, collective distribution).  
82 Metropolitan innovation clusters website: http://cmm.qc.ca/champs-intervention/developpement-
economique/dossiers-en-developpement-economique/grappes-metropolitaines/ 
83 The CREO is a regional body that fosters coordinators on issues such as youth leadership, social economy, 
digital arts and food security. It was created in 2004 and represented a shift towards representative 
democracy over deliberative democracy (Vaillancourt, 2017) and the business community over the non-
profit sector. As the privileged interlocutor of the provincial ministries, the CREO also made call for project 
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convene stakeholders in regional food planning. As the CREO does not have experience in the field of 
food security84, it conducted a number of sectorial assessments in agriculture, health, education and the 
community sector (2005-2008). Further, the committee participated in the provincial consultation of the 
agriculture and agri-food sector (the so-called Pronovost Commission), where it recommended 
increased support for urban agriculture and local public food procurement, and the promotion of local 
food. It also recommended that the Ministry of Agriculture broaden its economic mandate to integrate 
social development (e.g., community wellbeing), and to act as a mediator between the public and an 
increasingly conglomerated retail sector (CRÉ, 2007).  
The work of Nourrir Montreal, however, appeared to have been stalled. One issue was the challenge 
of working with a diversity of stakeholders. The NM committee was originally created to be cross-
sectorial in scope and to involve multiple networks. However, when assessing this experience, the main 
initiators of the SAM (2010) indicated: “after five years [of work], those around the table were mainly 
from the health, education and community sectors. Others became disinterested or didn’t benefit from 
it”. The missing actors might refer to some of institutional players (the City, MAFF, QEF, funders), but 
perhaps also the business community. Paradoxically, the reorientation of the CREO towards the private 
sector did not re-translate into an active participation of the business community in working towards 
public health goals. Coordinators of the committee did, however, promote the work in urban agriculture 
undertaken by community groups (community gardens, collective gardens) and universities 
(institutional gardens). At the time, this might have signalled a greater degree of institutional 
recognition of urban agriculture, and possibly encouraged groups to mobilize towards the 2011 
municipal consultation. 
One critique raised on the committee was that it was too oriented towards community-based anti-
hunger efforts. “Before the SAM, it was Nourrir Montreal, and at some point Nourrir Montréal was 
not going anywhere, it wasn’t about feeding Montreal, but instead about feeding poverty. The discourse 
there was about poverty: there always needed to be more money to provide core funding to all the 
community organizations that had trouble making ends meet at the end of the month.”85 This echoes 
the work of Harper and colleagues (2009) on food councils in the United States: “FPCs have also been 
criticized for being one-sided in their outlook. FPCs tend to come from the anti-hunger/poverty world, 
and stay isolated in that world.” They point to the challenge of being “single-issue” focused and 
neglecting other food systems activities and levers of intervention. In Montreal, the division between 
                                                                                                                                                                 
proposals, and therefore as a funder in the food planning network.  
84 Chantal Doucet (2010) shows that the CREO largely support a multi-functional paradigm to agriculture. This 
social learning, however, is not assumed when the CREO were created in 2004-2005. 
85 Interview, coordination committee (2015) 
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hunger alleviation on the one hand, and food access on the other, concentrated the discussion. As the 
quote suggests, regional negotiation is in deep tension, and contradiction, with the structural dynamics 
of public spending and the relationship between government and civil society. 
We can draw a third lesson from the Nourrir Montréal experience with regards to influencing policy 
and how power was negotiated. Although the Nourrir Montréal committee was designed in the spirit of 
a food policy council, it had only a weak advisory mandate to the CREO, limited funding and no 
advocacy or decision-making power. As one interviewee mentioned, “Community groups wanted to 
communicate to city councillors that food insecurity should be a priority of the city, but they [city 
councillors] didn’t want to hear any of it.”86  As a secondary agency, the CREO traditionally had an 
ambiguous relationship with civil society and with the municipality. Provincial reforms had reduced the 
influence of civil society, increased the role of elected officials and reoriented the CREO towards the 
business community (e.g., agri-food processing sector). For Lévèsque (2005), this likely resulted in less 
representation from women and youth in the institution, as these groups are less likely to be represented 
in office-holding positions. This shift in governance is seen as leading to a greater emphasis on 
representative democracy over deliberative democracy, and was an early indicator of the neoliberal 
reform of public institutions.  
Furthermore, the CREO represented elected officials from several municipal parties, as well as from 
multiple municipalities in the agglomeration of Montreal. There were also representatives from the 
province, which was perceived by some as meant to limit the influence of the City of Montreal. One 
respondent reveals how the hybrid governance of the CREO resulted in an ambiguous relationship with 
the municipality:  
 
 “[The CREO] is a decision making space that was created by the government of Quebec a 
decade ago. It adds on to the existing structures, that’s the city’s opinion, right? We are 
sometimes under the impression that its duplicating the work, we have elected officials on both 
sides, but at the same time, some of them are selected to sit on the CREO, which also comes 
down to power (…) The city thinks its essential to have a broad space for deliberation and 
mobilization that isn’t political. I think this was first and foremost the role of the CREO, but the 
CREO realized that in order to accomplish things, it needed [political] leaders. That’s when we 
felt duplication of mandates.”87 
 
 
The round of stakeholder deliberation 2005-2010 illustrates not only the tensions between community 
groups and government agencies, but also within the public sector. Further, the CREO was new to the 
                                                
86 Informal interview, coordination committee  (2015) 
87 Interview, coordination committee (2015) 
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field of food security and therefore had to undertake its own social learning (through assessments, in-
person meetings, etc.). That said, the experience of the Nourrir Montreal committee encouraged new 
innovations to emerge, notably in the field of urban agriculture and, as we show in the next section, in 
food access. 
4.2.2.3. The experiment of neighbourhood solidarity markets  
 
In 2006, the Montreal regional public health authority generated a study that represented a 
steppingstone in the agency’s intervention framework on food environments, built around the notion of 
food deserts. The study mapped physical proximity to stores, specifically fresh fruit and vegetable 
stalls88, and revealed that 40% of the population did not have adequate access. The health agency 
identified a number of micro-sectors (n=16) in low incomes communities with low rates of 
motorization and no stores within walking distance. (DSP, 2006) This study (repeated in 2013) 
reoriented the regional public health authority to improve access to fruits and vegetables (F&V) (DSP, 
2012).  
Groups were seeking new food provisioning options that fit with their criteria of equity and 
sustainability89. The Marché Central, the main food terminal in Montreal, was a hub to build 
relationships directly with farmers.  The newly re-vamped public health program provided funding to 
community-based initiatives (17 initiatives in 2008-2012 and 14 in 2013-2018) (DSP, 2012). Funding 
was also provided by the CREO, MAFF, the city and some boroughs and allocated to neighbourhood 
solidarity markets. These markets were seen as a solution to provide new markets to farmers, and 
greater access to low-income consumers (CRÉ, 2009). However, these market were seasonal, had a 
limited clientele, and organizations remained fragile. Markets took place on a very local, ad-hoc basis 
with few opportunities to mutualize resources. In this context, some institutional partners and funders 
reconsidered the use of their limited financial resources and withdrew from the project. 
The lack of sufficient funding and the withdrawal of the main funders raised a second criticism of the 
Nourrir Montréal committee (2005-2010). Funding was provided, in partnership with other regional 
and municipal public institutions, to pilot neighbourhood solidarity markets and temporary, seasonal 
                                                
88 The authors define food access based on the surface of the fruit and vegetable stalls. They also account for 
distance, 500 for pedestrians, and 3 km for automobiles. The geomatic study uses the motorization rate of 
different sectors, the automobile being the main vehicle for consumers to buy groceries. 
89 The organic-certified vegetable baskets delivered through community-supported agriculture (organized by 
Equiterre, an environmental organization) were judged to be too expensive for low-income consumers. A 
cheaper option, the good food box program (Bonne Boite Bonne Bouffe), was first piloted locally in Notre-
Dame-de-Grace and then scaled up regionally by the food bank network, but this system did not provide 
options for consumers to choose the products they wished to buy (Audet et al., 2015). In this context, 
community food security organizations sought other options. 
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food stalls. However, the short-term outcomes of this experience didn’t appear convincing enough for 
public sector bodies. Further, this pilot took place towards the end of the Nourrir Montréal committee’s 
five-year mandate, in 2008 and 2009. When the CREO announced it would not prioritize food security 
in its following five-year plan (2010-2015), other funders withdrew.  
The challenge of economic viability drove some of the more robust of these organizations, 
approximately fifteen in total, to create the Neighbourhood Markets Coalition. The markets pooled 
their logistics and buying power to supply individual members by partnering with local farmers in 
Montreal’s main food terminal, notably thanks to a new round of funding, this time originating from 
the Regional Roundtable on Healthy Lifestyles90 (RRHL). The project was piloted during the summer 
of 2012, but was aborted in early 2013. One analysis provides the reasoning behind the end of the 
project: 
 
“The rapid growth of the activities of Tera Ter and the food supply pooling project meant that 
they lacked solid foundations. (…) The fact that all the procurement was centralized in one 
organization that was in “competition” with private suppliers, but lacked the financial and 
technical resources, as well as the necessary volumes to negotiate, meant that the organization 
was unable to put money aside and have enough financial maneuver. Finally, the seasonality 
of the activities of Tera Ter, the structure and the logistics were fragile and hinged on too few 
resources. The lack of local anchoring among partner organizations, the decision making 
process and shared liabilities did not leave enough room to local partners and contributed to 
the weakening and eventual closure of the organization.” (RUI St Pierre, 2016, p.8). 
 
 
After the project ended, the Neighbourhood Markets Coalition developed a community-university 
partnership to reflect on their experiences and the obstacles they faced (Audet et al., 2014). The 
results of the study highlighted that local community groups were unable to organize a cost-
efficient system of distribution and transport due to logistical and financial issues. They 
encapsulate this obstacle to collective food provisioning in fresh fruits and vegetables as a “socio-
technical lock-in” (Audet et al., 2015; RUI St Pierre, 2016). 
This experience, however, contributed to social learning and networks in food systems planning in 
Montreal. The municipality had broken away from what had been a public responsibility over main 
public markets in 1992 (Jean Talon, Atwater, Maisonneuve, etc.). The main markets incorporated into 
                                                
90 The RRHL was set up in every region of Quebec by Quebec en Forme and public health agencies (Addy et 
al., 2014). As I show in the next chapter, the RRHL was dissolved in 2013 and re-convened to support the 
actions plans of the Montreal Food System (SAM) and Montreal Physically Active (MPA), two regional 
coalitions in health promotion.  
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the association of public markets of Montreal91 for the purpose of promotion and space rentals. Public 
markets played a historical function in the urban setting. “[A public market] was a mandatory place to 
buy food products, it provided a meeting point between people from the city and rural areas, it is a 
place where people stroll and learn about the latest municipal ordinances, participate to exhibition or 
cultural events. However, the market is more than a place to meet and exchange: it is the heart of the 
town, the center of a many activities.” (St Onge 2011, p. 16) 
Historically, the city had actually used its limited authority to prevent food-related activities in public 
spaces. For example, the #926 regulation, instituted in 1947, prevented selling food in public spaces on 
the basis of hygiene (i.e., food borne diseases), traffic, competition and cleanliness, acting as a 
significant constraint on farmers who wished to market their products. I can also mention the regulation 
passed in the wake of the Expo 67, which prohibited “slaughtering, raising, fattening, keeping and 
ultimately selling poultry or game in urban areas” (Duchemin and Vermette 2016, p.285), which was a 
common practice in the public markets.  
The progressive regulation over public markets, and eventual municipal disengagement showed how 
food falls into a City’s jurisdiction over the management of public space. This responsibility was then 
decentralized to boroughs. For example, on the issue of food trucks, the city underwent a consultation 
in 2012 only once the boroughs of Ville Marie (2002) and Verdun (2003) had considered and 
experimented with such options.92  
4.2.3. From peri-urban farmland to urban agriculture  
4.2.3.1. Agriculture land use planning  
 
Agricultural zoning in the metropolitan region is the result of successive land preservation reforms. 
Between the 1980s and 1990s, the provincial land use commission revised agricultural zoning in 
consultation with municipalities and the main farmers’ professional body (UPA) to ensure greater 
harmony between agricultural zoning and municipal urban development plans (Act on planning and 
urbanism, 1979). This resulted in a greater participation of municipalities in land use planning and 
preservation (CMM 2016). In the wake of the design of the Greater Montreal Region in 2000, 
agricultural land use zoning and protection was well recognized in the urban planning profession. 
The pressure of urban development on farmland and the rise of the cost of land (including due to 
                                                
91 The Corporation des marches publics de Montréal would eventually become a key stakeholder in the SAM 
2014-2016 Action Plan. 
92 Commission permanente sur le développement économique et urbain et l’habitation (2012) La cuisine de rue 
à Montréal : enjeux et réflexions. Consultation publique. 
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speculation) stand out as the main issues of conflict and concern for public authorities. In order to deal 
with the challenges, the metropolitan region set up a consultative committee on agriculture. In contrast 
with the permanent commissions tasked with metropolitan jurisdictions (urban planning, environment, 
economic development and finances, housing and transport), the consultative committee allocated half 
of the seats to farming representatives93.   
In 2012, elected officials of the municipalities in the metropolitan region validated the Urban 
metropolitan plan. The document provides an overview of agricultural zoning and expresses the goal to 
increase the proportion of cultivated farmland by 6% by 2031, an ambitious goal of an estimated 
thirteen thousand hectares. The documents aligns with agricultural land development plans at the 
regional county or city level that would eventually be developed under the guidance of the ministry of 
agriculture94, a process suppose to involve a range of actors, including municipalities, several 
departments of the City, the professional farming body, the CREO, landowners and community groups. 
In the agglomeration of Montreal (the island), zoned farmland is relatively marginal, representing 4% 
of the total surface of the island for a total of 2044 Ha  (Ville de Montréal, 2015), which is exclusively 
located in the western municipalities. Because of its immediate proximity to the urban area, agricultural 
land in West Island has an important social, recreational and educational orientation, as well as 
environmental conservation (e.g.,nature-park, zoo eco-museum, ecological farms) (Ville de Montréal, 
2015). Innovative examples include, in terms of production, the D3 Pierre farm, which acts as a social 
insertion platform and the Bord-du-Lac farm, a farming incubator with a cohort of new and emerging 
businesses. In terms of food distribution, the Santropol farm supplies a volunteer-run, meal delivery 
service to seniors in the city, and the Macdonald Campus farm supplies the university’s cafeteria. There 
are a number of conservation initiatives and educational outlets, not to mention the Macdonald Campus 
of McGill University, which is one of the two agricultural campuses in the province. 
Agriculture and food are an important part of local identity in municipalities in the West Island. 
However, urban development projects are a continuous source of tension between city councilours, 
environmental organizations, private developers, landowners and residents. The agricultural land use 
development plan provided an opportunity for provincial agricultural institutions to raise awareness 
among elected municipal representatives, and also to foster relationships and joint-planning between 
local and regional actors (Doyon et al. 2016; Chahine, 2011). This includes the four central municipal 
services participated in the technical committee that drafted the farmland development plan: urban 
                                                
93 http://cmm.qc.ca/a-propos/commissions-et-comite-consultatif-agricole/membres-des-commissions/ 
94 Plan de développement de la zone agricole (PDZA). Agricultural zoning is a responsibility of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food of Quebec. 
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planning, parks and greening, sustainable and social development (Ville de Montréal, 2015). 
4.2.3.2. The institutionalization of the community gardening program  
 
Urban agriculture has a long history in Montreal that predates agricultural zoning policies. During the 
earlier half of the XXth century, community gardening was generally promoted as an activity in times 
of hardship. The city allocated vacant plots to the Community Garden League of Montreal95 and the 
Ligue ouvrière catholique (the Catholic workers’ league) following the 1929 financial crisis. These 
were the same organizations that would later assume the responsibility of the ‘Victory Gardens’ in the 
wake of the Second World War (St-Hilaire-Gravel, 2014). Civic food networks and the city have since 
built the largest contemporary municipal community gardening program, which comprises of 8,000 
individual parcels in 97 community gardens spread across 18 city boroughs (Duchemin and Vermette, 
2016). The program underwent three phases: an initial self-institutionalization, followed by a full 
institutionalization as a municipal responsibility, eventually leading to decentralization to the borough 
level (St-Hilaire-Gravel, 2014).  
In the preliminary phase (1970s), neighbourhood committees negotiated access to vacant land from 
the city. In this stage, gardens were completely self-managed (membership, conflict resolution) and 
minimal guidelines were negotiated with the city. The Botanical Garden, an entity under the 
responsibility of the municipality, acted as an intermediary and facilitated the process by planning 
gardening space on its own land, requesting more funding from the City’s executive committee, 
providing technical services to gardeners and communicating their concerns (St-Hilaire-Gravel, 2014).  
The full institutionalization of the program took place in the second half of the 1980s. The city 
council moved towards a uniform framework with more parameters to respond to the growth of 
community gardens and to supervise the adoption of municipal regulations (St-Hilaire-Gravel, 2014). 
From this point forward, community gardens were defined as an extension of the municipality’s 
mandate and as a public service, which lead to a centralization of responsibility for allocating parcels 
and designing internal management rules. In 1990, the municipality’s executive committee delegated 
the responsibilities to the Department of leisure of boroughs, a decision that was reaffirmed during the 
municipal reorganization of 2002 (Duchemin and Vermette, 2016). 
4.2.3.3. The diversification of urban agriculture  
 
                                                
95 This organization was created in 1931 to create “community gardens for the unemployed” (St-Hilaire-
Gravel, 2014, p. 23) 
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 The issue of environmental sustainability also made its way into the municipal institutioanl 
landscape, in parallel with poverty reduction efforts. In 1995, the municipality launched an 
environmental education program (EcoQuartiers), with community centers to provide resources on 
waste reduction and recycling, energy efficiency and gardening and greening activities. This program 
was also delegated to individual boroughs. Environmental sustainability was further institutionalized at 
the central level when the regional health agency and the municipal sustainable development 
department partnered to launch the Quartier 21 program96. 
 Urban agriculture practices significantly diversified during the 2000s. Collective gardens emerged 
as an alternative to community gardens97 in Notre-Dâme-de-Grace. In this formula, gardens are 
organized by community organizations, schools or housing cooperatives. In contrast with municipal 
community gardens, which are divided into individual lots, collective gardens are managed as a group. 
There are now 85 collective gardens of 2000 to 2500 gardeners (Duchemin and Vermette, 2016). Since 
then, private businesses, urban developers and institutions have also started integrating urban 
agriculture onto their façades or rooftops, often with the accompaniment of universities or local groups. 
Beekeeping and fruit tree harvesting collectives have also sprouted up in different corners of the city, 
and new business models are taking shape in mushroom and micro-green production, greenhouse 
rooftop production and edible landscaping (Duchemin and Vermette, 2016). Animal husbandry (e.g., 
the re-introduction of chicken) has been somewhat more divisive and remains at a pilot stage.98 
 Some municipal boroughs played a more active role than others in the field of urban agriculture. In 
the borough of Rosemont La Petite Patrice, the administration encourages citizens to initiate edible 
landscaping projects in public spaces, such as at the base of trees along streets curbs (Duchemin and 
Vermette, 2016). The municipality of Côte St Luc, an affiliated town on the island of Montreal, was an 
early promoter of urban agriculture, being the first municipality in the province to adopt a ‘food 
charter’, which is a declaration of principles that identifies goals in consultation community members 
(Boulianne and Bissardon, 2016), and includes issues related to community wellbeing, food security 
and food waste.  
4.2.3.4. The consultative episode 
 
Despite having created a community gardening program, urban planning documents did not recognize 
                                                
96 This program is a municipal response to the United Nation Agenda 21 launched during the conference on the 
environment and sustainable development in Rio de Janeiro (1992) 
97 The success of the program meant that individuals were wait-listed. 
98 Although environmental groups appeared to be favourable, animal welfare advocates have argued against the 
re-introduction of chicken. e.g., https://pasdepoulesamontreal.jimdo.com 
 61 
urban agriculture as a land use activity outside of agriculture zones, until the most recent documents 
were published in 2015-2016. Urban agriculture businesses, for example, do not receive the same 
benefits as farmers producing on land zoned for agricultural activities (OCPM, 2012). The various 
zoning requirements (commercial, residential and industrial) leave little room for the full deployment 
of urban agricultural activities. Furthermore, the city was criticized because of its lack of leadership 
and promotion of urban agriculture, and for not setting common goals across departments and 
boroughs99. Community groups also called for increased recognition as full-fledged partners, and 
requested more financial and material resources (OCPM, 2012). 
Community groups seized the opportunity of the Right to initiate public consultations, instituted 
under the previous municipal administration100, to request a public consultation on urban agriculture. 
This initiative, triggered by the Urban Agriculture Working Group101 (UAWG) resulted in a large 
democratic exercise. However, its institutionalization became problematic (Abergel and Mailhot-
Leduc, 2013). In the span of three months, the coalition collected 29 068 signatures to initiate a 
consultation. 103 memoires were presented and 1500 people participated to the activities of the 
consultation, displaying a certain enthusiasm around the issue.  
As a result of the consultation, the Permanent committee on urban agriculture (PCUA) was launched 
in September 2013 to support urban agriculture practices across the City of Montreal in collaboration 
with relevant municipal departments. The Office of Sustainable Development was tasked with 
coordinating the PCUA, in collaboration with the Direction on Social Diversity, Large Parks and 
Greening, Urbanism and Economic Development, the Botanical Garden, as well as a city councilor 
from the City’s executive committee. It also includes a number of community groups and experts, 
including the UAWG, and the Urban Agriculture Lab.  
The scope of the new committee was negotiated within the City. On the administrative side, it 
appeared that narrowing the scope would be more realistic and easier to operationalize. On the political 
side, the lack of electoral safety appeared as a barrier for committing to policy change. The following 
exchange illustrates the ambiguity of the process:   
                                                
99 For example, the Department of large parks and greening does not plant edible varieties in its action plan to 
plant trees;    
100 The Tremblay administration (2005-2012) was the object of a number of corruption scandals. It is likely that 
the creation of a new consultative process was seen as a way to receive favorable public opinion. 
101 The Groupe de travail en agriculture urbaine (GTAU) represented community organizations with mandates 
specific to food security (n=4), urban agriculture (n=2) and urban planning (n=3), student-run groups, 
including Cégeps (n=7), environmental organizations (n=3), social businesses (n=6), collective and 
community gardens and networks (n=6), Ecoquartiers (n=10), coalitions (n=2) and others (urban designers, 
green architecture, etc.) (n=8). The UAWG/GTAU is coordinated by Alternatives, an international solidarity 
organization, which has spearheaded urban agriculture projects in Montreal (e.g. on rooftops).
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“CC: The MOPC [the Montreal Office of Public Consultation] report included the mention of a food 
council. We in the administration wished there would be a Permanent committee on urban agriculture 
[Changes topic]  
HM: You were saying the MOPC was already talking about a food policy council? 
CC: Yes, because the same groups have made repeated calls for years [Repeats]. It wasn’t considered 
a jurisdiction of the city. On the issue of jurisdiction, it is quite modest in terms of food. We can work 
on what employees eat, we can work on regulation, you know for zoning, maybe for certain activities. 
That was the city’s perspective at the time. We don’t know how it’s going to change, with the new 
administration. That [the PCAU] was a decision of the elected officials. [Hesitation] Here, we are on 
the administrative side, and then there is the political level. [Hesitation] At this time, it was a 
completely different political administration. It was during the last year of the Tremblay administration. 
We are in quite a different situation now…”102 
 
Pressures for reform were eventually met with the accommodation of the status quo: the committee 
achieved slow progress, and had to await the settling of the new mayoral administration of Denis 
Coderre103 (2013-…). One observer noted: “The real impact of the consultations remains uncertain, 
since there are no clear indications that participants in the consultations might play a role in shaping 
Montreal’s urban planning and food politics.” (Abergel and Mailhot-Leduc, 2013). Despite a cross-
sectorial representation at the municipal level, the main community coalition (Urban Agriculture 
Working Group) was not invited to participate: “Participation in the elaboration of urban policies is 
mediated by unequal access to pre-established networks and the hierarchy between types of actors 
based on their recognition by public entities” (Mailhot-Leduc, 2014). One coalition member indicated:  
“The invitation was sent to the directors [of CSOs], so there were only few people with expertise in the 
room.”104 This highlighted that few skills (technical, community engagement) were actionable in the 
context of the committee.  
4.2.4. Conclusion 
 
In this section, I provided a historical overview of the formation of community groups involved in 
food politics in Montreal, such as the Taskforce on Hunger (1991), the Neighbourhood Markets 
Coalition (2010) and the Working Group on Urban Agriculture (2011). Initially driven by an anti-
poverty and anti-hunger agenda, civil society increasingly experimented with integrating environmental 
values and bringing attention to urban planning and food provisioning. Further, the creation of 
neighbourhood-based roundtables provided more capacity for joint planning at a local level.  
Simultaneously, I explored the negotiation with public sector-led, multi-stakeholder roundtables, 
                                                
102 Interview, coordination committee (2015) 
103 Previously, Denis Coderre (1997-2013) was a Member of Parliament for the Liberal Party of Canada. 
104 Informal interview (2015) 
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especially with regards to funding arrangements and the recognition of civil society spaces and 
expertise. Whereas the city of Montreal was initially the institutional anchor (1990-1995), the 
responsibility for coordination shifted to the public health agency (1995-2005) and then to a hybrid 
para-municipal organization, the CREO (2005-2010). In this context, I highlight the creation of the 
Biofood Industry Council of the Island of Montreal (BICIM) as an instance of private-public 
institutional arrangement. All the actors became key intermediaries in the development of the Montreal 
Food Systems Plan.  
The municipality remained reluctant to adopt new responsibilities in food systems planning - other 
than its ‘traditional’ jurisdiction over agriculture land use - in the context of a relatively decentralized 
public administration, as demonstrated by its programing (community gardens, poverty reduction, 
Écoquartiers) and public space by-laws. In some cases, the central municipal administration pulled 
away from its existing responsibilities, as when it stopped managing the public markets (1993). 
Furthermore, a food security policy built around a local-regional continuum (1998) and a metropolitan 
agri-food cluster (2005-2010) failed to be activated. Not only were the institutionalization of food truck 
licenses and of the Permanent urban agriculture committee revealed to be overly narrow or restrictive, 
but also these measures constituted as ‘stand alone’ approaches to food policy. In this context, I echoed 
the importance of electoral safety, political champions and expertise (Clayton, 2015; Fesenfeld, 2016).  
4.3. Conclusion   
 
The analysis of the institutional landscape that was provided highlights that there is a persistent 
institutional void in terms of food policy at the provincial level. Despite some novel interventions in 
health promotion and agriculture, the neo-liberal turn in the 2000s has led to significant institutional 
changes, including the end of the regional public health authority and its centralization within health 
care services. Budgetary constraints have led to funding cuts in rural policy and regional socio-
economic development, a lock-in in agriculture expenses and a turn towards private charities in health 
promotion. The evolution of these discrete components of food policy – healthy eating, community 
well-being, multi-functional agriculture – highlights the need for a whole-of-government, joined-up 
food policy, as well as the importance of a solid social safety net to address hunger in the province.  
In this context, municipalities face the difficult task of trying to do more, with less, and to navigate 
the delivery of top down policies across sectorial, administrative and political siloes. The portrait, 
between 1986 and 2012, reveals that roundtables and institutional arrangement (ex. programs, 
partnerships, funding) have multiplied, bringing new interests and actors into the field of food systems 
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planning, but also adding complexity. Regional public sector organizations face further uncertainty: the 
two successive institutional anchors of public sector-led roundtables, the public health agency (1995-
2005) and CREO (2005-2010, 2010-2014), have both been merged into larger institutional bodies and 
seen their budgets and capacity reduced.  
This chapter is critical for us to understand the launch of a new round of stakeholder engagement to 
develop Montreal Food Systems 2025 Vision and the launch of the 2014-2016 Action Plan and 






5. Chapter 5: A case study of the Montreal Food Systems 2014-
2016 Action Plan 
 
5.1. Overview of case study  
5.1.1. Introduction to the SAM 2014-2016 Action Plan  
 
There have been multiple attempts to improve the coordination in Montreal, QC around city-region 
food systems over the past three decades, but these have largely remained in policy siloes. Ideas, 
interests and institutions have diversified, with civic food networks acting as a fertile ground for social 
innovations. These experiments have developed a multitude of arrangements with municipal and 
governmental programs and strategies. The successive experiences in food politics have indicated the 
challenges of working across sectors, and also of activating policy change from within the City and 
across boroughs. In this chapter, I focus on the case study of the Montreal Food Systems, the Système 
alimentaire montréalais (SAM) Action Plan between 2014 and 2016. This chapter analyzes several key 
and overlapping phases in the design and implementation of the action plan, and the progressive 
transition of the SAM into a municipal-sponsored Food Policy Council. 
In the first stage, regional public sector organizations launched a food systems planning process and 
coalition-building exercise (2010-2013). This process resulted with the SAM 2025 vision, providing a 
common vision around which to organize and, hopefully, plan future policies and programs. Following 
this initial planning phase, public sector bodies re-convened the Regional Roundtable on Healthy 
Lifestyles (stage 2) and mobilized resources from a public-private partnership in health promotion 
(stage 3), thereby triggering the 2014-2016 action plan. The action plan was articulated around new and 
pre-existing institutional arrangements and policy instruments (stage 4), which eventually informed the 
governance infrastructure, the priorities of the coalition, and also the intermediaries and civil society 
groups involved (stage 5).   
The convening of public sector bodies and intermediaries in order to plan the 2014-2016 Action Plan 
provided a forum where actors’ could bring propose actions to be funded. The fifth stage consisted of 
the mobilization of intermediaries as project leaders. I provide an overview of the action plan by 
looking at the mobilization of some actors in the field, especially the most politicized ones, and assess 
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their capacity to create new proximities, embody different roles and transform the relationships within 
the network (stage 6). The final section looks at the launch of the public consultation on the feasibility 
of a food policy council (stage 7), the positioning of the SAM coalition (stage 8) and its eventual 
transition into a municipal-sponsored Food Policy Council (stage 9). 
 
5.1.2. Overview of the conditions for an effective partnership 
  
The negotiation of a multi-level, cross-sectorial action plan among a range of organizations is complex, 
and not without challenges. The survey responses compiled for assessing the effectiveness of the 
partnership, combined with the results from my observations and interviews, are informative in this 
regard. In this section, I indicate whether the conditions were fully, or only partially met, and suggest 
some possible explanations, available in summary tables. Depending on the items, respondents 
agreeing whether the conditions were fully met ranged from just under half (45.5%) to three-quarters 
(75%) of the total answers. The conditions 1 to 4 looked at the mobilization and engagement of 
partners, whereas condition 5 and 6 highlight the dynamic of the partnership (see annex 2).  
The results of Condition 1 (problem-framing) indicate that the main sectors involved in food systems 
planning introduced their interests, perspectives and positions, but that the participation of other actors 
would have helped design more appropriate solutions. Participants noticed a weak involvement of 
elected municipal representatives and the lack of a stronger municipal mandate for regional food 
planning, specifying instead that it was the civil service of various public sector bodies that were 
leading the partnership. Despite an extensive consultation process (2011-2013) and the involvement of 
the association of public markets105, respondents highlighted the absence of food distributors, 
wholesalers and supply chain actors106. It is telling for example, that one fruit and vegetable industry 





                                                
105 Until the SAM Vision 2025 and Action Plan 2014-2016, the association had not been involved in multi-
stakeholder regional food planning. https://www.marchespublics-mtl.com/en/ 
106 The main retail actors in Quebec were represented in the SAM through Commerce canadien du commerce de 
detail), but their participation was limited, potentially due to a lack of interest, time or relevance.  
107 Association Québécoise des Fruits et Légumes (AQDFL) 
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Condition 1 – 
Problem-Framing 
Responses Possible explanations  
All the actors 




and position  
50.15% of 
responses 
indicate it is 
either 
partially met, 
or not met at 
all.  
• Extensive cross-sector consultation before 2014-
2016 action plan (5.2.1.) to determine common 
vision. 
• Weak involvement of elected municipal 
representatives and the Mayor’s office (5.4)    
• Community sector is traditionally more involved 
that the private sector (e.g., the fruits and vegetable 
sector and food distributors) 
• Community groups (local/regional, 
social/environmental) involved at different levels.  
• Process to determine actions vary from goal to goal, 
with some more inclusive than others.  
 
Condition 2 (interest-raising) shows slightly more positive results than Condition 1. It was noticed, 
however, that the initial strategic decisions – aligning with the health promotion agenda – came down 
to the discretion of public sector bodies alone. The availability of funding was viewed as an 
opportunity to implement new actions, but was conditional on a formal alignment with a sister 
partnership engaged in physical activity and recreation. My analysis of the partnerships and goals of the 
SAM 2014-2016 Action Plan reveals that the goals mirrored the priorities of existing public sector 
programs. This might indicate that input from civil society in initial strategic decisions was limited. 
 
Condition 2 – Interest-
Raising 
Responses Possible explanations 
Actors are interested 
in strategic decisions 
early in the process 
and in playing a role 
in the partnership  
37.5% of 
responses 




fully is met 
• The availability of funding triggers a “domino 
effect” among public sector bodies in reaching the 
initial strategic decisions to launch action plan. 
(5.2.3) 
• Existing public sector programs determine the main 
priorities of the SAM 2014-2016 Action Plan. 
(5.3.1) 
 
Condition 3 (enrolling) shows the most positive results in the survey. This means that the planning 
process was perceived as being inclusive, since civil society actors enjoyed as much, and perhaps even 
more, influence over decisions than institutional members and funders. The availability of funding 
stimulated community groups108 to voice their interest at both a strategic and operational levels. At a 
                                                
108 In the previous chapter on history and context, I introduced community coalitions such as the Taskforce on 
Hunger and Social Development, the Coalition of Neighbourhood Roundtables, the Urban Agriculture 
Working Group and the Coalition of Neighbourhood Markets.  
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strategic level, two community coalitions from the social and environmental sectors joined the 
coordination committee (see annex 8), and many more were convened to join talks within the different 
SAM 2014-2016 priorities109 to determine projects and actions to be implemented. Furthermore, 
participants leveraged their roles in different organizations, their expertise, their alliances and level of 
institutional recognition to influence the outcomes of funding allocation. The analysis of institutional 
arrangements illustrates the ways in which pre-existing relationships between civil society groups and 
public sector organizations determined which projects would eventually be funded, how much they 
would receive, and who would implement them (III.2) 
 
Condition 3 – 
Enrolling 
Responses Possible explanations 
Actors are brought 
into a position of 
negotiation and 
influence in the 
decision making 
process and accept 
temporary and 
negotiated roles  
75% of 
responses 
indicate it is 
fully met 
- Two organizations from the community sector 
(environmental and social) participate in the 
coordination committee level. Both 
organizations were created in the 1990s and 
enjoyed institutional recognition (5.2.4) 
- Broad appeal to the SAM partner committee to 
reach consensus on priority projects, but pre-
existing relationships with specific civil society 
groups determine who gets involved in the 
negotiation around funding allocation (5.3.2) 
 
The fourth phase (mobilizing) echoes a certain degree of uncertainty behind the funding arrangements, 
as the main funder, Québec en Forme, was expected to disappear from the provincial institutional 
landscape in 2017. The issue of funding was therefore recurrent in a context of cuts to public and 
public-community institutions (health services, community economic development, regional 
development, education, etc.). Despite the involvement of a range of public sector bodies, several 
respondents from public institutions argued that more resources (funding, human resources) should be 
committed, especially by the City of Montreal, to support the SAM both functionally (coordination) 
and operationally (projects). One example which was mentioned to me on multiple occasion was with 
the fact that the City did not appear to prioritize its own agricultural land use development plan (Goal 
4-B), leaving the SAM as the only funding source available to implement collective actions in the West 
Island110. Civil society members also indicated that not enough funding was available for the range and 
number of actions being undertaken. It was a challenge to mobilize other funding sources in the short 
                                                
109 There are 4 priorities that we are concerned with here: food access (Goal 2), public procurement (Goal 3), 
urban agriculture (Goal 4.a) and peri-urban agricultural land use planning (Goal 4.b) 
110 The allocation of health promotion funding to agricultural land use planning appears, in some way, as a 
paradoxical outcome. 
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period of time allocated to planning. Actually, one private foundation partially withdrew from the 
SAM, and another did not respond to the invitation to join the partners’ committee. The Montreal 
school board and the City’s office of sustainability, which also fund community food interventions, 
also partially withdrew from the partnership.  
Despite these unforeseen challenges, transformation within the network did happen. Certain 
community actors were particularly successful in mobilizing the network in which they work in. This 
was particularly evident from the social network graphs (annex 3-6 and 11) with certain actors getting 
closer to the core nodes after the launch of the action plan. The transformation operates in both the 
center and the periphery of the partnership, with actors leveraging formal and informal relationships. 
For example, the same community food hub was involved in scaling up two food access interventions 
from the local to the regional level111. In this context, that actor built relationships with new partners 
(e.g., the transit authority), while helping broaden the interventions of other organizations (e.g., the 
MAFF, the association of public markets). Most importantly, the same actor emerged as a policy 
entrepreneur, eventually mobilizing its political connections outside of the SAM partnership, thereby 
launching a consultation on the feasibility of a municipally mandated food policy council. This 
eventually provided a policy window (Kingdon, 1995) around which the SAM partnership could 
position itself to further integrate food planning into the institutional fabric of the City of Montreal.  
 
Condition 4 – 
Mobilizing 
Responses Possible explanations 
Actors reach a 
sufficient critical mass 
that is credible and 




indicate it is 
either 
partially met, 
or not met at 
all 
- The SAM Action Plan (2014-2016) is mostly 
funded by one provincial public-private 
partnership that is expected to dissolve in 2017, 
resulting in a high level of uncertainty (5.2.3) 
- As action plan is implemented, certain actors 
disengage (private foundation, education sector, 
municipal office of sustainability)  
- Transformation of the network and policy 
entrepreneurship in the center and periphery of 
the SAM partnership (5.3.3; 5.4) 
 
The last two conditions - Condition 5 (levelling of power) and Condition 6 (co-construction) - assess 
the dynamic of the partnership. They also point to certain challenges. Civil society seemed to have 
influence over decisions and partners were generally treated equally in discussions. However, one 
                                                
111 The project led to the installation of fresh fruit and vegetable stalls in corner stores and outside subway 
stations. These would end up being the two flag-ship projects of the SAM (Goal 2). In this case, scaling up 
simply means developing a given intervention in multiple neighbourhoods at once.  
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respondent regretted that some voices tended to be disregarded when consensus over funding allocation 
was more difficult to reach (Goal 2 and Goal 4-A). In that regard, it was up to individual public sector 
bodies, the ones responsible for leading the different priorities, to determine a decision making process. 
This lead to variability and, in some cases a lack of transparency, from one goal to the next.  Further, 
while certain actors were particularly successful in mobilizing resources, all partners did not see a 
shared distribution of benefits. The territorial dynamic behind the SAM 2014-2016 Action Plan is 
illustrative, because it shows which neighbourhood managed to leverage the regional partnership. Some 
respondents also indicated that, in some cases, funding was allocated for the activities of one 
organization, which would not be working with multiple partners and sectors.  
 
Condition 5 – 
Leveling of power 
Responses Possible explanations 
Actors develop 
mechanisms and 
structures to reduce 
structural inequities  
54.3% of 
responses 
indicate it is 
either 
partially met, 
or not met at 
all 
- Civil society organizations present in 
coordination committee are not necessarily the 
ones driving change (5.2.4; 5.3.3) 
- Local groups and neighbourhood roundtables are 
mostly absent from the SAM partner committee 
(5.3.2) 
- Civil society organizations are absent from the 
Regional Roundtable on Healthy Lifestyles. 
(5.2.4) 
- There are no clear, transparent mechanisms for 
reaching decisions over funding allocation. 
Some community voices were sidelined. 
 
From the point of view of governance, the decision making infrastructure was designed in such a way 
that civil society was selectively engaged at the strategic level (coordination committee) and was absent 
from the Regional Roundtable on Healthy Lifestyles112. Instead, funding arrangements determined both 
the timeline and accountability mechanisms – such as the evaluation itself - of the action plan. Further, 
the lack of consultation of community innovators at these levels meant that the RRHL and SAM 
partnership were perceived as a funder-driven, public sector initiative. This lack of trust was visible 
when the RRHL – rebranded as “Montreal, healthy metropolis” – presented its new governance model 
and fundraising plan in late 2016 during a meeting. 
The SAM partnership was mainly driven by a health promotion agenda, but developed mechanisms to 
balance regional food planning with environmental and economic concerns. The involvement of the 
                                                
112 The RRHL acted as the umbrella roundtable that would funnel funding to the two health promotion 
partnerships: Système alimentaire montréalais and Montréal physiquement actif.  
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MAFF was particularly noticeable as it was an actor whose involvement, until 2014, had been limited 
to land use planning and value-added, food processing activities. After a five full years of planning, 
organizations in the SAM partnership were better able to identify their differences, discuss them openly 
and, in some cases, to change their position around compromises. The combination of institutional 
arrangements between public sector bodies (programs, strategies) has created some synergies and 
raised awareness to further elaborate integrated solutions. 
Regional food planning continued to face a number of obstacles, including: the reproduction of siloes, 
provincial funding mechanisms that applied in a top down and sectorial fashion, institutional 
commitment to pre-existing relationships, and the reluctance of the City of Montreal to assume political 
leadership. Although the 2014-2016 action plan streamlined different food-related policy instruments, 
the best indicator of integration is perhaps the transition of the SAM partnership into a full-fledged 
Food Policy Council. For the 2017-2020 plan, a paradox remains noticeable: while funding 
arrangements with other public sector bodies were expanded, funding in absolute terms diminished. 
 
Condition 6 – Co-
constructing 
Responses Possible explanations 
Actors resolve 
controversies that 
divide them and 





indicate it is 
either 
partially met, 
or not met at 
all 
- Health promotion agenda drives SAM Action 
Plan, with a partial balancing of action plan 
through the leadership of regional office of 
agricultural ministry (5.2.2; 5.2.3; 5.3.1) 
- Consensus is more difficult around politicized 
issues and where civil society is most involved: 
food access (Goal 2) and urban agriculture (Goal 
4.a.) Consensus is easier to reach with food 
procurement (Goal 3) and agricultural land use 
planning (Goal 4.b.) (5.3.2). 
- Integrated solutions remain limited by provincial 
sectorial funding mechanisms and institutional 
commitments to pre-existing relationships. 
(5.2.3; 5.3.1) 
- Despite uncertain political landscape and 
neoliberal reform, SAM transitions into the 
SAM0-Food Policy Council and expands/ 
reduces funding arrangements (5.4). 
 72 
 
5.2. The building blocks of the Montreal Food Systems Plan.  
5.2.1. Designing a vision for food systems planning 
 
Once again, a new round of consultation was launched, but this time to develop a coherent vision for 
a sustainable food system for Montreal (2012-2013). According to the planning document, this round 
of stakeholder consultation was launched after drawing lessons from the Nourrir Montreal experience, 
which had been piloted by the CREO (2005-2010): “Following a strategic review in the context of the 
work of the Nourrir Montréal committee (2010-2011), the CREO initiated, with its partners, a process 
to design a plan for a sustainable and just food system for Montreal’s communities in December 
2011.”113  
In reality, there was discontinuity between the SAM 2025 Vision and the Nourrir Montréal 
committee. The Nourrir Montréal committee had been deactivated since the CREO had not prioritized 
food security in its 2010-2015 plan. It is more accurate to say that the Vision 2025 was born out of an 
ad hoc committee comprised mainly of public sector bodies and funders. The four actors were: the 
school board, the public health agency, the CREO and the city of Montreal’s branch in charge of 
combating poverty and homelessness114.  
As I’ve shown in the previous chapter, the experience of the Nourrir Montréal committee revealed a 
number of challenges around stakeholder coordination and policy making. These include: the lack of 
diversity in membership, the conflict between food access and anti-poverty discourses, the lack of 
financial resources to consolidate pilot projects, a weak advisory mandate and ambiguous decision 
making processes, as well as the absence of electoral safety and political champions.  
In response to these challenges, public sector bodies argued for the need to renew a process that 
would embody food systems thinking into a planning tool115. Such policy framework would provide a 
reference point for future municipal policies, public sector programs and community interventions. 
Informed by the City’s own experience in stakeholder engagement around sustainable development 
(Sustainable Montreal Plan 2010-2015), the ad-hoc committee envisioned a multi-level governance 
                                                
113 Internal documents 
114 This is one of the three departments of the Service on social diversity and sports of the City of Montreal.  
115 The American Planning Association’s Policy Guide on Community and Regional Food Planning was one of 
the core documents that framed the work of the SAM 2025 vision.  
https://www.planning.org/policy/guides/adopted/food.htm 
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model with a steering committee and a partner’s committee.  
In order to activate the planning process, the four organizations pooled resources together. The 
CREO and public health agency contributed 2/3 of the budget, and the school board and city of 
Montreal the last 1/3. The engagement of the school board is particularly note worthy, as they have a 
seat on the board of the CREO and therefore a position of influence.  
As one informant indicates:  
“At one point, it [NM committee] wasn’t going anywhere. That’s when we had the idea to open 
the mandate of Nourrir Montréal as a food systems mandate. The idea of the food policy council 
of Toronto was also there. Lise Bertrand had written a policy brief in 2004116. We had to resolve 
this deadlock; we had to take a sustainable development lens to the food system. We convinced 
Mrs. De Courcy, who was a member of the executive committee of the CREO. She was 
interested in developing a planning process around the food system that would include all the 
public, private, institutional, socio-economic, environmental partners (…) She said she believed 
in the project”117. 
 
Having secured these resources, the ad hoc committee hired a professional with an urban planning 
background to activate a new round of stakeholder dialogue. 88 organizations from across the field of 
food systems were engaged in a number of activities from 2012-2013. Furthermore, a steering 
committee was formed of 22 civil society and governmental bodies at the regional level. It included 
community coalitions, departments of the city, the public health agency and school board and other 
socio-economic development agencies.  
This collective visioning process aimed to build a “common vision” and a “shared language” around 
food systems, summed in the following commitment statement: “SAM 2025: Innovating to grow 
together - In 2025, all Montrealers have access to healthy, diverse and affordable food that is 
sustainably sourced.” (2013, p.10). To achieve this, the SAM 2025 vision underscores the current gap 
in regional food governance: the “absence of strong cross-sectorial food dialogue (…) the scattering of 
small local initiatives, the multiplication of actions in siloes and the fragmentation of interventions (…) 
lead to a duplication of human and financial regional resources.” The SAM 2025 Vision identifies five 
orientations, each divided into a number of axes of interventions and action items (2013, 10):  
1) Diversify the food supply 
2) Reduce the ecological footprint of the food system,  
3) Encourage access to healthy food,  
4) Promote healthy food  
5) Reinforce regional coordination 
 
                                                
116 Bertrand, L., Thérien, F. (2004). Vers un Conseil de politique alimentaire à Montréal. Des gestes plus grands 
que la panse, Dossier 10. 
117 Interview, coordination committee (2015). 
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The planning document provides an overview of the main actors and policy instruments, which I 
presented in the previous chapter. These include: the metropolitan and agricultural land use zoning 
plans, the public healthy agency’s food access program and the recently created city-sponsored urban 
agriculture committee. It also identifies provincial-level initiatives and programs, such as Québec en 
Forme, the provincial public private partnership in health promotion, and the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food (MAFF).  
 Institutional support for the SAM was not guaranteed in the early stages of the process, as the search 
for political champions continued. Only a few months after the planning process was launched, Mme 
De Courcy left the school board and CREO to present her candidature to the provincial elections, 
leaving the SAM without a valuable promoter. One informant indicated, “When we do a planning 
process, there is always a councilor responsible or a senior official to show the engagement of the city. 
It wasn’t the case with the SAM. They were on their own. For me, that’s a signal of their approach.”118 
This quote reveals that a lack of strong municipal mandate and political commitment may have affected 
the legitimacy of the SAM planning process. In the final stages of the planning process, the SAM found 
a new councilor, who signed onto the SAM 2025 vision: “It was picked up by Mr. Miele, municipal 
councilor for the borough of St Laurent. He became the elected councilor for the SAM.”119 As I later 
show, the involvement of the city councillor, however, appeared to be temporary.  
The consultation on urban agriculture took place at the same time as the SAM visioning process, 
adding complexity to the planning process. As one respondent articulated, “I remember going to the 
first meeting of the committee on urban agriculture (…) The SAM was presented to Mr. Ménard120, 
who noticed there was some redundancy. At the time, the SAM was not well known by the city, it was 
barely emerging.”121 This dynamic revealed two main gaps. There were two departments of the city 
involved in the SAM, but that was not a sufficient condition to create synergies and reduce the 
“duplication of human and financial regional resources.” (SAM, 2013, p.10). Indeed, while the SAM 
was situated at the agglomeration, island-wide, level, the PCUA was instituted through a motion at the 
City level. 
5.2.2. The mediation of stakeholder priorities  
Earlier, I raised the issue of mediation when discussing previous experiences in food systems planning. 
                                                
118 Interview, monittee (2015) 
119 Interview, coordination committee (2015) 
120 M. Réal Ménard was responsible for sustainable development, environment, parks and green spaces at the 
executive committee of the City of Montreal 
121 Interview, coordination committee (2015) 
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Since the beginning of the development of the SAM 2025 Vision, planners envisioned the development 
of three food systems clusters based on whether they were from the social, environmental or economic 
sectors.  
 The division of the SAM into the three sectors was meant to balance within and between sectors. 
Under the SAM coalition umbrella, the traditional influence of the regional anti-hunger coalition and 
the public health agency fell under the “social cluster”. This served to ‘contain’, in some sense, these 
dominant voices and ensure that priorities over community empowerment and food access did not 
monopolize all of the partnerships energies and resources, as it may have been previously been the 
case. In the environmental field, one could find the actors involved in urban agriculture, as well as the 
more institutional stakeholders in agricultural land use planning.  
 The growth of the SAM 2025 partnership committee in view of its 2014-2016 action plan (from 22 to 
35 partners) fell under the same lines. In the spirit of Actor Network Theory, assigning a sector to each 
actor a sector serves a stabilization function. One delegate of each sector was assigned a seat at the 
coordination committee level. These seats are assumed by recognizable civil society coalitions, the 
Taskforce on Hunger for the social cluster, and the Regroupement des écoquartier on the 
environmental side. The regional office of the Ministry of Agriculture, on the other hand, assumed the 
responsibility for representing the economic dimension122. 
  I’ve spoken of the Taskforce on Hunger in the previous chapter, and its experience representing front 
line food security (both charity-based and autonomy-based) organizations since the early 19990s. There 
are several elements of rationale behind the enrolment of the Regroupement that are worth making 
explicit123. First, as a municipal-community partnership, the Regroupement enjoys a degree of 
institutional recognition, in contrast with more politicized actors in the field of urban agriculture. 
Second, the representative of the Regroupement was also involved in food systems planning in the 
neighbourhood of Lachine124:  
 
“The SAM had an impact on the implementation of the Système alimentaire lachinois [SAL]. In 
fact, we were several people working on food, and that had heard about the SAM. We went to 
the official launch, and when we got back to Lachine, we told ourselves that we were also at a 
stage that we could do food system planning. We felt some momentum from the youth 
                                                
122 In contrast with the Taskforce and the Regroupement, the MAFF is not a civil society-based. This illustrates 
a lack of coherence in the role of civil society in decision making within SAM. 
123 Initially, the environmental cluster was represented by Equiterre, which had, since the late 1990s, 
championed  the community-supported agriculture scheme. Over time, Équiterre invested its efforts in farm-
to-school projects. It stepped off the SAM coordination committee due to a lack of time.  
124 The Écoquartier of Lachine, known as GRAME, was responsible for coordinating the Collective Garden 
Network of Lachine and invited to sit on the Lachine Working Group on Food Security.  
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roundtable125, which didn’t see where healthy eating activities were situated and felt more and 
more pressure from Quebec en Forme. So the youth roundtable came to the assembly and said 
they were interested in promoting the action and issues that we have in food. From this point 
forward, we had two roundtables working together to develop the SAL. We would not have had 
the reflex to do so without the SAM.” 
 
 
The Regroupement was therefore not only selected because of its regional reach, but also because 
of the territorial dynamic its representative was involved in. Local actors in Lachine used the SAM 
as a blueprint to integrate the various aspects of a food system into their planning (i.e., the Système 
alimentaire lachinois) and had a pre-established relationship with the main funder of SAM (QEF). 
The local-regional dynamic can be termed as one of recognition of local efforts by regional actors. 
5.2.3. Aligning with health promotion funding 
The development of a collection position around the SAM 2025 Vision activated a number of 
successive institutional arrangements that resulted in the development of the 2014-2016 action plan.  
The first of these arrangements is the alignment between the SAM coalition and a funding source, 
Quebec en Forme. QEF is the first of the three province-wide public-private health promotion 
initiatives (Avenir d’Enfant, Réunir Réussir). The alignment between SAM and QEF was mediated by 
an intermediary structure, the Regional Roundtable on Healthy Lifestyles (RRHL)126. A roundtable was 
created in each of Quebec's seventeen regions under the leadership of the regional public health 
agencies and QEF. They were designed as a springboard to engage and support the municipal, health 
and education sectors in implementing policies that foster healthier environments and encourage the 
adoption of healthy lifestyles by the population.  
The RRHL was re-convened the year following its dissolution in 2013. There were multiple reasons 
why its work was discontinued. The main actors involved in the first edition of the RRHL were almost 
exclusively from the regional ministerial offices involved in the provincial health promotion plan. This 
top down approach left the RRHL without territorial anchoring and provided little room for new ideas 
and approaches. 
In terms of implementation, financial resources (QEF) were allocated to nine projects through a call 
                                                
125 The youth roundtable, or table jeunesse, is an example of a population-specific roundtable that received 
funding from Quebec en Forme to work on health prevention, including healthy eating, drug abuse, school 
enrolment, disabilities, etc. 
126 Table intersectorielle régionale sur les saines habitudes de vie (TIR SHV) would eventually be re-branded 
as “Montreal, healthy metropolis” (MHC), or Montréal, métropole en santé (MMS). 
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out for proposals127. One respondent stated, “There was no follow up and relationship between these 
initiatives. There was no evaluation, no accountability and no durability in the approach.”128 The 
interviewee signalled there was a broader issue of organizational culture, whereby the regional public 
healthy agency would traditionally fund and organize the community sector instead of influencing the 
municipality in adopting new policies.  
Finally, the RRHL had focused primarily on coordinating information sessions and organizing 
trainings. When the provincial government issued new orientations129, members of the RRHL felt they 
did not have the capacity to fulfill its new mandate. In this context, the main funder, QEF, ‘pulled the 
plug’ and announced it would not fund the roundtable in its current format.  
The RRHL was re-convened a year later when QEF raised interest in two parallel coalition-building 
exercises (SAM and Montréal Physiquement Actif). I described, in the previous section, the emergence 
of the SAM through a series of workshops, the development of the SAM 2025 Vision and the 
formalization of a steering committee. Moreover, QEF was already partnering with the municipal 
administration in a parallel initiative (MPA) at the time it was reconsidering its funding allocation 
strategy.  
The focus of this parallel partnership was on fostering physical activity and active mobility as 
strategies to tackle sedentary behaviours. The City had signed unto the International Charter of Toronto 
for Physical Activity, which served to promote the resolution that, “actions aimed at increasing 
population-wide participation in physical activity should be planned and implemented through 
partnerships and collaborations involving different sectors, and communities themselves, at national, 
regional and local levels.” (MPA, 2014, p.5). In this context, the city developed an umbrella initiative, 
Montreal Physiquement Actif (MPA) and launched, in partnership with QEF, a summit to engage 
organizations in the field of youth fitness, sports, leisure and outdoor activities.   
The simultaneous and parallel emergence of the SAM and MPA in 2013-2014 triggered an opening 
by QEF to support these mobilizations and re-convene the RRHL. With the end of its provincial 
mandate in sight in 2017, QEF saw these two partnerships as an opportunity to strategically invest the 
remaining regional funds ($1.8M). Both the SAM and the MPA were seen as complementary health 
promotion coalitions, one focused on healthy diets, and the other on physical activity.  
                                                
127 One of these projects was the attempt to pool together the logistics and buying power of neighbourhood 
solidarity markets 
128 Informal interview (2015) 
129 (1) Support stakeholder training, continuing education and networking; (2) Promote policies that foster 
healthy living habits; (3) Mobilize regional actors and professional resources in various sectors; (4) Support 
the assessment to foster decision-making in local communities; (5) identify promising or exemplary practices 
or initiatives; (6) Foster networking to ensure connection between the various levels of intervention. 
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The proposal was initially met with skepticism from the regional public health agency. This opening, 
however, quickly led to a ‘domino effect’ when the municipality, which had been minimally involved 
in the RRHL in the past, decided to take on additional leadership. Specifically, this commitment came 
from the director of the Service on social diversity and sports, Mrs. Johanne Derome. This convinced 
the director of the regional public health agency, Dr. Richard Massé, to signal his institutional 
commitment. Both assumed the position of co-president of the RRHL, bringing on board their 
respective staff and re-convening the sectors of education, health, municipal and the regional office of 
the agricultural ministry in the RRHL. 
These arrangements resulted in a closer connection between three health-promotion institutions: QEF, 
the public health agency and the municipal department on sports and social diversity. The framing of 
SAM and MPA through the health promotion lens is not negligible. Boroughs and municipalities more 
readily exercise their jurisdiction over recreational spaces than over food systems, which was seen as a 
benefit for SAM. An alliance with a partnership in physical activity could theoretically provide a 
springboard for municipalities to turn their attention towards healthy diets and food systems. 
Furthermore, the commitment of the Service of sports and social diversity reaffirmed the role of its 
sub-department (the Department to combat poverty and homelessness) to continue as a core SAM 
partner. 
The alignment between SAM, MPA and the RRHL provided the necessary financial conditions for 
the SAM to design an action plan. Several informants highlighted that this funding was a cornerstone 
of the SAM Action Plan. Without such funding, its actors were unsure where the SAM would have 
gone: “Quebec en Forme arrived and told us they were ready to invest $900,000 before disappearing in 
2017. If they hadn’t been there …[sign]”130. Another interviewee adds:  
 
“What was interesting is that, at one point, we created a link with Quebec en Forme and healthy 
lifestyles. The fact that there was funding… it was an advantage… and that Quebec en Forme 
accepted to create that linkage with healthy lifestyles and physical activity… you know, because 
they are mainly focused on physical activity, but they accepted to open their approach to 
consider that food, the food system, contributed [to health promotion]. (…) I think it also forced 
the Regional Roundtable on Healthy Lifestyles, that had been interrupted by the public health 
authorities and government people, to create stronger relationships between food, healthy 
lifestyles and physical activity.”131 
 
 
One inconvenience in terms of the general framing of the RRHL is that the field of action of the SAM 
                                                
130 Interview, coordination committee (2015) 
131 Interview, coordination committee (2015) 
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is broader that healthy eating per se, as it includes multiple dimensions of the territorial food system. 
The framing of RRHL therefore does not necessarily resonate with the discourse and actions of actors 
in the field of food systems planning. Furthermore, these new arrangements resulted in adjustments in 
governance.  
5.2.4. Temporary governance and decision making functions   
 
The combination of SAM, MPA and the RRHL formalized a temporary regional institutional 
infrastructure. Funding allocation was conditional on providing an action plan, which included actions 
where both partnerships had to coordinate with one another. As Quebec en Forme planned to end in 
2017, the RRHL projected to raise funds to ensure the continuity of both SAM and MPA partnerships, 
provide training, support evaluation and reach out to actors with influence.  
The folding of the SAM into a health promotion framework resulted in the creation of an additional 
layer of governance above the SAM and MPA, and a greater influence of public health actors over the 
initiative. As shown in the network models we designed, the representation of the Regional public 
health agency and QEF show a high degree of centrality of these two organizations (annex 3 to 7). In 
sum, health promotion became the core institutional arrangement of the SAM coalition. This is echoed 
by one survey respondent, who notes “the weight of QEF and the public health agency in the decision 
making process.”132  
The assessment of the efficiency of the partnership does reveal the process was inclusive, since civil 
society actors had as much or more influence over decisions as institutional members or funders 
(Condition 3). This can be explained by the vocal participation of some community coalitions, the 
presence of two civil society groups in the coordination committee and the role of civil society 
intermediaries in the delivery of the action plan. However, the participation of civil society remains 
selective within the coordination committee. Indeed, although the actors enjoy a high degree of 
institutional recognition, consensus among civil society is not fully reached on who should participate 
at the strategic level. Further, the creation of an additional layer of coordination (the RRHL), wherein 
civil society actors are absent, means that opportunities for feedback and influence are limited at a 
higher level. In the following model, we clearly see the RRHL, represented in blue as the comité de 
pilotage, supplanting both cross-sectorial mobilizations (SAM and MPA). 
 
 
                                                
132 Survey response (2016) 
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The added institutional complexity – described as “institutional acrobatics”133 by one peer – has meant 
that that power is negotiated on several levels and that decision-making is not always clearly visible 
and demarcated. On the one hand, regional planners have to negotiate with provincial institutions, may 
they be sectorial programs or regional offices of provincial ministries. Quebec en Forme, as somewhat 
at being somewhat at arms length from the provincial government and embodying the entrepreneurial 
spirit of the private sector, appeared to have adopted a more dynamic approach to planning than 
government bureaucracies by brokering relationships with regional planners. On the other hand, power 
is also negotiated between the core institutional arrangement of public sector bodies and the extended 
network of civil society organizations, which I turn to in the following section.  
5.3. The Action Plan and the evolution of the policy network  
 
 The institutionalization of the SAM into a municipal-sponsored food policy council is the guiding 
thread of this thesis. The first priority of the SAM Action Plan was to strengthen regional coordination. 
The creation of the municipal-sponsored Food Policy Council of Montreal is the first item on the action 
plan, encapsulated as “contributing to the work of a regional food agency”134. Before I address this in 
the next section, I first want to articulate two dynamics. First, I show how the SAM coordinated across 
                                                
133 Informal interview (2015) 
134 SAM Action Plan 2014-2016 
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public sector and municipal bodies to set the agenda for the action plan (Goal 2, 3 and 4). Second, I 
describe the mobilization of civil society bodies as part of the action plan.  
5.3.1. Setting the agenda: the combination of policy instruments   
 
The SAM Action Plan was mainly designed around the goal of mobilizing of public sector 
organizations and pre-existing institutional arrangements. Indeed, the results of the second condition 
for an effective partnership135 illustrates how public programs are the ones that identify and frame the 
problems that would need to be addressed. 
 
The four SAM 2014-2016 objectives were: 
• Goal 1 - Build regional capacity through coordination, mobilization, networking and representation 
• Goal 2 - Enable physical access to healthy food by providing regional support to community food 
security initiatives  
• Goal 3 - Develop and organize supply and demand of public institutions by designing a regional 
procurement strategy for 2025 based on the specific needs of public institutions 
• Goal 4 - Support the development of urban and peri-urban agriculture by contributing to the 
respective regional action plans136 
• Goal 5 - Regional cross-sector actions between SAM and MPA. 
 
In order to illustrate the ramifications of the SAM decision-making process, I summarized, in table 3 
(p.92), the relationships between public sector bodies and partner organizations. Specifically, I focus on 
the goals 2, 3 and 4 of the action plan as emerging from the priorities of existing policy initiatives. In 
some cases, I provide additional details on the role and function of the public sector organization. 
These institutional arrangements are listed below.  
 
• In Goal 2, the first institutional arrangement is structured around the City’s department of social 
diversity, which recognized the role and contributions of two regional community food security 
coalitions that emerged in early the 1990s. For example, it has directly funded these organizations, 
participated in their annual donation drives or subsidized their office space at different points since 
the mid or late 1990s. The City has also acquainted itself with these organizations through the 
Forum on social development, a planning process leading to the department to the creation of a 
Policy on social development. The second arrangement in Goal 2 is based on the public health 
agency’s food security programming which aimed at improving access to fresh foods in food 
                                                
135 Raising the interest of actors in strategic decisions early in the process and in playing a role in the 
partnership 
136 Goal 4 is ramified as urban agriculture (Goal 4.a) and peri-urban agriculture (Goal 4.b) 
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deserts by providing grants to fourteen community food security organizations. In the context of the 
SAM Action Plan, two new partnerships were developed, one with an urban planning non-profit 
and the other with the association of public markets.   
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programming 
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community groups 
to fight against 
urban food deserts.  
 
2 community food 
hubs (Lachine and 
Ville-Marie)  
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markets near subway stations 
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• In Goal 3, the institutional arrangements are built with the same public sector organization, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF). The MAFF applied two different policy 
instruments, one being a strategy specifically oriented at the MASH sector (municipal agencies, 
schools and healthcare) and the other a grant-based program for regional agri-food marketing. 
These different sources of funding were combined to fund the projects of the Bio-Food Industry 
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• Agreement between 
MAFF and CREO to 
support the BICIM  
• Provincial strategy to 
increase Quebec-made 
agri-foods in the 
municipal agencies, 
school and hospital 
sector 
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• In Goal 4, the first institutional arrangement originates from a city-level roundtable convened by the 
Office of Sustainable Development. The Permanent committee on urban agriculture emerged 
following a citizen-led public consultation aimed at increasing the role of the city in the field of 
urban agriculture.  
 
• The second arrangement in goal 4 originates from the municipality’s historical jurisdiction over 
agricultural land preservation. The Office of urban planning implements the agricultural land use 
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agriculture markets in the 
Spring; Provided training 
to urban farmers. 
 
1 university 
Provided training in school 










• Designs agriculture 
land use plans with 
MAFF in West Island  
• Embedded in 
metropolitan and 
provincial farmland 
planning mechanisms  
1 farming 
organization  
Provides training for peri-
urban farmers  
 
1 university  
Assesses the productive 
potential of West Island 
farmland 
 
These institutional arrangements reflect the scope of the SAM 2014-2016 Action Plan. In total, six 
policy instruments (plans, strategies, programs) come into play (column 3: institutional arrangements). 
The table illustrates the complexity of working across departmental siloes and public sector 
organizations. The successive institutional arrangements help us to identifying decision makers within 
each of the 2014-2016 SAM objectives. These decision makers mainly convened civil society 
stakeholders to identify priority actions. In some cases, new partners joined in. Projects, and project 
leaders, are identified through multilateral negotiations.  
The majority of project leaders are from civil society (n=8). There are also university-based (n=2) 
actors, and private organizations (one farming organization, one agri-food-processing roundtable). 
Finally, there is also Concertation Montreal, a new municipal body created after the CREO was 
abolished as part of the renegotiation of the fiscal pact between provincial government and 
municipalities.  
Moreover, the summary table indicates how the health promotion agenda, which was initially the 
core institutional arrangements linking the SAM Action Plan to its funder (the RRHL), is broken down 
and bundled with other goals. In Goal 2, the public health agencies’ program is combined with 
municipal poverty reduction efforts. In Goal 3, the public health’s agency goals, to improve to food 
environments in education, health and municipal settings, align with the goals of the MAFF.  
A second alignment is also emerging built around the regional office of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
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Food and Fisheries. Indeed, the social networks graphs illustrate a clear shift after the launch of the 
action plan of the MAFF as a central node of the network. The MAFF participated not only into Goal 3, 
as the table indicates, but was also an active stakeholder in Goal 4. Both objectives correspond to a 
broader agenda of territorial revitalization through agriculture development. This is important, because 
it corresponds to a partial balancing of the health promotion agenda.  
 
5.3.2. Negotiating the agenda: identifying priority actions 
 
The SAM became an arena of negotiation between two dozens organizations at the during the period 
when funding was distributed. Partners were faced with the difficult task of building consensus around 
priority actions while balancing their personal and organizational objectives. I noticed that the decision-
making processes varied from one goal to another depending on the strategy and leadership of each 
public sector organization, the number of partners to deliberate with and the historical dynamic, which 
is unique to each issue. In the field of urban agriculture, for example, the City of Montreal only 
consulted with two groups, whereas the public health agency held meetings with dozens of local 
initiatives and regional coalitions. The nature of negotiations also varied according to the backgrounds, 
expertise, institutional recognition and resources available to each actor.  
The process of prioritizing actions is a key phase in the decision-making process. The prioritization of 
actions and funding allocation for Goal 3 and Goal 4b was relatively fluid compared to physical access 
(Goal 2) and urban agriculture (Objective 4A). In the latter cases, which I will look at in more detail, 
there were more hesitations and debate in regards to how to prioritize actions, the choice of project 
leaders, the scope of projects and decision-making mechanisms.  
Both the degree to which civil society was involved in the process, and how politicized the issues 
were, stand out as noteworthy variables to articulate the multilateral negotiations that took place in the 
SAM Action Plan. Indeed, civil society organizations represent the majority of project leaders, but as 
I’ve indicated in the previous chapter, some areas in food systems planning have historically been more 
politicized than others. This is the case with food access (Goal 2) and urban agriculture (Goal 4.a), 
where civic food networks had to negotiate the institutionalization of programs and consultation 
mechanisms with public sector bodies. For this reason, I narrow in on these two streams of the SAM. 
These contrasts well with the areas of public purchasing in the MASH sector (Goal 3) and farmland 
development in West Island (Goal 4.b), where actors are more institutionalized.  
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5.3.2.1. Case 1 of stakeholder dialogue: food access (Goal 2) 
 
In the field of food accessibility, the negotiations were framed around two generations of community 
food security organizations. In the 1990s, groups with an anti-hunger agenda and an empowerment-
based approach coalesced and received attention in the context of the City’s growing role in poverty 
reduction. Since then, the neighbourhood-level roundtables have been institutionalized, anchoring 
groups to coordinate around a number of issues (greening, food security, urban revitalization). 
Meanwhile, community organizations, which had come to work with the public health agency, invested 
in their social economic mandate to provide greater fresh food access in low-income neighbourhoods. 
While the decades-old Taskforce on Hunger had previously played a strong role in promoting and 
incubating new community interventions (e.g., school meals, collective kitchens, Magasins Partage, 
etc…), local organizations with a social and economic mandate were reluctant to align with its politics 
and discourse. As a result of this negotiation, the Taskforce was not taken seriously: it was a province-
wide, urban planning non-profit137 which was tasked with organizing regional food security forums. 
Further, the Taskforce’s project was planned and implemented independently from others in Goal 2.  
The decision-making process within the social economic cluster of Goal 2 embodied an important 
territorial dimension that was the subject of much stakeholder dialogue. The SAM negotiations were 
activated by two local dynamics. The first dynamic, situated in the neighbourhood of Ville Marie, is 
what I would term “contagious”. A community food hub had piloted food stalls in corners stores and 
installed a semi-permanent market outside of the Frontenac metro. Over time, its staff built capacity 
(i.e., funding, volunteers), expertise and credibility among its peers from its experiences in fresh food 
provisioning and links with academia (Audet al al., 2015). Based on its social learning, the community 
food hub proposed to continue working with the public health agency (F&V stalls in corner stores) and 
the association of public markets (F&V stalls outside metro stations). This dynamic is said to be 
contagious because it originated in one territory and these two flagship projects became models for 
diversifying fresh food access in other neighbourhoods. As I indicate later, the contagion of food 
innovations does not stop here, as they also had implications on the political landscape.  
The second territorial dynamic in Goal 2 is situated in the southwest neighbourhoods of Montreal, 
where a community food hub in Lachine had also spearheaded the collectivization of food-provisioning 
activities (RUI St Pierre, 2016), which I introduced in the previous chapter. Community groups 
proposed to pursue stakeholder dialogue regionally, but were uncertain that this level of intervention 
would be appropriate given the local specificities and anchoring of each community-run food market 
                                                
137 Vivre en Ville https://vivreenville.org/ 
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and stores. Further, a number of tensions of ‘coop-petition’ (cooperation/ competition) appeared to 
persist from previous attempts at pooling market power. In order to work around these issues, funders 
suggested that groups conduct an assessment on community food provisioning and an action plan. 
Groups were reluctant to add another mandate to the association of public markets (who was already 
involved in the two flagship projects) and instead delegated the task to the Lachine community food 
hub. These territorial dynamics echo a process mentioned earlier, that is one of recognition of local 
activities by regional level institutions and the SAM as a whole.138 
5.3.2.2. Case 2 of stakeholder dialogue: urban agriculture (Goal 4.A) 
 
In the late 2000s, the field of urban agriculture became an increasingly politicized municipal issue, 
eventually resulting in the launch of the public consultation in 2011 (Mailhot-Leduc, 2014; Duchemin 
and Vermette, 2016). However, the aspirations that had spurred the process were met with institutional 
inertia and electoral politics: neither the Office of Sustainable Development nor city councilors became 
the champions community groups had wished for to recognize, facilitate and promote urban 
agriculture. In this context, the SAM Action Plan provided an opportunity for the City to invite 
committee members to submit projects and partially fill a gap in the consultation process: “It was in the 
continuity [with the action plan] because we saw this source of funding as a potential for urban 
agriculture groups (…) it was an opportunity to pursue their actions.”139 Two groups were convened: 
the representative of an urban agriculture coalition and a university-based center. 
Building consensus was particularly challenging:  
 
“It was tricky between them (…) we asked them to agree with each other, they were not so 
many of them but… If weyou asked me today how to redistribute funds, I would definitely 
work like with [the program] Quartier 21. (…) I don’t really know why they couldn’t agree 
with each other, ultimately it was a question of funding, but I also saw it in a different way, their 
roles were different in [the field of] urban agriculture. What I mean is that some are more 
oriented towards the grassroots, you know, helping groups on the ground, and then there are 
others who approach it as playing an advisory in urban agriculture. It’s not the same, that’s why 
I’m saying they have different values and conception of their roles.”140  
 
 
 This quote highlights the different roles and values of the groups involved. For the community 
                                                
138 A third territorial dynamic was present in Montreal-North, where SAM partners attempted to convince a 
neighbourhood food security coalition to join the dialogue. Interestingly, the coalition aligned with the 
Taskforce on Hunger, instead of the SAM.  
139 Interview, coordination committee (2015) 
140 Interview, coordination committee (2015) 
 88 
coalition, the development of urban agriculture was stalled by the lack of appropriate coordination 
mechanisms, such as the membership, mandate and institutional setting. As documented by one of the 
spokespersons of the UAWG, the recognition of its experience, network and knowledge was at the 
heart of the issue:  “Although the roundtable [PCUA141] brought together several important players, the 
majority of committee members do not have a thorough knowledge of the sector. Alternatives, which 
represents the Urban Agriculture Working Group within the Permanent Committee on Urban 
Agriculture, continues to coordinate biannual meetings. However, this consultation is not taking place 
in the best of conditions, because it is neither funded nor recognized by the City. We believe that the 
PCUA should be dissolved and replaced by an innovation roundtable focused on action and that would 
be able to respond to the needs of the sector by resorting to experienced advisors.” (Alternatives, 2016)  
 The voice of the UAWG had traditionally been sidelined in the PCUA. For example, after the 
consultation (2011-2012) had ended, the community coalition initially did not receive a seat at the city-
sponsored roundtable. Furthermore, the citizen-led advocacy work of the community coalition meant 
that institutional actors perceived it as limited in other fields (technical, commercial, jurisdictional). 
One civil servant pointed out to me, “Here, in Montreal, I tell you, urban agriculture is badly 
interpreted by the public administration. Urban agriculture, for the Montreal public administration, its 
citizen, it’s communitarian… You know what I had to say to urban planners? I had to speak of urban 
agriculture as ‘farming activities outside agricultural zoning!’”142 In contrast, institutional actors were 
more willing to recognize the expertise held by a university-based research center143, which was able to 
make policy proposals by inviting outside experts in the field of urban agriculture144. In this context, 
the idea of involving the UAWG to act as an innovation roundtable was rejected, and funding was 
allocated to both groups (UAWG and research center) for their respective activities. 
 
5.3.3. Mobilizing intermediaries, activating change  
 
Once the negotiations to allocate funding took place, the action plan activated a number of project 
leaders.  Activities included organizing regional or national events, generating technical knowledge, 
facilitating stakeholder dialogue and piloting projects. During the short span of the action plan, the 
                                                
141 Permanent committee on urban agriculture 
142 Interview, coordination committee (2015) 
143 The Laboratoire d’agriculture urbaine (Université du Québec à Montréal) 
144 One of the lunch-conference of the SAM was on urban agriculture. The research center brought in the 
Boston Food Policy Office.  
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mobilization of intermediaries within the objectives 2, 3 and 4 lead to a partial distribution of roles and 
the mobilization of new partners and expertise, summarized in table 2. These resulted in some 
noteworthy changes in the SAM network. I specifically narrow in on one of the most influential 
territorial dynamics in the partnership. 
The most visible change documented was around Goal 2, where the two flag ship projects145, 
originating from social learning in Ville Marie, were piloted at a regional level to be implemented in 
other neighbourhoods. The actual installation of new fresh food stalls (in corner stores, near metro 
stations) is both an organizational and technical intervention. In other words, this mobilization 
distinguishes itself from other activities (i.e., capacity building, promotion, training, events) by building 
new provisioning channels to residents and strengthening community-based food distribution supply 
chains.   
At the organizational level, the project leader was a mediator between local community food 
organizations installing the new food stalls, and institutional actors and funders. Further, the cross-
sectorial scope of these projects involved the urban transit agency, in the sector of transport, as well as 
economic development agencies146. Finally, these projects also became platforms to explore 
opportunities with other private sector actors, such as Ultramar, a gas retail company, to make available 
healthier food options available.  
One effect of scaling up the solidary market model was to add a social and solidarity dimension to the 
mission of the public markets’ association. This is novel, because its mission, dating back to when it 
was incorporated in 1993, was solely economic in scope (i.e., promotion, renting out its kiosques, etc.). 
With the SAM Action Plan, the association developed a new role in institutionalizing neighbourhood 
food markets. The mobilization of knowledge in food supply and distribution is noticeable, which was 
previously lacking in regional stakeholder dialogue. The network graphs developed illustrate how both 
the community food hub and market association became more central actors in the network and built 
institutional proximity with public sector organizations (annex 3 to 7, annex 11). This place-based 
dynamic of institutional entrepreneurship is one of the key findings of this research. 
The contribution of project leaders, notably in Ville Marie, spilled over beyond Goal 2 and the SAM 
Action Plan. In the field of urban agriculture, the professional and geographic proximity with the 
research center provided a fertile terrain to support small-scale urban agriculture businesses and launch 
greenhouse projects (e.g., near the Frontenac station, on the Palais des Congrès). The research center 
also provided advice to the City over municipal regulation of urban bee populations and was consulted 
                                                
145 The installations of F&V stalls in corner stores and outside metro stations. 
146 City’s Division of economic development and intermediaries, the Committee on social economy of Montreal 
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on the new urban agriculture program of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Fisheries (MAFF)147. 
The latter illustrates how the agricultural ministry means to diversify its interventions (Doddridge and 
Sénéchal, 2013), a trend that was covered in the previous chapter. The benefits of the participation of 
the ministry at the regional level can be highlighted as one that legitimizes urban agriculture in they 
eyes of the municipal administration, positioning it as an opportunity for job creation to the municipal 
administration. 
The noticeable territorial dynamic in the SAM originating from Ville-Marie continued to spread and 
transform the network, serving as a model to for connecting urban agriculture, distribution, marketing 
and food recovery activities (preparation, compost) at a neighbourhood scale. The diversification and 
integration of local interventions (through forums, joint-planning and borough policy) provided a fertile 
model for other territories and was promoted in the SAM forums148. In this context, the coalition of 
neighbourhood roundtables149 may become a key channel for community groups to promote territorial 
food systems, and signal a potential shift away from the anti-hunger discourse of the Taskforce on 
Hunger. 
Finally, the Ville- Marie borough was the only sector in Montreal that developed an integrated 
borough food strategy: “The borough’s inquiry was supported by the Carrefour alimentaire Centre-
Sud, which made an initial food strategy proposal. The borough wished to commit and contribute, in 
the limits of its jurisdiction and with the resources at its disposal, to work towards food security and 
promote healthy eating” (2016, p.2). In contrast with stand-alone policies in other boroughs, such as 
Côte St Luc's urban agriculture charter, or zoning by-laws limiting fast food outlets in Côte-des-Neiges, 




                                                
147 In the context of this program, the MAFF officially partnered with the Urban Agriculture Lab of the 
Université de Québec à Montréal to create an urban agriculture research and knowledge transfer hub. 
https://www.actualites.uqam.ca/2017/nouveau-partenariat-agriculture-urbaine 
148 This mobilization contributed to the impact of the SAM Forum in June 2015, which was co-organized by 
Vivre en Ville. The event attracted 180 participants, and showcased the experience of organizations from 12 
different neighbourhoods to build regional momentum.  
149 The representative of the coalition is the Corporation de Développement Communautaire of Centre Sud, 
from the borough of Ville Marie. 
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5.4. Transition: from partnership to policy council  
5.4.1. The opening of a policy window 
 
The SAM coalition emerged out to fill a coordination gap. Despite having issue-focused and 
neighbourhood-level roundtables and coalitions, there was no overarching food systems planning 
approach before the SAM 2025 Vision and action plan. The alignment with the health promotion 
agenda provided the coalition with the resources to invest, as a “financial leverage”, into projects, 
outreach and training activities. The SAM, however, operated in a context of high uncertainty and short 
planning horizons, has always had in sight the end of the provincial mandate of Québec en Forme, its 
main funder, in 2017. 
In this context, an institutional void persisted. Despite the involvement of some of the key municipal 
departments and regional governmental offices, the SAM coalition had no mandate to influence city 
councillors, provide advice on future programs, or to recommend the adoption of new regulations and 
by-laws in boroughs. In this context, actions to influence the city officials remained limited.150 In the 
same vein, elected officials were insufficiently engaged in the development of the SAM. The SAM 
lacked political capital. One city councilor had signed onto the SAM 2025 vision and contributed to 
having the SAM Action Plan endorsed by the City. However, one actor indicates, “It should be noted 
that, despite all the efforts, that the SAM was not in capacity to embody such a model [hybrid model of 
governance of food policy council], in particular because of the too little involvement of city councilors 
on the SAM’s partner committee.” (MPM, 2016, p.3)  
Ensuring the continuity of the SAM meant gaining greater influence and authority on municipal 
issues and facing the established “political lock-in” documented by Audet and colleagues (2015). Some 
critical groundwork was completed: on April 28th 2014, the municipal council “adhered” to the SAM 
2025 vision and partners151. The proposal was made by city councilor Monique Vallée, from Lasalle, a 
councilor that promoted the work of food security organizations, such as participating in the annual 
donation drives of food banks and magasins partage. This proposal received support across party lines: 
the proposal was supported by city councilors from the Saint Laurent, Mr. Miele, and Villeray-Saint 
Michel-Park Extension, from the Mayor’s party, and from the former opposition party leader. 
                                                
150 The Regional Roundtable on Healthy Lifestyles promoted a “healthy living challenge” in which the Mayor 
participated (Défi Santé); the SAM granted a small financial prize to the borough of Côte-des-Neiges for its 
new zoning; the SAM also worked, with MPA on a municipal healthy eating procurement policy for public 
events. 
151 Municipal council (2014) p. 14 
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As planned, the city council recognized the SAM. However, this was not sufficient to determine a 
clear role for the city and move the food policy council agenda forward.  In an unexpected turn of 
events, borough councilor of Ville Marie, Valérie Plante (opposition party), proposed a motion to 
further “affirm the role of the city of Montreal in food” (Aug. 2014). In turn, city councilor Monique 
Vallée, from across the aisle, proposed to task the Commission on diversity and social development, 
which she was responsible for, to conduct a consultation on “the feasibility of a food policy council.” 
This process officially launched a parallel consultation process to the SAM, the second one if we 
include the urban agriculture consultation in 2011.  
During my research, I asked SAM stakeholders on multiple occasions whether this motion was part 
of the SAM attempt to influence political decision makers. It wasn’t. Political influence appeared to 
reside outside of the capacity of the SAM, as a coalition largely comprised of public sector 
organizations and the civil service. Speaking of the previous, Nourrir Montreal initiative, one advocate 
pointed out, “The institutions [funders] don’t have much room for manoeuvre with the political 
[branch]. They are civil servants, they can support initiatives, but they can’t go much further than 
that.”152  
Besides the historical political alignment between the city councillor from LaSalle and anti-hunger 
groups, a new type of political leadership, originating from Ville Marie this time, emerged. This new 
champion likely built on their experience in designing an integrated, borough-level food strategy. 
Further, the territorial dynamic coincides with the contagious effect of the community food hub in 
SAM 2014-2016 Action Plan. This coincidence, or trace, signals an insider/outsider game by policy 
entrepreneurs. By officially studying the feasibility of a Food policy council, the City of Montreal 
would politically commit to play a new role in the future. 
 
5.4.2. The positioning of the SAM partnership  
 
The announcement of the consultation came as a surprise to the SAM coordination committee who 
were unaware that attempts were made to directly influence city councillors. It’s important for us to 
highlight this coordination gap, as it reveals that trust building between the SAM coordination and its 
partners cannot be taken for granted. That said, the SAM as a coalition played a notable role in the 
work of the Commission on diversity and social development. It took part in preparatory sessions held 
                                                
152 Interview, coordination committee (2015) 
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prior to the public consultations. Furthermore, the commission met with individual members, including 
the Taskforce on Hunger and the regional public health agency.  
The coordination committee members wrote and co-signed a position paper, which received external 
letters of support from two organizations in the health sector, an environmental group (a former 
committee member) and a neighbourhood roundtable (from Mercier-Est). Several members of the 
coordination committee also wrote position papers and, in certain cases, leveraged their positions in 
other consultative bodies or organizations, to present a second position paper. In all, the coordination 
committee members generated seven position papers in the span of a month with the goal of 
communicating a common message: that the future, the municipal-sponsored Food Policy Council 
should directly build on the groundwork laid out by the SAM.   
A mobilizing effect was observed, despite the little amount of time allotted to producing these 
papers. In total, 23 out of the 43 interventions made to the Commission were from active members and 







The Commission on diversity and social development generated fifteen recommendations to inform 
the creation of a food policy council to both the municipal and agglomeration councils. The municipal 
executive committee was then responsible for issuing its opinion on whether to validate, reject or 
change the recommendations. Before it did so however, SAM coordinators were convened with the 
Service on social diversity and sports to plan a workshop and assist the city in responding to these 







Participants who submitted a position paper, 
 according to sector (Sept-Nov 2015) 
Québec en Forme et SAM 
Environnement et urbanisme 
(n=3) 
Santé (n=3)  
Commercial ou privé (n=3) 
Universitaire (n=3) 
Communautaire - organisme 
(n=6)  
Communautaire - instance de 
concertation (n=10) 
Diagram 1: Sectors that have submitted a position paper 
to food policy consultation. 
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to discuss their respective models.  
 
5.4.3. The transition of the SAM to a food policy council  
 
The Commission was in favour of the creation of a food policy council. The fifteen recommendations 
it issued launched a negotiated back and forth between official and nonofficial city channels. 
Unfortunately, there is a lack of detail, in both the commission’s report and city council’s response, 
about the financial commitments of the city, which city councillor should be the official channel and 
where the food policy council should be embedded. I do map, however, some of the changes that 
resulted from the negotiation between the Department tasked to combat poverty and homelessness, the 
executive municipal council and SAM planners.  
In terms of governance, the commission proposed a “hybrid governance model” in order for council 
members to have both access to city councillors and organizational networks outside the reach of the 
municipality. The Commission proposed to merge the municipal-sponsored Food Policy Council with 
the Permanent committee on urban agriculture convened by the Office on Sustainable Development. 
However, the Commission remained ambiguous in terms of keeping the SAM as it was while still 
creating a new food policy council. During a later workshop, SAM coordinators expressed the need to 
have one and only structure and merge the SAM into the municipal-sponsored FPC. We see this in the 
response of the executive council to the commission: 
 
“The collaborative linkages between the Food Policy Council and the SAM partnership. 
Recommendaiton-12: Plan to have a seat on the FPC reserved to the SAM partners. 
Response to R-12: The executive committee cannot align with this recommendation, 
considering that the existence of the SAM in parallel to a FPC would create redundancy and 
eventually disengage actors. The current SAM actors informed the city that a fusion of their 
agency with a FPC (…) would be possible. In consequence, the executive committee invites 
all of the SAM actors to adhere to a future FPC in order to participate in the works.” 
 
The city tasked the main public sector partners of the SAM to propose a model of governance, but 
also asked them to renew their financial commitments before it could take an official position. This was 
somewhat unsatisfactory for some, who wished for the city’s executive council to sit directly at the 
table and take greater leadership. 
This process of back-and-forth between municipal agencies and the SAM is important because it 
clarified the roles of the food policy council. The Commission and the executive council proposed that 
the future FPC would adopt two roles, one being advisory and the other to stimulate regional 
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cooperation. Since, SAM partners proposed two additional roles: acting as a financial leverage and 
project incubator (which it was already doing) and policy advocacy. In the latter case, this is a new role 
for the SAM, and goes beyond the recommendations issued by the Commission.  These four roles 
(cooperation, advisory, advocacy and incubation) of the new Food Policy Council illustrate the 
embedding of new norms into municipal institutions.  
 
Roles of SAM Food Policy Council (2017) 
1. Provide a forum for cooperation and local-regional linkages 
2. Advocate for policies and sustainable and just food systems 
3. Act as an advisor to partners and public and municipal 
institutions  
4. Incubates structural initiatives by acting as a regional financial 
leverage (matching funds, seed money) 
 
At the time I was finalizing this thesis, the SAM coalition was undergoing a transition into the 
municipal-sponsored Food Policy Council. On the side of public sector organizations, funding 
arrangements are renewed. Actually, the mandate of Quebec en Forme was extended two additional 
years, providing additional space for planning. On the side of SAM coalition members, they were 
consulted to come together into taskforces on the issues of (1) urban agricultures, which include both 
urban and peri-urban farming, (2) distribution and procurement, (3) food security and (4) waste 
reduction. Further, partner organizations proposed to create a broader network of individual and 
organisational members, which would extend beyond an official partners’ committee.  
 
5.4.4. Between policy adjustments and policy gaps 
 
The parallel deployment of the SAM Action Plan and the FPC consultation ended up being timely. As 
the SAM Action Plan ended, it received a mandate to create a municipal-sponsored FPC. Interestingly, 
several changes within official city policies are also noticeable, with a greater integration of food 
systems into official policy documentation. The new Policy on social development mentions the 
upcoming FPC, further committing the city to continue participating in its development.  
The Office of Sustainable Development, whose work had been circumscribed to urban agriculture 
and waste management, started to embed health and nutrition in its 2016-2020 plan. The integration of 
healthy eating is seen as an “improvement of the social dimension aspects of the municipal 
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administration’s sustainable development action plan 2016-2020: In connection with Action 12, to 
make urban agriculture and healthy lifestyles part of the neighbourhoods’ DNA and, related to the 
financial backing of community organizations, to support projects that will promote the adoption of 
healthy lifestyles, in particular by making healthful food and physical activity accessible to everyone.” 
Under this heading, the strategy will help “consolidate the actions of Montréal, métropole en santé”, 
the re-branded Regional Roundtable on Healthy Lifestyles (RRHL).  
The Office of urban planning also announced the farmland development plan (2015), which 
mentions farming activities outside of areas expressively zoned for farming, i.e., urban agriculture. This 
is important because it aligns with the goals expressed by urban agriculture initiatives, which had 
advocated that UA be recognized into official planning documents. The forth orientation of the plan 
states, “To integrate the development of commercial agricultural activities in industrial and commercial 
sectors in the urban zone”. The plan also wishes to develop “innovative agricultural production projects 
within the urban zone”. The commercial aspect includes both private and social economy (coop, non-
profit) and expands the scope of urban agriculture beyond the bias of some public sector bodies as only 
a social activity. However, some partners have expressed reserved in terms of the implementation the 
farmland development plan (it is not an “action plan”) due to the absence of political capital. Indeed, in 
2014-2016, actions were operationalized through the funding allocated by the SAM153, and hence not 
directly through the City itself.  
However, policy gaps persist. This was the case with the surprising announcement of the Policy on 
Children (Ville de Montréal, 2016). Specifically, the policy plans to invest $2.3 M per year to provide 
meals in schools. However, this policy did not consult with SAM actors, neither core public sector 
organizations nor stakeholders involved in institutional procurement (Goal 3). Indeed, SAM 
stakeholders had made the education sector a priority to improve institutional buying practices. Despite 
having conducted a report, organized a national event and piloted new projects, the municipality and 
the SAM actors were unaware of one another. Instead, the Policy on Children was targeted towards 
non-profits that distribute donated foods from the agri-food industry to school breakfast programs. An 
alternative policy option would have to strengthen project funding of the food policy council and 
earmark funds for the education sector, or to have built on previous efforts of the consortium of social 
economy enterprises that has been working with school boards since 1991154. In this sense, the Policy 
                                                
153 This included farmer-led training activities and delivering assessments on municipal-owned land: (1) its 
agro-economic potential and (2) species and habitats at risk.  
154 The Collectif de la table des écoliers was engaged in Goal 3. However, the timing of the action plan did not 
align with its readiness to propose a universal school food program, instead of the current targeted program 
which reaches 1 in 9 chilren.  
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on Children (2016) represents a missed opportunity for the upcoming Food Policy Council and 
stakeholders involved in the SAM, but most importantly the population as a whole. 
5.5. Conclusions: institutionalizing innovation, influencing policy  
 
The SAM Action Plan 2014-2016 provides an interesting case to illustrate how urban food planners 
have to negotiate provincial, municipal and community dynamics. This chapter revealed the long, 
multi-faceted process of institutionalizing food innovations. 
 First, the launch of the SAM Action Plan revealed a combination of several institutional arrangements 
to secure funding and streamline policy instruments. At this stage, I showed the impact this had on the 
governance structure and the limited input of civil society. Funding allocation, on the other hand, was 
the result of a negotiation between intermediaries around specific goals. I explored the most politicized 
spaces where civil society was most present, and revealed the difficulties of building consensus and the 
sidelining of certain voices. Finally, I narrowed down my analysis to highlight the territorial dynamic 
behind two flagship projects, and the institutionalization of neighbourhood food markets. 
 The territorial dynamic that I made visible in this chapter also played out, unexpectedly, at the 
political level. Despite the SAM Action Plan, the coalition lacked sufficient political capital and a clear 
strategy to pursue its work beyond 2017. As a result, an insider/outsider game, which coincided with a 
territorial dynamic, lead to the launch of a parallel consultation on a food policy council. As a result, 
the SAM coalition mobilized around that “policy window” and was able to influence the executive 
committee, via the Department on Poverty, to merge into a hybrid food policy council with political 
buy-in. While there are still elements that remain to be finalized155, I covered the foundations of 
Montreal’s upcoming SAM-Food Policy Council. 
 In the future, the SAM-Food Policy Council will be faced with the difficult task of solving policy 
gaps. I mentioned, for example how new official city documents are increasingly inclusive of the issues 
of health and nutrition and the diversity of urban farming practices. However, others policy gaps 
remain, as illustrated by the Policy on Children, where no communication channels were set up 
between policy makers and the SAM policy networks. Further, the FPC will also have to negotiate 
across stakeholder priorities and agendas while recognizing the contributions of emerging community 
leaders and coalitions.  
 
                                                
155 Not least the financial commitment of the city, the institutional anchor of the FPC and which city councillor 
are going to be delegated as an official representative and potential champion 
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6. Chapter 6: Conclusion and discussion 
 
City-regions are emerging as leading arenas to coordinate and facilitate the emergence of territorial 
food systems, notably through the creation of food policy councils (MacRae and Donahue, 2013; 
Harper et al., 2012; Boulianne and Bissardon, 2016). This thesis provided a detailed overview of how 
multiple spaces were crafted to address food-related issues in Montreal, Quebec (1986-2012). In the 
context of the shifting terrain of provincial neoliberal reform (2000s-2010s), the successive multiple 
attempts to create a regional coordinating body eventually succeeded in transforming a stakeholder-led 
coalition into a hybrid, municipal-sponsored Food Policy Council (2014-2017). However, the 
institutionalization of socially innovative experiments, carried out by civic food networks, reveals a 
number of tensions, challenges and policy gaps in city-region food governance.  
Before I conclude this thesis, let me recall the core questions of my research:  
• What influence has Quebec’s provincial regulatory landscape had on city-region food 
governance?  
• How have policy networks evolved over the past three decades in Montreal? What issues have 
they tried to address, and what barriers have they faced?  How have previous group formation 
and institutional arrangements shaped Montreal’s current food strategy and governance?   
• How do actors negotiate their roles and relationships in the development and implementation of 
the action plan? Was the SAM partnership model successful, and if not, what were its limits? 
How did the SAM partnership evolve into the municipally mandated Food Policy Council?  
This final chapter is divided into five discussions. First, I address the research questions from the 
perspective of food policy and food planning: I summarize the provincial and municipal food policy 
landscape in the context of neoliberalism. In part two and three, I reintroduce the vocabulary of Actor-
Network Theory (translation, controversy, mediator) in my analysis of the case study, and reflect on its 
use as a methodology. In the last section, I look at opportunities for the municipal Food Policy Council 
to engage across levels of government, and finally conclude with the notion of commoning in food 
policy. 
6.1. City-region food governance: top down and bottom up 
 
In this thesis, I indicated a number of dynamics that had an influence on city-region food governance. 
My field research and the SAM 2014-2016 Action Plan took place when there was a high degree of 
institutional uncertainty. As Marsden (2000) suggests, it is important to contextualize Actor-Network 
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Theory in food studies within its given political economy. At a regulatory level, the neoliberal turn of 
the Quebec model led to a succession of reforms that have significantly reoriented health care and 
health prevention, education and childcare services, as well as regional, rural and community economic 
development (Bouachard and Lévesque, 2005; Vaillancourt, 2017). These fields are relevant for city-
region food systems planners, given that some have been either institutional anchors for previous food 
councils, or key participants at least. Budgetary constraints are also a recurrent issue. The uncertainties 
surrounding the continuation of the public-private partnership Quebec en Forme illustrates the effects 
of provincial institutional arrangements on the time horizon of food systems planning in Montreal. 
Perhaps more dramatically, several of the SAM partners and professionals – in the school board, the 
public health authority and community economic development agencies – simply lost their employment 
due to budgetary cuts and organization restructuring.  
From a food and nutrition policy standpoint, I explained that, despite significant achievements in the 
field of the social and solidarity economy in the 1980s and 1990s, nutrition policies, and school meal 
programs in particular, remained targeted initiatives with limited reach, and never fully extended on a 
universal basis throughout the education sector. Further, anti-poverty legislation that passed in 2001 
neither recognized food as a human right nor provided a social safety net that was solid enough to 
curtail food insecurity in the province. While the law helped recognize empowerment-based and 
collective food security interventions over charity-based solutions, food security programming has 
remained sectorial in scope and been contained within public health (Bilodeau, 2006). 
In terms of agricultural governance, the consultations that took place in the 2000s demonstrated the 
effects of political in-fighting and the lack of commitment to long term policy change. Although the 
main governing body, the MAFF, has diversified its interventions and played a firmer role in agri-
environmental policy (Doddridge and Senechal, 2013; Doyon et al, 2016; Benoit, 2015) the investment 
in new programs156 has hit a financial lock-in (Benoit, 2015), cross-compliance157 mechanisms have 
applied to narrow criteria (Mundler and Ruiz, 2015) and its mandate continues to be defined on 
economic performance alone. Moreover, the corporatist legacy of the 1960s has both enabled, but also 
contained, pressures for reform: the main farming body has largely retracted into a defensive position 
in view of the dominant trade agenda, the consolidation of market power by processors and retailers 
and the participation of new environmental, social and rural organizations. 
                                                
156 Since 2008, the MAFF has developed programs in the organic sector, local food promotion and certification, 
institutional purchasing, (semi-)direct agri-food marketing, multifunctional agriculture, agricultural land use 
planning, urban agriculture 
157 Cross compliance is a mechanism whereby farmers are eligible for government support under the condition 
of their compliance to environmental regulations. 
 100 
This brief overview shows that an institutional void persists at the provincial level, leaving 
municipalities with the task of combining previously isolated mandates (social inclusion, economic 
development, agricultural zoning, greening, waste management, etc.), of working across levels of 
municipal governments and engaging an increasingly diverse set of interests. I explained that, 
administratively, the city is relatively decentralized at the borough-level, where most programming 
decisions are made, and unlike other cities, neither education nor public health are under the municipal 
jurisdiction.  Moreover, the city had traditionally provided support for the main public markets, but 
pulled out in 1992, and, historically, has used its limited powers to restrict animal husbandry and 
selling food in public spaces (Duchemin and Vermette, 2016). I also mentioned some of the regional 
discussions that took place regarding a food security policy (1998) and a metropolitan agri-food cluster 
(2005-2010), and how neither were activated. 
There have been successive efforts to create a regional roundtable on food systems in Montreal. There 
were a combination of factors that caused these efforts to be stalled or discontinued, but those that 
appeared the most visible to me were the following: in 1994, efforts were stalled by electoral change; in 
2004, the commitment of public health authorities on programming appeared to have sidelined 
municipal policy change, while the creation of the CREO appeared as an opportunity to gain proximity 
with the city (Bertrand and Thérien, 2004); finally, in 2010, the committee lacked a clear advisory 
mandate and, in the end, was oriented towards pilot projects rather than policy change. Previous 
experiences were criticized as lacking diversity and being mainly framed around hunger, poverty and 
an under-funded community sector. Simultaneously, public health orientations towards access to fruit 
and vegetables were criticized for not addressing the root causes of food insecurity, and imposing on 
community groups to invest into their economic mandate (Audet et al., 2015). 
At the departmental level, progress has been slow. The department responsible of social development 
and poverty reduction was the first municipal interlocutor on the issue of food security. In the 2000s, 
urban agriculture became the object of a large-scale consultation, and it was the department of 
sustainable development that was tasked with convening a working group. For a number of reasons - 
including a lack of electoral safety and administrative capacity, and a weak connection with 
practitioners and their networks - the work of the committee was stalled. Eventually, the mandate of the 
SAM-Food Policy Council was a given to the first of the two (Commission de la diversité et du 
développement social, 2017). 
In many ways, Montreal has also been at the avant-guard in food policy. For example, in the 1990s, 
the municipality created one of the world’s most large-scale community gardening programs (Saint-
Hilaire-Gravel, 2014; Mailhot-Leduc, 2014; Duchemin and Vermette, 2016). Later, in the 2000s, the 
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city reached a tri-partite agreement with the public health agency and a public foundation to support 
cross-sectorial neighbourhood roundtables (Longtin and Rochman, 2015), which would eventually play 
a key role in community food security planning. Agricultural land use plans are now instituted in all 
municipal counties and cities in the metropolitan region and are a rare example of multi-level 
coordination in food systems governance (Doyon et al, 2016; CMM, 2016). 
Civic food networks and civil society organizations have increasingly diversified over time. Initially 
understood as either charity- or empowerment-based, community groups have since been analyzed 
based on their activities in production, meal preparation, sale, as well as food recovery and waste 
reduction. I could have spoken in more detail of the food bank distribution network, which I’ve heard is 
the largest in North America, or the collective kitchen movement, which has grown to include 
thousands of groups in the province during the 1990s. In this thesis, I decided to focus on three types of 
coalitions that have respectively organized around hunger (Bilodeau et al., 2002), urban agriculture 
(Mailhot-Leduc, 2014) and neighbourhood solidarity markets (Audet et al., 2015). I was interested in 
their political and social dimension and the role they played in the configuration of the SAM network.  
I articulated some of the negotiations and compromises that took place, but also the differences 
between status and influence, highlighting the need to bridge the gap between poverty and social 
economy, and between civic and commercial urban agriculture. I looked at Goal 2 (food access) and 
Goal 4.A (urban agriculture) as the two arenas where civil society was most visible and consensus 
harder to reach. In the end, I narrowed my analysis to focus on two interventions funded through the 
SAM Action Plan (Goal 2) and to indicate its technical, territorial and political aspects. Multiple data 
points (social network models, informal interviews, observations, policy documentation) point to the 
opening of a “policy window”, to borrow from Kingdon (1995), around which the SAM could position 
itself as a hybrid public-collective coalition.  
6.2. Actor-networks and regional food planning 
 
This thesis uses the explanatory power of Actor-Network Theory (ANT) to shine light on the multiple 
institutional arrangements and informal relationships across organizations, sectors and levels behind 
city-region food planning. In my research, I applied ANT in my methodology and analysis.  
One evident way I applied ANT was to use the partnership assessment tool developed by public 
health researchers Bilodeau and colleagues (2008). The survey focused on the different stages of 
engagement of public sector and civil society organizations. The tool also raised questions related to 
power and integrating the roles of multiple actors. Specifically, the results indicate that the conditions 
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were partially met, therefore suggesting that the SAM 2014-2016 was partially successful. To 
understand this, let’s go back to the different stages of engagement. 
There were several levels and moments when the partnership successively mobilized actor-networks. 
After being disbanded in 2013, the Regional Roundtable on Healthy Lifestyles was reconvened to 
support two “bottom up” regional partnerships158, which included the SAM partner committee behind 
the 2025 vision. The SAM then mobilized a number of non-governmental intermediaries159 
(community food hubs, environmental organizations, professors, roundtables/coalitions, etc…), which 
in return activated their respective resources (matching funds, partnerships, knowledge). Parts of the 
mobilization resulted in visible outcomes. Other than the direct outcomes of installing fresh food stalls 
in areas with limited access, I document the passing of a motion at city council to assess the feasibility 
of a municipal Food Policy Council. I propose to see it, as suggested by MacRae and Winfield (2013), 
as a “policy window” (Kingdon, 1995) activated by policy entrepreneurs160, or “mediators” in ANT 
vocabulary, both inside and outside of the SAM partnership.  
ANT hypothesizes that innovations are the result of actors resolving controversies161. This coincides 
with the process of translation162, which results in new compromises between actor-networks seeking 
solutions to a problem. In the case of the SAM Action Plan 2014-2016, the compromise settled around 
a two-year funding arrangement with non-governmental organizations in the arena of health 
promotion163. Multi-level governance (2014-2016) led to an absence of civil society participants at the 
Regional Roundtable on Healthy Lifestyle, which was perceived as a funder-driven, public sector 
initiative.  Further, civil society actors driving change at the operational level were not necessarily 
welcomed in the SAM coordination committee, therefore containing some valuable energies. In 
retrospect, emphasis should have perhaps been put on expertise and the capacity to engage other 
partners.  
Another compromise, however, unpredictably came forth, which positively politicized food in the 
                                                
158 The Système alimentaire montréalais and Montréal physiquement actif  
159 The intermediaries are mobilized through individual pubic sector bodies and their respective programs (e.g., 
food access and community development, value-added food processing, public procurement, agricultural 
land use planning, urban agriculture) 
160 A policy window occurs when three streams are combined: a problem stream, a policy stream and a political 
stream.  
161 The theory argues that a controversy always precedes the emergence of an innovation, of a change, with the 
process of construction as the resolution of these controversies.” (Bilodeau et al., 2002, p.6). 
162 “The notion of translation refers to the continuous re-interpretation that actors operate in terms of their roles 
and the innovation they produce, starting from their respective interest and powers relationships, and leading 
to the construction of compromises.” (Bilodeau et al., 2002, p.6).  
163 The emphasis on healthy eating, over hunger, as a policy discourse is noteworthy, creating a gap with 
community groups raising their core issues (e.g., food insecurity, empowerment). 
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municipal arena. The City of Montreal came to institutionalize a new form of governance mechanism, a 
Food Policy Council. The public consultation, led by a municipal commission comprised of elected 
officials, likely raised the profile of food as a municipal issue. Furthermore, it was a platform for civil 
society, and neighbourhood food roundtables in particular, to engage directly on the issue, and raise the 
profile of “local communities” in “regional” issues. 
During the SAM 2014-2016 Action Plan, the compromises led to some visible changes in actors’ 
conception of their roles164 in the realm of territorial food systems. For example, Montreal’s 
independent association of public markets extended its economic mandate to a social one by integrating 
neighbourhood solidarity markets as part of its work. The council representing small scale, value added 
food processors (BICIM) developed new know-how in institutional procurement and greater 
competency in food systems issues. Finally, the regional office of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food 
and Fisheries also started seeking opportunities in commercial urban agriculture, reaching out to 
businesses and researchers as advisors. Some of the changes in roles include temporary contributions or 
partial withdrawals. The City of Montreal's changing role is in the making, as policy adjustments and 
gaps remain.   
6.3. Evaluation as actor-network   
 
The assessment of the SAM 2014-2016 Action Plan would not be complete without a review of the 
evaluation process itself. I generated a host of non-human actor-networks - graphs, charts and reports - 
and presented the evaluation to the SAM stakeholders. In this section, I draw here directly from my 
experience as a participant observer and evaluator, to point to some of the noteworthy crossroads and 
limits to the study.  
After two years of active involvement in a local food justice network that I had helped create, Justice 
alimentaire Montréal, I was enrolled into the SAM 2014-2016 Action Plan as a graduate student 
interested in assessing progress in city-region food governance. My role moved from being an activist 
and organizer to being a student and researcher, and finally to my being hired as an external, part-time 
evaluator and consultant. I would also accept contracts from non-governmental organizations. In other 
words, my role was not limited to observation alone. The SAM partnership empowered me to take 
actions in the periphery of the SAM Action Plan. For example, at one point I convened a regional 
meeting on social finance, as a result of which one community group was able to connect with the 
                                                
164 My own shift in positionality as a student and evaluator, as well as an advocate on provincial and national 
food policy issues, is one such example.  
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necessary investments for its semi-permanent market infrastructure outside of its local subway station. 
In general, however, I would negotiate multiple roles at once, which may have led to possible 
confusion in the context of the SAM 2014-2016 Action Plan.  
The development of the evaluation methodology over the course of six to eight months revealed the 
difficult task of assessing the SAM 2014-2016 Action Plan. There were many actors involved with the 
different goals, and multiple projects being implemented each with their respective audiences. There 
were additional constraints: the short time span of the action plan; the limited capacity for evaluation; 
and the diversity of projects (e.g., skill building, knowledge generation, promotion). The coordinators 
of the SAM signaled an interest in social network analysis and hoped to capture its effectiveness as a 
coordinating body through modeling software. After finding a partnership assessment tool (Bilodeau et 
al., 2008) with a reliable framework that did not shy away from issues related to funding, power and 
participation, I turned to Actor-Network Theory. ANT provided a theoretical bridge between two 
methods: social network models and the six conditions for an effective partnership. 
There were some obvious limits. In terms of the Social Network Analysis, coordinators put greater 
emphasis on demonstrating the breadth of the network, than the quality of the relationships. I had to 
choose whether to generate data on the relationships evolving through time, and whether the SAM 
partnership made any difference, or to capture the depth of the relationships themselves. In the context 
of evaluation, I chose the former. The result, however, was not entirely satisfactory. As one can see in 
the annex, network graphs form one dense, connected component. Indeed, the survey featured the name 
of all the organizations in the SAM partner committee and tended to be self-containing. In reality, I 
found the network graph extracted from the evaluation report (Annex 11) to be more informative and 
easier to design. The data was generated based on project leaders’ (n=13) indication of who were their 
partners, and who were the three they considered “the most involved.” 
The partnership assessment tool also presented some challenges. The survey was sent in the spring of 
2016, when there was little indication that the SAM partnership would transition into a municipally 
mandated Food Policy Council. Moreover, the SAM partnership was multi-layered, and it might have 
been unclear which level in the partnership participants had in mind when responding to the survey 
(e.g., within their specific goal or the SAM partnership as a whole). Furthermore, while the tools 
worked well to explain the tensions between the public sector and civil society, I had to generate 
complementary observations on how power was navigated by non-governmental actors. Finally, the 
different stages of the SAM partnership165 did not necessarily coincide with the “moments” of the 
                                                
165 (1) The development of the 2025 vision, (2) the opening of a funding opportunity, (3) the re-convening of the 
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assessment tool166, which rendered the narrative aspect of the analysis a challenge.  
Actor-Network Theory not only informed the tools I was using, but the research process itself. My 
initial interest in the SAM 2014-2016 Action Plan was to participate in the working groups of food 
supply and distribution167. This focus changed along the way because I noticed that the working group 
working on institutional procurement was better resourced than the one on community provisioning. 
While both groups conducted valuable assessments and built relationships, I found that they were not 
necessarily the centerpieces of the mobilization taking place between 2014 and 2016. Instead, my thesis 
focused on two flag ship projects that embodied a technical (i.e., installing food stalls) and territorial 
(i.e., piloted in one neighbourhood and replicated elsewhere) dimension. This shift is a clear illustration 
of my choice to "follow the connections, 'follow the actors themselves'” (Latour, 2005, p. 179). 
From my experience, nowhere was institutionalization more challenging than in the process of 
conducting evaluation. Unfortunately, neither the coordination committee nor project leaders were 
officially asked to provide their input in the initial phase of the project. The lack of consultation of 
these key stakeholders limited the ability to develop appropriate evaluation tools and metrics, but most 
importantly to understand the goals and audiences of the evaluation. Instead, there was greater 
emphasis on externalizing evaluation to an ad hoc committee comprised of researchers and 
practitioners in evaluations from funders, and eventually to contract a masters student.  
Despite having regular access to a number of stakeholders and spaces (working groups, events, etc.) 
interviews were only scheduled with individual members of the coordination committee, instead of 
projects leaders or organizations that were less engaged in the process or that withdrew. Moreover, the 
coordination committee remained relatively closed to the researcher. The evaluation was not prioritized 
as a collective endeavour of learning and planning and, as a result, not appropriately communicated to 
SAM partners. Instead, it proved to be difficult to change the parameters of the evaluation once it had 
been accepted. While the evaluation noted shortfalls in the governance and engagement process, it was 
not given sufficient time to address these issues collectively with stakeholders in planning sessions. 
The ambiguity of institutionalization can illustrate the margin of manoeuvre available to partners. As 
I’ve shown, intermediary spaces (taskforces, committees, roundtables, networks, coalitions, etc.) are a 
key avenue for a regional coordinating body to address specific issues. In the context of the SAM 
                                                                                                                                                                 
RRHL, (3) the engagement of public sector bodies, (4) the engagement of non-governmental intermediaries, 
(5) the activation of their networks, (6) the transformation of the SAM network, (7) the opening of a policy 
window, (8) the positioning of the SAM, (9) the transition to a Food policy council. 
166 (1) Problem-framing, (2) interest-raising, (3) enrolling, (4) mobilizing 
167 There were two working groups, one focused on provisioning practices in the community sector of quality, 
fresh food (Goal 2), and the other on food procurement in municipal agencies, schools and hospitals (Goal 
3).  
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Action Plan, previously informal relationships were encouraged to formally incorporate. Three new 
venues were formalized to facilitate stakeholder collaboration: an inter-university network, a 
community food distribution network and a waste reduction coalition.  One of the initial goals of 
Justice alimentaire Montréal (JAM) was to facilitate university-community collaborations. However, 
in the context of the SAM Action Plan, greater emphasis was put on the academic component. It is 
revealing that, out of these three spaces, only the waste reduction coalition managed to raise enough 
interest, capacity and momentum to continue its work as a full-fledge taskforce in the upcoming Food 
Policy Council. 
6.4. Multi-scalar strategies to institutionalize territorial food systems  
 
This thesis underscored some of the multi-level dynamics at play, whereby cities are embedded in 
larger systems of political and economic governance. Municipalities, like other public sector and 
public-civil society organizations engaged in territorial food systems, are affected by the provincial and 
national policy agenda. In this context, the creation of a municipal-sponsored FPC may provide new 
opportunities to strengthen the emergence of TFS, from a local to national scale.  
In the urban setting, a first layer of governance that needs to be addressed is at the local 
(neighbourhood) and supra-local (borough, adjacent neighbourhoods) level. In two of the flagship 
projects, a model experimented in one neighbourhood leveraged regional resources to build capacity 
and multiply into other areas of the city. The Montreal neighbourhood roundtables provided a fertile 
ground for food networks to coordinate their activities and foster civic engagement. Further, the 
neighbourhood is the immediate arena for citizen engagement. The vision of ‘Good food 
neighbourhoods’, or Quartier nourricier, “is a plural response to the numerous economic, social and 
environmental problems in the Centre-Sud of Montreal.”168 The project aims to diversify food 
production capacity in public spaces and create synergies with food preparation and commercialization 
infrastructure. It also includes educational and community outreach through workshops and forums. In 
other areas, such as Lachine and Montreal North, community stakeholders have also come together 
around a common vision for their neighbourhood.  
I also documented synergies between neighbourhood-level food systems planning and borough food 
strategies, highlighting the potential for combining policy instruments. The Ville-Marie food strategy 
provides an overview of actions under its jurisdiction. In the context of the Food Policy Council 
                                                
168 Presentation by Carrefour alimentaire Centre Sud  Retrieved from: http://www.cdccentresud.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/11/Présentation-Carrefour-alimentaire-projet-Q21.pdf  
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consultation169, the city proposed that one elected councillor in each borough be mandated to bring 
food into policy-making decisions. Based on social learning in Ville Marie, it is important to emphasize 
the connection between previously isolated departments and policies (zoning, by-laws, funding, real 
estate, events) and develop leadership and trust with neighbourhood roundtables, community groups 
and citizens. An annual overview of neighbourhood food policies, actions and challenges could serve 
as a reporting mechanism.  
The Food Policy Council became instituted at the agglomeration, island-wide level, but its 
accomplishments are likely to depend on the activation of the central City’s creativity and boldness, 
both administratively and politically. The city will have to build buy-in across services to identify 
which departments will be taking leadership on each portfolio. For example, the Office of sustainable 
development is already covering community-based urban agriculture and composting, while the 
Department of Economic Development is positioning itself to support commercial urban agriculture 
and social enterprises. This would also help to identify gaps, around municipal food procurement for 
example, and models to work from170. The city should also have to think beyond its departmental 
scope. There is groundwork to integrate programming and funding (greening, urban revitalization, anti-
poverty) at the central level to reduce redundancy for boroughs, making it potentially easier to 
strengthen ‘good food neighbourhoods’. Communications, research and staff training are also cross 
departmental in scope, and could be mobilized to promote food to the public and across municipal 
offices. 
The moral leadership of the city is also required to effect change at higher levels of governance. At 
the metropolitan level, the launch of the agricultural land use development plan can act as an 
observatory for the promotion of models across municipalities and be leveraged to build awareness of 
strategic opportunities. To better align with health and environmental outcomes, the current territorial 
approach focused on farmland could be combined with a sectorial intervention. Specific value chains 
should be prioritized based on health and environmental outcomes, such as the fruits and vegetables, 
whole grains and legumes sectors, as well as organic food and farming (Desjardins 2014). In the spirit 
of the metropolitan ‘agri-food’ cluster, priority investments should be assessed and promoted by 
economic development agencies.  
                                                
169 “It asks that each borrow and linked municipality designate a city councillor responsible for the food 
portfolio. The designated individuals would have occasionally assist in the FPC [Food policy council] For 
the City of Montreal, the mandated councillors can be the same as those responsible of the social 
development portfolio in the boroughs.” 
170 In terms of public food procurement for example, the SAM has developed a model to increase healthy food 
options in municipal-sponsored events.  
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Municipal political champions can also address provincial and national issues and promote the 
adoption of food policies and a stronger social safety net. As we’ve seen, the implementation of top 
down, sectorial government policies and programs constrains cross-sectorial coordination. An 
institutional void persists at the provincial and national levels, where policy is mainly oriented around 
productivity and exports. Further, the roll-back in public services under neoliberal reform threatens 
access to health, education and other services that are social determinants of health. The upcoming 
agri-food policies in Quebec and Canada in 2018, currently under consultation, may provide an 
opportunity for city-regions to have their word and advocate for a greater legal recognition of food as a 
human right.  
In the context of Quebec, it is important that the experience of Montreal does not remain contained 
at the urban level. In rural areas, the CREO and regional public health authorities, which have now 
largely disappeared, previously coordinated, funded and participated in roundtables focusing on 
agricultural land use planning, the agri-food sector, food security and health promotion. As the case of 
Montreal shows, a food policy council can help combine these goals, experiences and resources to 
strengthen TFS regionally. 
6.5. The commoning of food governance  
 
In this thesis, I introduced the reader to the changing political economy of Quebec and the formation of 
some of the key social and public sector organizations in Montreal. I then analyzed the regional food 
planning community through the lens of Actor-Network Theory. I explain that actors in the field of 
regional food planning mobilized in different ways around the SAM 2014-2016 Action Plan, which 
eventually transformed into a Food Policy Council. I raise critical issues and gaps to conclude that the 
SAM remains a fragile partnership that is in transition. Finally, I name a few possible ways to 
coordinate food policy at different levels of government.  
One of the goals of this thesis was to share three decades of experience in food planning in Montreal, 
and the multiple attempts to build a food policy council. The experience of Montreal is interesting 
because it operates in a different linguistic and cultural context than the majority of North America. 
The political economy of Quebec also contrasts in many ways with that of other provinces or states 
(e.g., the social and solidarity economy), and I indicated ways in which the neoliberal turn of Quebec, 
dominant since the 2000s, created stress on regional food planners and communities.   
City-region food planning will continue to be an arena where top down policy and bottom up 
innovations meet and negotiate compromises. Although municipalities are likely to gain new 
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competencies and weight in global governance, the excessive commodification of food (and society in 
general) will likely make them more vulnerable to economic and climatic shocks. 
A deeper socio-cultural shift will therefore need to operate on the way people value food. Canadian 
philosopher John McMurtry (1998, p. 24`) adopts the term “civil commons” to refer to “society’s 
organized and community-funded capacity of universally accessible resources to provide for the life 
preservation and growth of society’s members and their environmental life-host”. Ugo Mattei 
articulates a related idea, “They [the commons] express a qualitative relation. It would be reductive to 
say that we have a common good. We should rather see to what extent we are the commons, in as 
much as we are part of an environment, an urban or rural ecosystem.” (Bollier, p. 164).  
The commons are core to people’s valuation of food as a social construct: food should not only be 
considered as a commodity, but a basic need, a human right, a renewable resource, a commons (Vivero 
Pol, 2013). In this spirit, an underlying goal of this research was to learn from my practice of 





















Annex 2: Conditions for an effective partnership 
 
Condition 1  
• Item 1 : Dans le partenariat, les acteurs concernés par les enjeux sont mobilisés  
• Item 2 : Dans le partenariat, les populations ou organismes qui desservent participent 
activement à notre partenariat 
 
Condition 2  
• Item 1 : Les partenaires sont activement impliqués dans l’analyse des enjeux et non seulement 
dans l’exécution.  
 
Condition 3  




• Item 1: Dans le partenariat, les partenaires ont la capacité de prendre des décisions et d’engager 
des ressources nécessaires 
• Item 2 : Dans le partenariat, les organismes partenaires maintiennent leur collaboration pour la 
durée des projets 
• Item 3: Dans le partenariat, les ressources (humaines, financières, de compétences) sont 
mobilisées pour réaliser les actions 




• Item 1: Dans le partenariat, tous les partenaires sont traités de façon égales dans la discussion et 
dans la prise de decision 
• Item 2: Dans le partenariat, la contribution de chacun à la réalisation des projets est reconnue 
• Item 3: Dans le partenariat, les avantages découlant du partenariat sont répartis équitablement 
parmi les partenaires 
• Item 4: Dans le partenariat, les critères et mécanismes de reddition de comptes (à qui, quand et 
sur quoi rendre compte) entre les partenaires et les bailleurs de fonds sont négociés 
 
Condition 6:  
• Item 1: Dans le partenariat, la formulation d'une diversité de points de vue élargit les 
possibilités d’action 
• Item 2: Dans le partenariat, les partenaires sont aptes à identifier leurs divergences et d'en 
discuter 
• Item 3: Dans le partenariat, les partenaires parviennent à résoudre leurs divergences 
• Item 4: Dans le partenariat, les partenaires parviennent à dépasser leurs intérêts propres pour 
converger vers l’intérêt des populations qu’ils ont à desservir 
• Item 5: Dans le partenariat, les partenaires parviennent à se mobiliser autour de solutions 
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intégrées qui dépassent la seule coordination des actions de chacun 
• Item 6: les partenaires modifient leur rôle (ce qu’ils faisaient déjà) pour réaliser des solutions 
nouvelles 
 

















































































































































































Annex 8: Members of SAM-CC 2014-2016 
 
• Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Centre-Sud-de-l’Île-de-Montréal  
(previously Direction de la santé publique)  
• Ville de Montréal 
o Service de la diversité sociale et des sports, Division de lutte à la pauvreté et à 
l’itinérance  









































• Direction régionale du Ministère de l’Agriculture, des Pêcheries et de l’Alimentation du Québec 
(economic) 
• Concertation Montréal (previously Conférence régionale des élus)  
• Québec en Forme  
• Regroupement des éco-quartier (environmental) (replaced Équiterre Jan. 2015) 
• Table sur la Faim et le Développement Social du Montréal Métropolitain (social) 
 
Annex 9: Members of SAM-CP 2014-2016  
 
Social  
• Regroupement des Magasins-Partage de l’île de Montréal 
• Centraide  
• Table sur la Faim et le Développement Social du Montréal Métropolitain  
• Coalition montréalaise des tables de quartiers  
• Collectif de la Table des écoliers 
• Ville de Montréal, Service de la diversité sociale et des sports, Division de lutte à la pauvreté et 
à l’itinérance  
• Université de Montéal, Département de Nutrition  
• Commission scolaire de Montréal 
• Moisson Montréal  
• Centre intégré universitaire de santé et de services sociaux du Centre-Sud-de-l’Île-de-Montréal  
(previously Direction régionale de la santé publique)  
• Québec en Forme  
• Conférence régionale des élus  
 
Environmental :  
• Équiterre 
• Groupe de travail en agriculture urbaine  
• Conseil régional de l’environnement  
• Regroupement des éco-quartier 
• Centre d’écologie urbaine  
• Marché Frontenac (Carrefour alimentaire Centre-Sud) 
• Ville de Montréal 
o Direction du développement durable  
o Bureau du plan d’aménagement  
• Communauté métropolitaine de Montréal  
• Union des producteurs agricoles  
• Recyc-Québec  
 
Economic:  
• Direction régionale de la transformation alimentaire et des marchés  
• Conseil des industries bioalimentaire de l’île de Montréal 
• Inter-Corporation de développement économique communautaire (changed into PME Montreal) 
• Comité sur l’économie sociale de l’île de Montréal  
• Institut Tourisme et Hotellerie du Québec 
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• Conseil canadien du commerce de detail 
• Corporation de gestion des marches publics de Montréal 
• Tourisme Montréal 




Annex 10: Social network indicators 
 
Indicateurs Avant 2014 2014-2016 2017-2020 
Nombre de liens  334 428 (245 VIA, 183 SANS) 389 
Average Degree  7.525 8.4 9.125 
Average Weighted Degree 8.35 10.7 9.725 
Network Diameter 3 3 4 
Graph Density  0.193 0.215 0.234 
Modularity  0.173 0.141 0.123 
Connected Components 1 1 1 
Average Clustering 
Coefficient 0.388 0.422 0.414 
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